UPDATE ON SIX NORTH KOREANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002296

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL KN KS TH DPRK
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SIX NORTH KOREANS


Classified By: SUSAN SUTTON, POLITICAL COUNSELOR, REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. In an April 20 meeting, ROK Embassy
officials expressed familiar concerns about U.S. resettlement
of North Korean refugees but indicated that they would be
prepared to help in accordance with commitments the ROKG has
made to the United States. In a subsequent UNHCR-ROK Embassy
meeting, there was agreement that interviews of the North
Koreans would be conducted at the UNHCR office. UNHCR
requested ROK assistance in nationality verification and
resettlement interest, but the ROK Embassy said it needed to
seek approval from Seoul. UNHCR told Refcoord that after
nationality verification is complete, UNHCR would issue its
normal protection letter for North Korean refugees and then
have the North Koreans sign a form stating their resettlement
country preference. End summary.

ROK Response on Six North Koreans
--------------


2. (C) Embassy Political Counselor and refugee officers met
with the new ROK Political Counselor and other officers on
April 20 to discuss the six North Koreans who have approached
the Embassy about resettlement to the United States. Embassy
Political Counselor opened by noting the high level of USG
and Congressional interest in the six and the importance of
working together quickly on their cases. Political Counselor
noted that the USG expected the ROK would provide assistance
in determining nationality and performing background checks.
The U.S. understood the sensitivity and complicated nature of
the North Korean refugee issue and stated that the U.S. would
work discreetly and in a manner that we hoped would not
disrupt the existing pipeline that moves North Koreans to the
ROK. Political Counselor noted that we had been in contact
with UNHCR and understood that UNHCR wanted to meet with the
ROK Embassy as soon as possible to request ROK assistance
with the group of six.


3. (C) ROK Embassy officers responded by noting that they had
received instructions from Seoul and that the ROK hoped the
USG would assume a major role and responsibility in handling
the cases of the six North Koreans. The ROKG cared very much
about the existing pipeline and cooperation with UNHCR which
worked quietly and efficiently. U.S. resettlement of North
Koreans could create a pull factor that might endanger the
current system. This greatly worried the ROKG.


4. (C) ROK Embassy officers state that the number of North
Koreans coming to Thailand had increased substantially this
year. It was unclear whether this was due to NGO activists
anticipating the start of U.S. resettlement or a tougher
Chinese policy that was making it harder for North Koreans to
resettle to the ROK through China. It was also possible that
other North Koreans already in Thailand and headed for the
ROK might change their minds if they learned of a U.S.
option. It was essential to avoid any publicity that might
put the existing system in danger. An ROK officer noted the
case several years ago when a group of North Koreans had
climbed over the wall of the the Japanese Embassy and sought
resettlement to Japan. The North Korean government had
complained to the Thai government about that development. It
would be very hard to keep resettlement of North Korean
refugees to the United States quiet. The ROKG was very
concerned about its relations with the DPRK and third
countries such as Thailand.


5. (C) The ROK side continued that it understood the United
States may need some help with the six North Koreans and it
was prepared to help. At the same time, it was important for
the United States to have UNHCR engaged on the issue. Once
UNHCR asked for help, the response would be favorable.
However, an ROK Embassy officer, not the ROKG official
seconded to UNHCR, would provide the assistance. It would be
best to conduct the interviews of the six North Koreans at
UNHCR. The ROK Embassy officer would help in verifying
nationality but the United States should understand that
there could not be complete certainty in a determination by
the ROK Embassy officer that the six were in fact North
Koreans and not, for example, Chinese. The ROK Embassy
officer would provide his best judgement, but the ROKG could
not take responsibility or provide an assurance that its
determination would be correct.


6. (C) In addition, the ROK side stated that it would be
prepared to provide any interpretation assistance that UNHCR
might require. Regarding background checks, the ROK Embassy
officials stated they they would do their best to help but
did not provide a time frame for when the background checks
would be completed.

Outcome of UNHCR - ROK Embassy Meeting
--------------


7. (C) UNHCR officials subsequently met with ROK Embassy
officials on April 20 to discuss the six North Koreans.
UNHCR acting chief Giuseppe de Vincentis informed Refcoord
that there was agreement that interviews of the North Koreans
would occur at the UNHCR office. De Vincentis said that,
following instructions from Geneva, he told the ROK officials
that UNHCR was seeking concurrence in using the South Korean
secondee since that was existing practice but that any other
official that the ROKG might deem appropriate in verifying
nationality and resettlement country preference would be
acceptable.


8. (C) According to de Vincentis, the ROK officials responded
by stating that they needed to seek guidance from Seoul on
whomever was used and asked whether UNHCR had a preference.
De Vincentis said he responded that since UNHCR thought
existing practice should be followed, the preference was for
the secondee. De Vincentis said he pressed for approval in
time to permit interviews on April 21. The ROK officials did
not make a commitment on when Seoul approval would be
forthcoming. Subsequently, UNHCR called the ROK Embassy at
cob and was told that no approval had been received. De
Vincentis asked Refcoord whether the USG had any preference
on the question of which ROK official would do the
interviews. Refcoord responded that we had no preference.


9. (C) De Vincentis said that he foresaw that after the
nationality verification is completed, the standard UNHCR
person of concern letter for North Koreans would be produced
and given to the North Koreans. Then UNHCR would follow
normal practice and ask the North Koreans to fill out and
sign a form which asks them for their resettlement country
preference. (Comment. This last form is for internal UNHCR
purposes. The Bangkok OPE would subsequently have the North
Koreans sign the USG form regarding the U.S. refugee program
that confirms interest in U.S. resettlement).
BOYCE