Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK1176
2006-02-27 09:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SENATOR FEINGOLD'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

Tags:  PGOV PREL TH BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS POL MIL US FTA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001176 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, H
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL TH BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS POL MIL US FTA
SUBJECT: SENATOR FEINGOLD'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
THAKSIN

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001176

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, H
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL TH BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS POL MIL US FTA
SUBJECT: SENATOR FEINGOLD'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
THAKSIN

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 20, Senator Russell Feingold
(D-WI) accompanied by Ambassador Boyce called on Prime
Minister Thaksin. Thaksin said the relationship with the
U.S., as exemplified by our close cooperation following the
December 2004 tsunami, was excellent. The discussion focused
on violence in southern Thailand; the disappearance of human
rights lawyer Somchai Neelaphajit and other human rights
concerns; F-16s, Hmong refugees from Laos; and Thaksin's
domestic political challenges. Senator Feingold expressed
serious concern over the situation in Burma. END SUMMARY

SOUTHERN THAILAND - THAKSIN PLAYS COP
--------------


2. (C) During a February 20 meeting with Prime Minister
Thaksin at Government House, Senator Feingold expressed
concern over the ongoing violence affecting far southern
Thailand and asked for the Prime Minister's assessment of the
situation as well as his plans to work with the National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC). Thaksin emphasized that
there was no evidence of intentional terrorist involvement in
the South and that Malay separatism was a primary factor
behind the violence. There was a committed group of armed
militants who used separatist propaganda about the unique
history of the region to manipulate youths to fight for an
independent homeland.


3. (C) Thaksin claimed the government and the NRC were now
"heading in the same direction," after the NRC's initial
failure to understand the complexity of the situation. The
NRC believed the violence was rooted in the deep feeling of
"injustice" felt by southern Muslims who felt that they had
been mistreated historically by the Thai state. Both he and
the NRC understood that they needed to address the concerns
of ethnic Malay Thais. "We need to look into their hearts."



4. (C) When asked about reports of heavy-handed tactics in
the South, Thaksin defended Thai security practices. He
described the Krue Se incident of April 2004 as an instance

of security forces being involved in "hot pursuit" of
militants. The Tak Bai incident of October 2005 was the
result of a lack of proper military transportation. The
deaths at Tak Bai resulted from suffocation, and not from the
actions of security forces. He blamed the militants for
deliberately manipulating the Tak Bai incident in order to
provoke a dramatic confrontation with security forces.


5. (SBU) Thaksin said economic underdevelopment was a
factor in the violence because of resentment among ethnic
Malays of the better economic conditions on the Malaysian
side of the border. The Islamic education system contributed
to the poor economic conditions in the region because Islamic
schools did not equip their graduates with job skills.


6. (C) Thaksin boasted several times that he had personally
interrogated some of the captured militants. Most had been
manipulated by separatist ideas or paid to commit violence.
There was absolutely no evidence of connections between the
captured militants and JI or Al-Qaeda. Thaksin claimed that
under questioning the captured militants readily confessed
their involvement in the insurgency and that harsh
interrogation techniques were not required to obtain
information from them.

SOMCHAI - "A HEART ATTACK DURING QUESTIONING"
--------------


7. (C) Senator Feingold asked about the investigation into
the disappearance of human rights lawyer Somchai Neelaphajit.
Thaksin said the inquiry into the disappearance would finish
in mid-March and that additional arrest warrants of police
officers would be issued by the Department of Special
Investigation (DSI). The findings so far implicated some
mid-level police officers in the disappearance. The police
allegedly brought Somchai to the Criminal Suppression
Division for questioning. While under interrogation Somchai
had a heart attack and died. After the heart attack police
panicked and took Somchai's remains outside of Bangkok where
the body was incinerated. The police did not know Somchai
had a heart condition. Thaksin claimed that Somchai had not
been interrogated harshly, however, the police were unaware
he had a heart condition and Somchai was without his heart
medication. Thaksin emphasized that these actions were from
"working level officers."

EJK
---


8. (C) Senator Feingold asked for an explanation of reports
that Thai security forces had been involved in other
extra-judicial killings, especially during the 2003 "war on
drugs." Thaksin denied these reports, saying that Thai
forces respected the rule of law. The number of killings
during the "war on drugs" had been exaggerated and most
involved drug kingpins "cutting-off" underlings in order to
silence them. Thaksin complained that media reports,
especially the Thai English language press, were unfairly
critical and unreliable. "The papers are readable, but not
quotable."

BURMA AND ASSK
--------------


9. (C) Senator Feingold asked about current Thai policies
towards Burma and strongly urged additional Thai efforts to
press for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK). Thaksin
said that ASEAN leaders had used tough language with the
Burmese during the December 2005 ASEAN summit, a first for
ASEAN. He complained that the Burmese had failed to tell
even ASEAN members about their plans to move their capital.
Thaksin offered Bangkok as a possible venue for the Burmese
regime to engage with the international community. Senator
Feingold emphasized the importance of Thai engagement with
the Burmese to secure the release of ASSK. Thaksin said the
SPDC would not hold ASSK "forever" but would wait until after
the national reconciliation process was finished. After
being pressed, Thaksin he said he would try to talk to Than
Shwe personally about ASSK.

HMONG REFUGEES
--------------


10. (C) Senator Feingold thanked the Prime Minister for
Thailand's cooperation on Hmong refugees, especially the
recent case involving 27 Hmong children. Thaksin said that
the Lao were difficult to work with and acted defensively.
The case of the 27 children was a good example of this. He
complained that illegal immigration from Laos was an ongoing
problem for Thailand.

REGIONAL SECURITY, CHINA
--------------


11. (C) Thaksin said that Thailand was concerned about
piracy in the Strait of Malacca and would support collective
security efforts, although it remained primarily an issue for
the littoral states. He noted that pirates from Aceh were of
particular concern. Regarding China, Thaksin said bilateral
relations were very close, particularly under his
administration.

FTA
---


12. (SBU) Thaksin said he wanted a "fair" FTA with the
U.S., suggesting it would require sacrifices from both sides
in order to enjoy the overall benefits an FTA would bring.
He quipped, "you Americans like won-ton soup, but you don't
like one-ton pickups." The negotiations with the U.S. are
very complicated, especially the areas regarding
pharmaceuticals and financial services. The Bank of Thailand
was particularly worried about some of the FTA's financial
services provisions.

F-16s
--------------


13. (SBU) Senator Feingold made a strong push for the Thais
to purchase/upgrade U.S. F-16s rather than Swedish or Russian
aircraft. Thaksin said he had asked the Royal Thai Air Force
(RTAF) Commander Chalit for a final recommendation, which he
expected within a week. Thailand was seriously looking at
Russian planes was because the Russians were offering a
barter deal and because the sale would open up new markets to
Thai agricultural exports. Thaksin said there were two
components to the aircraft deal -- mid-life upgrades for
existing F-16s and procurement of some new aircraft to
replace the RTAF's aging F-5s. The RTAF would purchase
mid-life upgrades for a number of F-16s, but Thailand would
not buy new U.S. aircraft unless a better deal was offered.
Thaksin believed the purchase of Russian aircraft should not
affect cooperation with the U.S. Ambassador Boyce reminded
Thaksin that a purchase of Russian aircraft could in fact
affect technology transfers and raise questions over
interoperability with U.S. forces. Thaksin said access to
technology was very important for Thailand and urged the U.S.
to offer better terms.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S.
--------------


14. (SBU) Thaksin highlighted the overall positive image of
the U.S. in Thailand, noting that many Thais -- including
both he and the Foreign Minister -- were the products of the
U.S. educational system. Most Thais did not have strong
opinions about the U.S. war on terror; however, there was a
general negative feeling about the U.S. invasion of Iraq,
especially among Thai Muslims.

POLITICAL CHALLENGES IN THAILAND
--------------


15. (SBU) Senator Feingold asked the Prime Minister about
recent challenges from opposition figures to his government.
Thaksin downplayed opposition efforts to oust him, calling
recent protests "part of the normal democratic process."
Thai political elites got bored quickly because of the
history of short lived governments in the past. His rural
base remained strong, and even in Bangkok he still enjoyed
more support than the opposition. An extraordinary session
of parliament would be convened on March 6, followed by a
debate from March 8-10, in order to refute opposition charges.


16. (U) Senator Feingold's office cleared this message.
BOYCE