Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK3196
2006-05-26 06:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THE POLICE SEARCH FOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PHUM TH HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003196 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS
PACOM FOR FPS (HUS0)
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM TH HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THE POLICE SEARCH FOR
SYNCHRONICITY

REF: A. A) BANGKOK 03179 (SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: SENIOR THAI
OFFICIALS BRIEF EAP DAS JOHN)

B. B) BANGKOK 03192 (SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: MAY 17-18
VISIT TO FAR SOUTH)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH L. BOYCE. REASON 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003196

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS
PACOM FOR FPS (HUS0)
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM TH HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THE POLICE SEARCH FOR
SYNCHRONICITY

REF: A. A) BANGKOK 03179 (SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: SENIOR THAI
OFFICIALS BRIEF EAP DAS JOHN)

B. B) BANGKOK 03192 (SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: MAY 17-18
VISIT TO FAR SOUTH)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH L. BOYCE. REASON 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. While the Royal Thai Army has moved to
reassert its traditional role of managing security in the
restive South, the Royal Thai "provincial" police remain the
foundation for investigating, arresting and prosecuting
militants. Over the past two years, senior Thai officials
have moved from denial to admitting that there is a serious
problem in the South. As reported in refs, they are
beginning to admit that RTG efforts in the South are
hamstrung by a lack of coordination, poor skills in some
units, and a lack of efforts to win the support of the local
public. Police officials in the South, however, believe that
they are making headway through better intelligence derived
from jailed suspects, improved cooperation with the Army and
nascent efforts to win the population's "hearts and minds."
This cable takes a more in-depth look at the role of the
local police, their cooperation with other parts of the RTG,
some recent successes, and their internal shortcomings. End
Summary.

THE FORCES ON THE GROUND
--------------


2. (C) The RTG has not been shy about committing resources to
the South. Nearly 45,000 soldiers and police are operating
in a region approximately the size of Connecticut. Military
forces totaling approximately 35,000 troops fall under the
command of the 4th Army, headquartered in Nakhon Si
Thammarat. The 5th Infantry Division (five regiments) and
the 15th Development Division (three regiments) totaling
approximately 20,000 troops are the main units of the 4th
Army. About 15,000 other military forces are assigned to the
South, including three Marine Battalions, Special Forces
units detailed from the Special Warfare Command at Lopburi
(Task Force 90),and additional forces redirected from the

Third Army Area in the Northwest. Each province has at least
one regiment of Rangers--irregular paramilitary forces
recruited from the local population.


3. (C) The Royal Thai Police (RTP) provide the backbone of
law and order in the South. Often referred to as the
"provincial police," these are the local cops charged with
administering speeding tickets, investigating petty crimes
and the other quotidian acts of day-to-day law enforcement.
The provincial police are also the cornerstone of
anti-separatist efforts. They are often the first on the
scene and the only law enforcement agency with a full time
presence in all three provinces


4. (C) The three southernmost provinces are grouped into
police Region IX. There are about 2,300 provincial police in
Yala, 2,500 in Pattani, and 3,500 in Narathiwat. These
police are augmented by the Royal Thai Border Patrol police,
almost 1,500 provincial police from other provinces, and
officers from the Bangkok-based RTP Special Branch (SB) and
RTP Criminal Suppression Division (CSD). Additionally, the
Ministry of Justice's relatively new Department of Special
Investigations (DSI),also based in the capital, has been
active in several specific cases in the South, but does not
have a full-time presence in the area.


5. (C) The Region IX forward operating command in Yala is
charged with overseeing all police activities in the three
southern provinces and draws upon other police units for
expertise. The head of the command's special raid unit is a
Colonel from CSD, and the chief of the RTP's forensic lab in
Bangkok routinely travels to Yala to assist in
investigations. Police stations are often collocated with
the local administrative headquarters at the provincial,
district and sub-district levels. Forensic labs in each of
the three provinces support field operations, though
complicated work such as DNA analysis must be done at the
central police forensic lab in Bangkok.

COORDINATION IS THE COMPLICATION
--------------


6. (C) Military and police forces are coordinated under the
Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPC),
which is led by the Supreme Commander of the 4th Army Region,
GEN Ongkorn Tongprasom. The SBPPC was established in April
2004 and charged with coordinating all security, civil
affairs and administrative work in the three restive
provinces. This was not the first such coordinating body in
the South; the RTG established the Southern Border
Administrative Center (SBAC) in the 1980's to counter the
separatist movement. The SBAC served as the preeminent
governing body in the South, with the ability to remove
corrupt officials and determine local budgets. It was not,
however, a strictly security-focused organization. The SBAC
worked hand in hand with Civil Military Police Task Force 43
(CMP 43),which served as the focal point for security
forces. SBAC and CMP 43 were dissolved by Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra in May 2002.


7. (C) Following the upsurge in violence in 2004, the SBPPC
was established in the hope of capturing the magic of SBAC
and CMP 43. According to Ministry of Interior (MOI)
officials in Yala who served under both systems, however, the
SBPPC is almost entirely focused on security affairs--like
the old CMP 43--to the detriment of civil, political and
administrative issues. Moreover, the SBPPC does not have the
clear lines of authority, coordination and bureaucratic
support to optimize operations in the South. (Note. As
reported in ref A, Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai appears to
understand this problem and plans to establish a joint center
for administering a campaign to win "hearts and minds." End
Note.)


8. (C) The delineation of police and military
responsibilities is not so clear on the ground. According to
Region IX police officials, the Army has the lead in rural
portions of the South, with urban and major roads under
police control. This can lead to confusion when units
respond to a bombing or attack. Although the Army has no role
in investigating such attacks, Army units are sometimes the
first on the scene. According to Maj. Gen. Amporn
Charuchinda, the deputy police commissioner for Region IX,
the police have given Army units some training in evidence
collection, but military units will often fail to share
evidence with the police, instead presenting it to senior
Army officials.

SOME BETTER COORDINATION WITH ARMY...
--------------


9. (C) Region IX police point to at least one area of
increased cooperation with the Army, however. RTG officials
have been frustrated by several incidents when, in an attempt
by police to arrest suspects, local villagers either block
security forces from entering the village, or take hostages
to force the release of those suspects. According to GEN
Amporn, the police are increasingly working with the Army and
MOI officials to try and prevent these incidents. Amporn said
that when making an arrest in one of these "red zone"
villages, a company size army unit will cordon off the
surrounding area before a twelve-man tactical police team
goes into the village to make the arrest. MOI officials are
often used to coordinate raids with local village officials,
and to act as translators, in areas where villagers refuse or
are unable to speak Thai with security officials. (Note:
This coordination seems to have broken down during the
botched May 19 arrest in Narathiwat when local villagers
reacted to an arrest by holding two government teachers
hostage before severely beating them. End Note). Police
units are also requesting Army blocking movements--in the
form of concentric rings centered on crime scenes, one, three
and seven kilometers in diameter--in the hopes of catching
perpetrators on the run.

...AND PROSECUTORS
--------------


10. (C) Police officials also have been frustrated by what
they see as poor cooperation from local prosecutors. Not a
single militant has been successfully prosecuted yet.
According to Amporn, the problem lies in the short duration
of prosecutor assigments--prosecutors rotate into new
positions every year. That said, Amporn is hopeful that the
recent visit of the chief prosecutor for the South to Yala
will result in better cooperation.

POLICE CONFIDENT THEY ARE IMPROVING
--------------

11. (C) GEN Amporn and his subordinates confidently assess
that they are getting a handle on the separatist movement;
"we know who they are now." Amporn cited the lack of attacks
on police sites in 2006 as evidence that the insurgents are
not as bold anymore. The authorities granted under the
emergency decree (renewed every three months) allow the
police to detain suspects much more easily. Amporn said that
the police now have the names of 500 suspected militants and
have already arrested 200 suspects. These suspects are now
providing valuable information during interviews and through
their "pocket litter" and other physical evidence. These
leads have given the police a better sense of the militants'
tactics and organization. According to Amporn, the militants
prefer to set up a safe house within one kilometer of an
attack site, and often stash an extra set of clothing along
their escape route to change into while fleeing the scene.
The police have found military uniforms cached in this
manner. Some suspects even dress as women so as to evade
capture.


12. (C) Some of Amporn's newfound information on the
insurgency is a bit questionable. In Amporn's view, the
militants are growing "frustrated" and "bored" because their
operations over the past two years have failed to produce
results. Amporn also believes that some militants cloak
their activities under the cover of pick-up soccer games--the
insurgents favor a six-man operational unit, and local soccer
teams have seven players each. According to Amporn, the
leaders of the insurgency are Thai-Malay dual nationals who
use different names on each side of the border so as to elude
authorities.


13. (C) Amporn was blunt in stating that his first priority
is to improve basic police capabilities. His forward command
in Yala is also one of the three police training centers in
the South and he has pushed to re-train almost 10,000 active
police in basic skills already. Amporn and his subordinates
expressed interest in possible USG training assistance but
cautioned that any training must be conducted outside of the
South.

BUT THEY HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO
--------------


14. (C) Local police in Thailand have spent decades
perfecting a public persona that emphasizes their corruption
and cruelty. For the Region IX police, this has not helped
in their efforts to develop informants and win the support of
the public. GEN Amporn seems to understand this, to a
degree. In a December 2005 meeting with PolOffs, Amporn
emphasized the need to interrogate suspected separatists and
capture the leaders of the movement who were
hiding--according to him--in Malaysia. In a meeting this
month (ref B) Amporn instead emphasized the struggle to build
local support for the police and Army. "Winning people is
key to winning the situation." According to Amporn, his
units are engaging in civil affairs projects, such as
painting mosques, and Region IX officials have moved
"trouble" officers to desk jobs. Police officials are also
trying to highlight the role and service of Muslim officers.
Some ideas don't appear to be as effective in building public
support, however. Amporn is excited about the construction
of a new "visitors' center" for the local jail, so that
family members and friends of the growing number of arrested
suspects may visit their loved ones in increased comfort.








BOYCE