Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANDARSERIBEGAWAN636
2006-12-22 08:36:00
SECRET
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Cable title:  

PURSUIT OF TERRORIST INFO EXCHANGE WITH BRUNEI

Tags:  ASEC BX CVIS KHLS KVPR PINR PREL PTER 
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VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBD #0636/01 3560836
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 220836Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3652
S E C R E T BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000636 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, AND CA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2016
TAGS: ASEC BX CVIS KHLS KVPR PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: PURSUIT OF TERRORIST INFO EXCHANGE WITH BRUNEI

REF: STATE 190832

Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, Reasons 1.4 (B & D)

S E C R E T BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000636

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, AND CA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2016
TAGS: ASEC BX CVIS KHLS KVPR PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: PURSUIT OF TERRORIST INFO EXCHANGE WITH BRUNEI

REF: STATE 190832

Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, Reasons 1.4 (B & D)


1. (C) Reftel requested reporting on Government of Brunei
(GOB) activities to collect identifying personal information
on terrorists or suspected terrorists. Following post
assessment is keyed to questions posed reftel. The majority
of this information has not/not been publicly released by the
GOB. It was acquired by post in numerous discussions with
GOB officials over last several months, including within the
context of pursuing an HSPD-6 information sharing agreement
with Brunei. Some of it is classified as "Secret" by the GOB
and was shared with us in confidence.

--------------
Immigration Databases
--------------


2. (C) The GOB maintains a computerized immigration database
at all ports of entry (POE's). This system tracks all
entries and exits and provides immigration officers at the
POE with a detailed record of those events, as well as a
digital facial image of the traveler that was captured during
his/her initial entry into the system. This system, which
was procured from a German company, looks to be robust and
efficient. The database is updated on a continual basis. It

is also used for screening visa applications. Its most
significant limitation appears to be the lack of a rigorous,
transparent, and consistent GOB-wide set of SOP's for
entering names into the system watchlist.

--------------
Watchlist and Information Sharing
--------------


3. (C) A name-based watchlist is integrated into the
computerized GOB immigration system described above. It
includes immigration violators and criminal suspects entered
by the Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF). The RBPF and the
Internal Security Department (ISD) can add suspected
terrorists or terrorism supporters to the list. In addition,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade provides the names
of individuals designated on the UNSC terrorist list.
Multiple classified GOB databases contain background
information on terrorist suspects whose names may be entered
into the watchlist.


4. (S) The GOB has no formal watchlist agreements with other
countries. Information is shared on an ad hoc, case-by-case
basis. Post is aware that ISD conducts regular intelligence
exchanges with some (but not all) ASEAN countries, and some
watchlist entries are presumably shared in these contexts.
The GOB is currently reviewing the USG proposal for an HSPD-6
information-sharing agreement.

--------------
Biometrics
--------------


5. (SBU) As noted above, the immigration database available
at all POE's includes the capability for digital facial
imaging. The GOB currently issues a machine-readable
passport. It has contracted with a private company for
manufacture and issuance of a biometric passport that meets
ICAO biometric standards and USG requirements for Visa Waiver
Program countries. The GOB plans to begin issuing this new
biometric passport when it becomes available from the
manufacturer early in 2007.

--------------
Identifying Appropriate Partners
--------------


6. (SBU) The GOB is definitely an appropriate partner for
data sharing. Post and Department have been actively
pursuing an HSPD-6 information sharing agreement with GOB for
the past year, and have provided GOB with the text of a model
MOU, which it is currently reviewing. Post is cautiously
optimistic that we may be able to finalize an HSPD-6
agreement in 2007.


7. (C) Post believes GOB will be willing and able to apply
necessary safeguards to USG information supplied under an
HSPD-6 agreement, and would use such data appropriately. It
is conceivable that GOB information supplied to the USG under
such an agreement could include individuals whom do not meet
the USG bar for excludable terrorist activity, such as
Islamic religious dissidents. This issue can be easily
avoided, however, by requesting that the lookout entries
supplied by the GOB under HSPD-6 be tailored to USG
requirements.


8. (C) Given the progress made to date in pursuing an HSPD-6
information sharing agreement with the GOB, post believes
that USG efforts to expand terrorist information sharing with
the GOB should continue to focus on the HSPD-6 path in 2007,
unless that approach is ultimately rejected by the GOB.
SKODON