Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK2826
2006-05-11 09:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF EAP A/S HILL

Tags:  OVIP MARR MASS PREL PGOV TH 
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PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHBK #2826/01 1310945
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110945Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8557
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 002826 

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DEPARTMENT FOR A/S CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016
TAGS: OVIP MARR MASS PREL PGOV TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF EAP A/S HILL


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 002826

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SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016
TAGS: OVIP MARR MASS PREL PGOV TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF EAP A/S HILL


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)


1. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

Chris, we're looking forward to your upcoming visit to
participate in the ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue. I am also planning
to host a dinner in your honor with former Prime Minister
Anand Panyarachun. Anand is thoughtful and I think you'll
enjoy hearing his views on southern Thailand, the ongoing
political situation, and regional issues. We're also
arranging for you to meet with MFA Permanent Secretary Krit
Garnjana-Goonchorn immediately after you arrive from
Singapore and are working with the U.S.-ASEAN Business
Council on a breakfast meeting. You may wish to thank Krit
for the RTG's help in facilitating the movement of the six
North Koreans to the U.S. There's a decent chance the Thai
will help again in the future, so long as their involvement
is kept out of the press. In addition to hearing your views
about regional economic issues, the USABC will want to hear
about prospects for FTA talks resuming after a new government
is in place. The political situation here remains fluid --
any specifics we provide in this cable could very well be
overcome by events by the time you are here. Nonetheless,
demonstrations have stopped for now and we have moved out of
crisis mode. We are working closely with Washington agencies
and PACOM on a series of initiatives designed to improve our
ability to promote counter-terrorism cooperation and regional
maritime security. Thai policy towards Burma remains a
friction point, although the Thai are coming around to the
view that ASEAN's "constructive engagement" policy is not
working. The problem is what to do next. It's unrealistic
to expect much progress as long as the government is in
caretaker status. END SUMMARY.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION


2. (C) The Thai political system continues to work through
its biggest domestic political crisis since 1992. We can

expect relative calm to prevail through the end of June as
the Thai turn their attention to the 60th anniversary of the
King's ascension to the throne. Once the pageantry is over,
however, the uncertainty begins. One encouraging sign: the
three main opposition parties give early indication they will
contest the next round of parliamentary elections. With
that, much speculation now is turning to Thaksin's plans.
Though he vowed on April 4 not to return as Prime Minister in
the next Parliament, his supporters say the subsequent
annulment of the April 2 polls has changed the situation.
They reason that Thaksin is now freed from his earlier pledge
not to run and that there is no reason why he could not head
the government if TRT wins a majority. The prospect of
Thaksin's return risks reigniting street protests and
attendant uncertainty.

THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH


3. (C) Although the domestic political crisis has dominated
the news headlines (both national and international) in
recent months, the violence in the South has continued
unabated. It remains the RTG's most pressing security issue
and a potential threat to our interests. Approximately 1,200
persons have been killed either by militants or by security
forces since January 2004 when the decades-old insurgency
flared up again. There is no current evidence of direct
transnational terrorist involvement in the South, but we know
some linkages with suspected regional terrorists (JI) exist.
Southern separatists direct their anger at the government in
Bangkok, not at the U.S., and continue to define their
struggle mainly along ethnic rather than religious lines.
However, rumors that the U.S. is somehow fomenting the
violence as part of our war on terror continue to be widely
believed in the South. To avoid feeding these rumors, we
meticulously avoid military training exercises and the like
in the South, and do not label our security assistance as
related to the conflict.


4. (C) The RTG response to violence in the far South remains
undercut by poor security force capabilities, rampant
stove-piping, and the lack of an effective
prosecutorial-police partnership. In the last two years we
have shifted a significant portion of our wide ranging
training and assistance programs to help improve Thailand's
capabilities. We have determined that our excellent
military-to-military assistance program is generally on the
right track. The Thai police, however, remain the weak link
in the southern security apparatus. We have proposed to
Washington a bold, new inter-agency plan to refocus our
assistance, combat Thai shortcomings, and help the government

BANGKOK 00002826 002 OF 004


reverse some of its losses in the South. The key elements of
this plan are:

--Setting up a central, single coordinator at the Embassy to
ensure that our wide range of law enforcement training
fosters institutional change in the Thai security forces and
improves their capabilities in the South. We are in
discussion with DOJ about establishing an ICITAP presence in
Bangkok to meet this need.

--Identifying an appropriately experienced individual to
foster a true police-prosecutor partnership, particularly in
the South, that leads to arrests and convictions. We aim to
adjust the work requirements of our current DOJ Resident
Legal Advisor to reflect this new priority.

--Setting up new comprehensive training that provides Thai
security officials in the South with both basic and advanced
investigative and counterterrorism skills, while encouraging
them to work with their counterparts in other agencies.

MILITARY COOPERATION


5. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over
50 years of close cooperation. Thailand is the fourth
largest participant in the U.S. International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program. Thailand's
willingness to allow the United States to use Utapao Naval
Air Station as the hub for our regional tsunami assistance
program was key to making Operation Unified Assistance a
success and was only possible because of decades of combined
experience. PACOM recently named Utapao as the most
important Cooperative Security Location (CSL) we have in all
of the Asia-Pacific region -- it remains vital to our efforts
to supply operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.


6. (C) A key U.S. objective in the region is to improve
Maritime Security. As part of Section 1206 of the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2006, we recently proposed to
the Royal Thai Supreme Command and the Royal Thai Navy the
Andaman Sea Maritime Security Initiative. This project is a
layered approached to assist the Thai military to secure
territorial waters while also providing coverage of the
northern shipping lanes feeding into the Strait of Malacca.
It would combine a High Frequency Radar in the vicinity of
Phuket capable of reaching Sumatra -- 200 miles away -- with
a constellation of overlapping x-band radars to provide radar
coverage of the waters off the west coast of Thailand. The
USD 20 million initiative would also improve the Royal Thai
Navy's interdiction capabilities. If we can create similar
arrays in neighboring countries, this system could be part of
a regional network -- perhaps providing a clear view of all
ocean traffic in SE Asia.


7. (C) While you are here, our largest annual exercise, Cobra
Gold, will be underway. Perhaps due to their lack of a
colonial heritage, Thai leaders are far more willing to host
multilateral exercises than are others countries in Asia.
Unlike Japan, which only hosts annual bilateral exercises due
to legal prohibitions over collective security, or Australia,
which avoids multilateral exercises so as not to "dumb down"
its own training opportunities, the Royal Thai Government
supports multilateral exercises as a way to show regional
leadership. So long as our concepts are properly sold to
Thai military and political leaders, we should be able to
continue to modify exercises to meet our regional security
objectives -- including an ability to establish a
near-continuous presence in the region. Cobra Gold 2006 will
include almost 7,000 U.S. troops working together with Thai
counterparts in field training exercises ranging from
Military Operations in Urban Terrain and Air Assault
Operations to Naval Special Forces protecting offshore
natural gas platforms. The Command Post Exercise at Cobra
Gold will include participation by U.S., Thai, Japanese,
Singaporean and Indonesian forces and will focus on peace
keeping operations. Cobra Gold in the coming years will be a
centerpiece of our Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI),
which is designed to train 15,000 regional peacekeepers by

2010.

THE ROLE OF CHINA


8. (C) While emphasizing the vital role of the U.S. in the
region and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S. engagement,
Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger relations with
China. Bangkok views both India and China as sources of
unlimited consumer demand and hope to conclude FTAs with both
nations. China's growing influence in Thailand is evident in

BANGKOK 00002826 003 OF 004


business, the arts, the media and the military. Chinese TV
-- in Mandarin and English -- is widely available. Every
visit by a senior American official is countered by multiple
visits by Chinese. The Thai military has a growing number of
Chinese weapons systems in its arsenal. The PLA Navy has
close links with the RTN and recently conducted a major ship
visit to Phuket. The Chinese Ambassador here speaks good
Thai and previously served as their DG for East Asian
Affairs. Their Defense Attach is sophisticated, experienced
and polished.

GENERAL ECONOMIC PICTURE


9. (SBU) U.S.-Thai economic relations remain strong, with
the U.S. being the largest market for Thai goods. U.S.
direct investment in Thailand is second only to Japan's. The
Thai economy has largely recovered from the 1997 economic
crisis, although growth rates remain at levels much lower
than the economy's pre-1997 performance. Buoyed mostly by
exports, GDP looks set to grow at around 4-4.5 percent this
year. Major economic challenges include adapting to the
onslaught of China; infrastructure development; and
addressing persistent widespread poverty in the countryside.
The bilateral FTA is in limbo due to the current political
crisis. The FTA had encountered growing opposition within
Thailand before the onset of the current crisis, and its
unpopularity will hinder any future Thai government efforts
to re-start talks. Given hesitancy in Thailand and a short
time frame in the U.S. before Trade Promotion Authority
expires, Thai officials have hinted at negotiating a less
ambitious trade deal that would address immediate problems
such as possible changes in U.S. GSP policy, and trade
diversion caused by Thailand's other FTAs.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THAILAND


10. (C) Thailand lost in its bid to gain a seat in the new
UN Human Rights Council despite receiving 120 votes and U.S.
support. G/TIP has decided against placing Thailand on the
Tier 2 Watch List this year. The decision is largely due to
significant progress from the RTG to return seven TIP victims
from Malaysia. The seven are hill tribe members and are not
technically considered Thai citizens by the RTG. They have
been in Malaysian immigration detention for over a year after
being rescued from a brothel. One bright spot in the ongoing
political drama is in the area of press freedom. The print
media has been particularly bold in its criticism of the
government, and even the government controlled broadcast
media has taken tentative steps away from self-censorship.

REFUGEES


11. (C) The RTG gave excellent cooperation on the six North
Korean refugees. This was a positive in the bilateral
relationship. At this point, we do not have a good sense of
how many other North Koreans will ask for U.S. resettlement.
The RTG position remains that they will work with us on a
discreet, case-by-case basis. On Burmese refugee
resettlement, the material support waiver recently signed by
Secretary Rice will allow us to proceed with DHS interviews

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for some Karen refugees. We expect a DHS team to arrive and
begin interviews in early June. Persons who provided support
to the Karen National Union (KNU) can now be approved for
U.S. resettlement if otherwise qualified. The material
support waiver does not cover former combatants and Karen
National Union members. These two groups will remain
ineligible. The net result will likely be an approval
percentage well below what we had initially hoped for. This
will be a disappointing result for us, the RTG, and the
refugees.

BURMA


12. (C) Like several other ASEAN countries, Thailand is
coming to grips with the fact that the policy of constructive
engagement with the regime in Burma is not working. The
dilemma is what to do next. The caretaker status of the
current government means that no new Burma policy directions
can be expected until the domestic political turmoil is
resolved. We are concerned by Thai plans to collaborate with
Burma on the construction of several hydro-electric dams
along the Salween river in Burma. The construction of these
dams will likely result in increased forced labor and bring
new waves of population displacement. The dams promise to
bring a new source of energy to Thailand, but many of the
displaced persons will undoubtedly add to the population
already in camps along the border. The "reorganization" of
population around the new capital and a recent military

BANGKOK 00002826 004 OF 004


offensive in Karen State are other sources of renewed
population displacement. Thai officials have downplayed
reports of a major Burmese army offensive in the border
provinces, but note that close to 2,000 new refugees have
arrived in one camp and are awaiting in-processing.

WE WELCOME YOUR VISIT


13. (U) I'm looking forward to catching up and to hosting
you for dinner.

Skip
BOYCE