THAILAND POLITICAL CRISIS: WHAT IT'S ABOUT, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001411

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH SNAP
SUBJECT: THAILAND POLITICAL CRISIS: WHAT IT'S ABOUT, AND
WHAT WE SHOULD DO

REF: A. BANGKOK 1208

B. BANGKOK 0959

C. BANGKOK 0538

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reasons 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) We are not likely to see an early resolution of the
political confrontation between Prime Minister Thaksin and
his opponents. To facilitate better understanding of
possible outcomes and the significance of these events for
the U.S.-Thai relationship, and to contemplate the best way
to position the USG vis--vis these unfolding events in
Thailand, we offer the following analysis and suggestions.

WHAT'S NOT HAPPENING
--------------


2. (C) What we are witnessing is not a power struggle
between the boycotting opposition parties and the Prime
Minister. The three boycotting parties are not leading the
opposition to the Prime Minister, rather, they are being
dragged in its wake. They decided on the boycott strategy
with great reluctance, and only when it became clear that
they would be severely criticized by the activist groups
leading the anti-Thaksin demonstrations if they participated
in the polls. Until Thaksin dissolved parliament, the
opposition Democrats were still trying to use more
conventional legal mechanisms to uncover Thaksin's unethical
or illegal dealings and to hold him accountable in that way.


3. (C) This is not about reducing Thai Rak Thai's majority
in the Parliament. The opposition movement -- NGOs and civil
society groups -- raises no objection per se to another TRT
leader taking over as Prime Minister. Many people who oppose
Thaksin personally, even vehemently, nonetheless support many
of the TRT policies. The leaders of the protest movement
have, for the most part, no strong ties to any political
party.


4. (C) The opposition boycott is neither unconstitutional nor
illegal. The Democrats point out that this is not the first
time they have used this tool: they boycotted the elections
of 1952 to protest military rule. The boycott may prove to
be unpopular (public opinion polls present a mixed picture so
far) and the opposition parties know it may cost them in the
polls during subsequent elections, but they made their
calculation and decided it was a political gamble worth
taking.


5. (C) This impasse will not last forever. Thailand will
host dozens of VIP visitors, including many of the crowned
heads of Europe, beginning in early June to celebrate the
King's 60th anniversary on the throne. The significance of
this anniversary for the Thai people cannot be overstated.
Our contacts are virtually unanimous in predicting that the
crisis will be resolved before the anniversary gets underway.


6. (C) Are the "elite" in Bangkok taking an undemocratic
stance in trying to oust a popularly-elected leader? There
is an element of truth to this accusation, but it is not the
whole story. The Bangkok elite never really warmed to what
they see as the nouveau-riche, upstart, know-it-all Prime
Minister and his very un-Thai abrasiveness. Initial support
from some who liked Thaksin's "fresh" thinking on the economy
and his appeal to Thai nationalism faded as questions about
his ethics and his effectiveness as national leader grew.
Many Bangkok residents are convinced that although government
corruption across-the-board is no worse than with previous
administrations, corruption at the top is the worst it has
ever been. Following the promulgation of the 1997
constitution, the Thai Senate and a variety of independent
institutions were supposed to play an important
checks-and-balances role, but Thaksin has neutralized almost
all of them. In the opposition view, with no viable legal
venues left to hold Thaksin accountable for anything, there
was little recourse but to take the argument to the street
(ref A).

WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT?
--------------


7. (C) This struggle is to ensure that Thailand is a genuine
democracy, with checks and balances on power that work in a
Thai context. It is the second act of the story which
started with the 1992 pro-democracy demonstrations, followed
by the efforts to put in place a new constitution to ensure
civilian government that was both effective and democratic.
The 1997 constitution is a good document, but, like a new
roof, it sprang leaks in some places. Thaksin, with steely
efficiency, exploited these leaks to his political advantage
over the past 5 years. While most of Thaksin's current
critics castigate him for a wide variety of reasons,
including their personal self-interest, the controversy over
the Shin Corp sale (ref C) turned out to be the last straw,
the single issue around which a fractious array of Thaksin
opponents could galvanize. Tellingly, many of his old allies
turned against him. In this conflict, Thai society is
sorting out some important questions: how much corruption is
just too much? How do you balance the right of the citizens
to elect whomever they choose with the need of society to
have respect for the rule of law? What kinds of checks and
balances are necessary to keep society just, and how do you
make them work?

8. (C) Thaksin has been accused throughout his term of
office of a variety of illegal or unethical actions in
connection with his family's Shin Corp. When he was first
accused of concealing his assets, the Constitutional Court
issued a controversial acquittal in 2001. It is widely
believed that Thaksin paid off judges in order to secure this
8-7 decision. When a journalist wrote about the degree to
which Shin Corp had benefited from the Thaksin government's
policies, the company sued her for libel, and she is facing a
possible fine of usdols 10 million and two years in prison.
Frustration over the PM's impunity in relationship to Shin
Corp dealings reached a head in February, when the
Constitutional Court refused to consider the petition from 28
Senators to review the Shin Corp deal and examine whether the
PM had violated Thai law. Ironically, it is possible that
this controversial sale was at least technically legal. But,
just as there is no institution in this country that has the
power to convict Thaksin, there also appears to be no
institution that has the moral authority to acquit him.

WHAT ABOUT THE U.S.?
--------------


9. (C) As in other places around the world, Thais tend
either to look to the US for leadership or blame the US for
what goes wrong. In 1992, reports that the US believed the
leading civilian candidate for PM was involved in drug
trafficking circulated widely. Our opposition to that
candidate was the opening utilized by junta leader General
Suchinda to claim the top job, the act that led to the
prodemocracy demonstrations and the violence that accompanied
them. During this past year, opposition elements seized on
our FTA negotiations as a club with which to beat the PM.


10. (C) That said, it is particularly striking that neither
side is asking for the US to take their part in the ongoing
struggle. We have regular contacts with the protest
movement, the opposition parties, the military and with
leaders in the TRT, including the embattled PM himself. We
talk to journalists and academics. As rumors fly, everyone
wants to know what we know -- but no one has asked us what to
do. The Thai seem prepared to work this out themselves, in
the context of their constitution (with all its quirks). The
US does have a role to play: emphasizing the need for all
parties to use peaceful means and to find a just solution.
If either side begins to use violence or improper means
(vote-buying, intimidation, etc. then we will want to use
public statements and private channels to voice our concern.
For the time being, respecting the collective Thai ability to
sort their way through the current impasse is the best thing
we can do for Thai democracy and our bilateral relationship.
BOYCE