EAP DAS JOHN'S MEETING WITH MFA PERMSEC KRIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001471

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL TH BURMA US
SUBJECT: EAP DAS JOHN'S MEETING WITH MFA PERMSEC KRIT

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a March 8 meeting with MFA
Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, EAP DAS Eric
John countered the perception that the U.S. was not
sufficiently engaged in Southeast Asia. Krit indicated that
a 505 Agreement on Excess Defense Articles could be concluded
prior to March 15. He observed that the current political
situation in Thailand is unique in Thai history. Krit
described Indonesian and Malaysian attempts to engage with
Burma and suggested continued coordination on Burma between
ASEAN members, the U.S., and other regional powers. END
SUMMARY


2. (C) On March 8 EAP DAS Eric John, accompanied by the
Ambassador, met over lunch with Thai Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn.
Krit was accompanied by Director General of American Affairs
Nongnuth Phetcharatana and East Asian Director General
Nopadol Gunavibool.

THE IMAGE OF THE U.S. IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
--------------


3. (C) DAS John -- noting recent suggestions from Singapore
and elsewhere that the U.S. was not fully engaged in the
region -- highlighted the upcoming visit of Secretary Rice,
which would be followed by the President's visit in November
for APEC, as evidence of positive and dynamic U.S. engagement
in Southeast Asia. The re-emergence of China is not a zero
sum game for the U.S. Krit agreed, however, he cautioned
that the U.S. image in the region had suffered because the
U.S. appeared to only discuss Southeast Asia in a negative
context, citing the Human Rights Report and Burma as
examples. He indicated that a positive message from the
Secretary during her visit would resonate.

SIPDIS

505 AGREEMENT
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador asked about the status of our request
that Thailand modify an existing agreement to allow the
continued transfer of Excess Defense Articles (EDA) to the
Thai military (505 Agreement),which needed to be concluded
by March 15 in order to allow the handing over of EDA
helicopters to the Thai Army. Krit said the agreement had
been held up by an ongoing bureaucratic struggle between MFA,
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Cabinet over whether
agreements such as this required Cabinet consultation. MFA
was waiting for Cabinet notification before proceeding with
the diplomatic note approving the agreement. Krit suggested
that, although he favored approaching the cabinet on this
issue, he would consider releasing a diplomatic note if MOD
sent MFA a letter formally requesting it do so. Such a
letter would provide MFA with the political cover it needed
to issue the diplomatic note approving the agreement.

CURRENT POLITICAL TURMOIL
--------------


5. (C) Krit described the current political situation as
unique in Thai history. He highlighted the restraint of the
police and military and the overall lack of violence as
symbols of Thailand's political maturity. "In the old days
it would have been resolved by now because people would have
come to blows." Thaksin had not anticipated that the sale of
Shin Corp. would create such a backlash since in his mind the
deal was only a business transaction. Despite the appearance
of impropriety the opposition had not been able to make any
of their charges stick and notwithstanding the protests in
Bangkok the Prime Minister still was very popular in the
countryside.

BURMA: MULTI-NATIONAL COORDINATION
--------------


6. (C) Krit agreed that under President Yudhoyono,
Indonesia was on the way to re-assuming its "rightful and
positive" leadership position in ASEAN. Yudhoyono's February
visit to Burma had gone well because he had the credibility
to deliver a message to the junta about the need for change.


7. (C) Krit said that Foreign Minister Kantathi was working
hard to facilitate a visit by Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed
Hamid to Burma to meet with the regime leadership. However,
the RTG had had very limited contact with the SPDC over the
last few months. Krit noted that even military-to-military
contact had not been taking place recently. The Burmese were
using the move to Pyinmana as an excuse to avoid meeting with
FM Hamid. The Ambassador said that FM Hamid should not agree
to go to Burma without permission to visit Aung San Suu Kyi.
Krit believed that the Burmese would not allow a Hamid visit
if seeing ASSK was a precondition. He suggested such a
request be handled in a more "ASEAN" manner because dealing
with the Burmese publicly only caused a defensive reaction.
While a tougher stance towards the junta had strengthened
ASEAN to a degree, it had failed to produce results. Krit
encouraged continued high-level U.S. engagement with India
and China over Burma, agreeing that common language among the
major powers was beneficial.


8. (U) DAS John did not have the opportunity to clear this
message.
BOYCE