THAI RESPONSE ON NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001340

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2016
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM KN TH DPRK
SUBJECT: THAI RESPONSE ON NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES

REF: STATE 33786

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR BOYCE, REASONS 1.4 (B, D).


1. (C) Summary. During March 3 conversations, Thai FM
Kantathi and NSC Chief Winai said that the North Korean
refugee issue was sensitive for Thailand. However, they
indicated that the RTG was willing to work with the USG on
discreet, case-by-case processing of North Korean refugees
for U.S. resettlement. This represents a welcome shift of
the Thai position, but one that needs to be treated with some
caution given the uncertain political future of the Thaksin
government. End summary.


2. (C) Per reftel, Ambassador met March 3 with Foreign
Minister Kantathi on North Korean refugees. Ambassador also
took the opportunity to raise the issue of the missing Hmong
minors (septel). Prior to the meeting, and per reftel,
Refcoord contacted ROK Embassy Counselor Hong-Kyun Kim and
stated that the Embassy had received instructions to approach
the RTG on North Korean refugees and hoped the ROK Embassy
would inform the RTG, if approached, that it had no ojections
to the planned U.S. strategy on this issue.


3. (C) Ambassador told Kantathi that the North Korea Human
Rights Act requires the USG to facilitate the resettlement of
qualified North Korean refugees to the United States. The
United States recognized that this issue was sensitive for
Thailand and appreciated that the Thai had done a good job of
quietly facilitating the movement of North Koreans to South
Korea. The United States did not want to do anything that
might negatively affect the current situation. At the same
time, the United States thought there might be cases for
which U.S. resettlement would be appropriate. The United
States did not know of any such cases now, but if one arose
would cooperate with UNHCR and the ROK in determining bona
fides and carrying out the other usual steps of U.S. refugee
processing. If the United States found that a refugee was
ineligible for U.S. resettlement, the ROK had said that it
would nevertheless accept the person. The Ambassador urged
the Foreign Minister to permit U.S. processing of North
Korean refugees and allow them to depart for the United
States if found eligible.


4. (C) Kantathi responded that Thailand permits South Korea
to process and resettle North Koreans quietly. The Thai had
also worked successfully with the ROK when some North Koreans
had entered the Thai Embassy in Hanoi. He said that he had
heard that North Korean refugees had found it hard to
integrate into South Korea. It seemed the United States was
now prepared to give the "green light." Kantathi asked if
the United States was most interested in getting access. The
Ambassador replied that we wanted to process North Korean
refugees for resettlement to the United States and briefly
described the steps of the process. The Ambassador again
urged Kantathi to allow the U.S. to move ahead with this
initiative.


5. (C) Kantathi said this issue was sensitive for Thailand.
He noted that the North Koreans had targetted Embassies in
Beijing but the Chinese had been successful in cutting off
that option by strengthening security in the diplomatic
quarter. Now the North Koreans followed a route that took
them through Yunnan Province and down the Mekong River.
Thailand had heard that there were 30,000-40,000 North
Koreans around the region outside of their country. The Thai
government was worried about a pull factor and did not want
to encourage the North Koreans to come to Thailand. It would
be best if North Koreans could be processed for resettlement
with UNHCR assistance in China. Kantathi also stated that
Thailand's relations with North Korea were sensitive. He
cited the issue of the Thai woman who had apparently been
abducted many years ago by the North Koreans and whose case
came to light after Robert Jenkins left North Korea. The
Thai government had raised her case, unsuccessfully so far,
with the DPRK. It would continue to pursue the issue,
however, and might work with the Japanese and Chinese to
achieve a satisfactory result. The North Korean government
was very difficult, Kantathi said.


6. (C) Kantathi then said that, personally speaking, the RTG
could work with the USG on the U.S. resettlement of North
Koreans on a discreet, case-by-case basis. He emphasized
that the process must be discreet. He also requested that
the USG explore the possibility of resettlement processing
with the PRC. The Ambassador thanked Kantathi for this
response.


7. (C) Following the discussion with Kantathi, the Ambassador
telephoned General Winai Phattiyakul, the head of the Thai
National Security Council. The Ambassador made similar
points to Winai about U.S. intentions and strong desire to
process North Korean refugees for U.S. resettlement. The
Ambassador relayed the response of FM Kantathi and asked if
Winai had the same position. Winai responded that the normal
Thai practice was to send North Korean refugees to South
Korea. Then moving off the stance he had previously taken,
Winai responded that if the USG was willing and able to
process North Korean refugees, it would probably be possible
to work something out.

8. (C) Comment. This is a welcome response from the Thai
government and a shift of the previous Thai position. The
current uncertain political situation and the possibility
that Thaksin may not remain in power means that the Thai
response should be taken with some caution. End comment.

BOYCE