THE THAI ARMY COMES TO DINNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001302

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL MARR TH TRT SNAP
SUBJECT: THE THAI ARMY COMES TO DINNER

REF: BANGKOK 1214

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)


1. (C) Summary. During a March 2 dinner hosted by the
Ambassador, Royal Thai Army (RTA) CINC, GEN Sonthi
Boonyaratglin and his senior staff appeared relaxed and gave
no indication that the Army plans to involve itself in the
ongoing political crisis. Sonthi told the Ambassador that he
had recently urged PM Thaksin Shinawatra to show restraint,
make concessions to his critics, and avoid antagonizing
opponents in order to defuse tensions but seemed skeptical
that Thaksin would do so. Sonthi believes that the present
situation is much different than that of 1992, the last time
the Army intervened in Thai politics, and suggested that the
only way the Army would intervene would be to protect the
monarchy and restore order. Although Sonthi and his senior
staff officers were surprisingly candid in telling Embassy
officials about their dissatisfaction with Thaksin's
leadership -- to the point of making jokes at his expense --
they took pains to demonstrate their intention to remain on
the sidelines. Sonthi hopes that anti-Thaksin rallies
continue to remain peaceful but acknowledged that his biggest
worry is that they will not. END SUMMARY.

SONTHI ASKS THE PM TO SHOW RESTRAINT


2. (C) On March 2, the Ambassador hosted RTA CINC Sonthi
and seven senior RTA officers to dinner at the residence. In
a pull-aside before dinner, Sonthi briefed the Ambassador on
his February 28 meeting with PM Thaksin. Sonthi said that,
contrary to press reports claiming he had urged to PM to step
down, he had simply urged Thaksin to back away from
confrontation, show a willingness to make concessions, and
generally take the high road when commenting on the political
situation. He was quick to note, however, that given the
PM's personality, it was unlikely Thaksin would heed such
advice.

THIS IS NOT 1992


3. (C) Sonthi believes that the current crisis differs
significantly from 1992 -- when segments of the RTA fired on
protesters opposing General Suchinda Krayprayoon's assumption
of the Prime Ministry. In 1992, Sonthi explained, the RTA
had a vested interest in Suchinda remaining in power. Today,
the RTA has no similar stake for or against Thaksin. Sonthi
said that his biggest concern was that an unforeseen act
might cause one of the protests to become violent. He
underscored the need to be on the watch for agitators who
might try to provoke violence. Sonthi indicated that the
only circumstance under which the RTA would intervene would
be to protect the monarchy.

WHAT ABOUT SURAYUD?


4. (C) Sonthi is a protege of retired Army Commander and
current Privy Councilor General Surayud Chulanont. Sonthi
told the Ambassador that Surayud is uncomfortable with press
speculation that he might be appointed as an interim Prime
Minister should Thaksin step down. Nonetheless, Sonthi was
keenly interested in hearing about the Ambassador's February
28 meeting with Surayud and asked whether the Ambassador's
impression of Surayud corresponded with his own (reftel).

NOT CRITICAL OF CHAMLONG


5. (C) The Ambassador invited Sonthi to comment on the new
dynamic presented by the involvement of retired GEN Chamlong
Srimuang in the anti-Thaksin rallies. Sonthi refrained from
endorsing or criticizing Chamlong's role in the protests.

ARMY SUPPORT FOR THAKSIN NOTICEABLY LUKEWARM


6. (C) Sonthi and his staff appeared very relaxed throughout
the evening. The officers freely expressed their opinions
about the political situation and some even made jokes at
Thaksin's expense. GEN Chirapong Vanarat, Chief of Staff for
GEN Sonthi's inner office, went so far as to predict that
Thaksin would have to step down within the next three days.
That said, these same officers gave numerous examples of
steps they were taking to avoid giving any impression that
the military intends to intervene. Overall, we were struck
by how tepid the senior Army leadership's support for Thaksin
seemed to be.

MOLES IN OUR MIDST?


7. (C) Interestingly, the only wall flower during dinner
was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence LTG Chatchai
Thavaraputta. His reticence was probably due to his having
been an Armed Forces Prep School classmate of Thaksin's. In
Thailand, police and military officer candidates attend prep
school together for two years prior to moving on to their
respective service academy. Members of the same class meet
annually and form close bonds. An officer is frequently more
loyal to his prep school classmates than he is to any other
group. Thaksin has been criticized by many within the RTA
for promoting his classmates, graduates of Prep School Class
10, ahead of more senior officers. During dinner, GEN
Chirapong laughingly said within earshot of LTG Chatchai that
the only reason Chatchai was present was to watch the others.


8. (C) Officers at post had been concerned that the last
minute addition to the Thai delegation of MAJ Saravudh
Shinawatra, nephew of the Prime Minister, might inhibit
conversation. However, Saravudh and the other aides waited
outside the dining room throughout dinner. Several of the
aides spoke openly with PolOff while the senior officers
dined in the residence. Whenever Saravudh would approach,
however, the other aides would stop talking about the crisis
and turn the conversation to something more innocuous.
Saravudh otherwise spent most of dinner on a cell phone
talking with two of his girlfriends.

COMMENT


9. (C) Sonthi gave every appearance of being a measured
professional who is committed to keeping the Army on the
sidelines of the unfolding political situation. We also
believe that he and his senior staff have a good grip on the
Army rank-and-file.
BOYCE