Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANDARSERIBEGAWAN440
2006-08-30 07:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Cable title:
BRUNEI'S UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT: MILITARY PREPARATIONS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000440
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, IO/UNP, AND PM
SINGAPORE ALSO FOR DAO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL UN IS LE BX
SUBJECT: BRUNEI'S UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT: MILITARY PREPARATIONS
ADVANCED BUT REALISTIC ON THE POLITICS
REF: A. BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 415 (NOTAL)
B. STATE 134133
C. USUN 1545
D. BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 398 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Amb. Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000440
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, IO/UNP, AND PM
SINGAPORE ALSO FOR DAO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL UN IS LE BX
SUBJECT: BRUNEI'S UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT: MILITARY PREPARATIONS
ADVANCED BUT REALISTIC ON THE POLITICS
REF: A. BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 415 (NOTAL)
B. STATE 134133
C. USUN 1545
D. BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 398 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Amb. Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) In meetings August 29 and 30, senior GOB officials
indicated to us that plans are well advanced for the Royal
Brunei Armed Forces to fulfill the Sultan's pledge to
contribute troops to UNIFIL should UNSYG Annan request a
Bruneian contribution. They said that they understood that
Israel had not yet approved a Bruneian contribution, and so
Brunei had not yet made a formal offer of troops as a nod to
Israeli sensitivities. We expect Brunei will remain in "wait
and see" mode as regards UNIFIL but will be ready to make a
small contribution of 100-200 mechanized infantry troops in
conjunction with Indonesian and/or Malaysian forces if asked
to do so. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) planning for a
potential UNIFIL contribution is well advanced. In separate
conversations with RBAF Commander Major General Halbi,
Director of Operations Colonel Jofri, and Deputy Minister of
Defense Pehin Yasmin, Ambassador and DCM learned that the
RBAF has been getting ready to carry out a phased deployment
of 100-200 troops as part of a tripartite Malaysian,
Indonesian, and Bruneian force. A medical contingent would
be the first RBAF unit to deploy, followed by two mechanized
infantry platoons and associated equipment: armored
personnel carriers, trucks, and four-wheel drive vehicles.
RBAF planners intend to work with the UK to move the vehicles
via sea lift to Cyprus for staging into Lebanon; they
estimate a total transit of 24 days. DepMinDef Yasmin told
us that airlift via leased Antonovs was another possible
option for moving the vehicles. The RBAF is also intending
to stage its troops through Cyprus, presumably via RAF
Akrotiri.
3. (C) Our RBAF and MinDef contacts were well aware of
Israeli objections to UNIFIL contributions from countries
which do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, and
also that the Israelis appeared to object more strongly to
Malaysian than to Indonesian involvement in UNIFIL. In
response to our questions, they said that an RBAF deployment
in conjunction with Indonesia alone would still be doable.
Colonel Jofri said it would require a change in planning
assumptions but the RBAF could adjust relatively quickly.
DepMinDef Yasmin told us that in some ways it was easier for
RBAF mechanized infantry to work with the Indonesians rather
than the Malaysians, since both Brunei and Indonesia operate
the same French-made APC's. (Comment: The RBAF has 35 VAB
and 20 Shorland APC's in its inventory.)
4. (C) DepMinDef Yasmin told us he has reached an agreement
with New Zealand for NZ forces to provide accelerated
peacekeeping training to the RBAF, which has only limited
peace monitoring experience in Aceh and Mindanao. Yasmin
expected the Kiwi trainers to arrive in Brunei within a week
to ten days to commence the training program. He believed
this would be useful even if the RBAF did not end up
deploying to UNIFIL, since it would support the previously
stated MinDef goal of having a dedicated PKO unit of at least
platoon size trained and operational by 2007.
5. (C) Notwithstanding the RBAF preparations, the GOB is not
pushing for an early invitation to UNIFIL and is well aware
of the diplomatic complications involving a UNIFIL
contribution. Dato Haji Shofry, Permanent Secretary for
Bilateral Relations at the MFAT, told us that the GOB
understands the political environment and knows about
BANDAR SER 00000440 002 OF 002
Israel's objections to accepting contributions from some
Muslim nations. That is why Brunei has not made a formal
offer of forces and is waiting for a request from UNSYG Kofi
Annan. Shofry said that normally the receiving country
approved PKO participants, but on a practical basis, the GOB
understood Israel's desire as a combatant to vet the PKO
force. He avoided a direct answer to our question about
whether the GOB would be willing to move forward with a
deployment over Israeli objections, but said it would be
reluctant to see "our boys" in a situation where one of the
recent combatants was opposed to the Bruneian presence.
COMMENT
--------------
6. (C) With a clear readiness to make good on the Sultan's
commitment to contribute forces to UNIFIL, the GOB has
accepted a realistic "wait and see" attitude to deal with
this operation's political complexities. Our interlocutors
all expressed a desire to participate in the mission, but
were careful to indicate that their willingness not be seen
as an attempt to force anything on Israel. Current efforts
to improve training and readiness of the RBAF's PKO-capable
units are a clear sign that the GOB is serious about its
commitment to play a wider role in international multilateral
operations.
SKODON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, IO/UNP, AND PM
SINGAPORE ALSO FOR DAO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL UN IS LE BX
SUBJECT: BRUNEI'S UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT: MILITARY PREPARATIONS
ADVANCED BUT REALISTIC ON THE POLITICS
REF: A. BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 415 (NOTAL)
B. STATE 134133
C. USUN 1545
D. BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 398 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Amb. Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) In meetings August 29 and 30, senior GOB officials
indicated to us that plans are well advanced for the Royal
Brunei Armed Forces to fulfill the Sultan's pledge to
contribute troops to UNIFIL should UNSYG Annan request a
Bruneian contribution. They said that they understood that
Israel had not yet approved a Bruneian contribution, and so
Brunei had not yet made a formal offer of troops as a nod to
Israeli sensitivities. We expect Brunei will remain in "wait
and see" mode as regards UNIFIL but will be ready to make a
small contribution of 100-200 mechanized infantry troops in
conjunction with Indonesian and/or Malaysian forces if asked
to do so. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) planning for a
potential UNIFIL contribution is well advanced. In separate
conversations with RBAF Commander Major General Halbi,
Director of Operations Colonel Jofri, and Deputy Minister of
Defense Pehin Yasmin, Ambassador and DCM learned that the
RBAF has been getting ready to carry out a phased deployment
of 100-200 troops as part of a tripartite Malaysian,
Indonesian, and Bruneian force. A medical contingent would
be the first RBAF unit to deploy, followed by two mechanized
infantry platoons and associated equipment: armored
personnel carriers, trucks, and four-wheel drive vehicles.
RBAF planners intend to work with the UK to move the vehicles
via sea lift to Cyprus for staging into Lebanon; they
estimate a total transit of 24 days. DepMinDef Yasmin told
us that airlift via leased Antonovs was another possible
option for moving the vehicles. The RBAF is also intending
to stage its troops through Cyprus, presumably via RAF
Akrotiri.
3. (C) Our RBAF and MinDef contacts were well aware of
Israeli objections to UNIFIL contributions from countries
which do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, and
also that the Israelis appeared to object more strongly to
Malaysian than to Indonesian involvement in UNIFIL. In
response to our questions, they said that an RBAF deployment
in conjunction with Indonesia alone would still be doable.
Colonel Jofri said it would require a change in planning
assumptions but the RBAF could adjust relatively quickly.
DepMinDef Yasmin told us that in some ways it was easier for
RBAF mechanized infantry to work with the Indonesians rather
than the Malaysians, since both Brunei and Indonesia operate
the same French-made APC's. (Comment: The RBAF has 35 VAB
and 20 Shorland APC's in its inventory.)
4. (C) DepMinDef Yasmin told us he has reached an agreement
with New Zealand for NZ forces to provide accelerated
peacekeeping training to the RBAF, which has only limited
peace monitoring experience in Aceh and Mindanao. Yasmin
expected the Kiwi trainers to arrive in Brunei within a week
to ten days to commence the training program. He believed
this would be useful even if the RBAF did not end up
deploying to UNIFIL, since it would support the previously
stated MinDef goal of having a dedicated PKO unit of at least
platoon size trained and operational by 2007.
5. (C) Notwithstanding the RBAF preparations, the GOB is not
pushing for an early invitation to UNIFIL and is well aware
of the diplomatic complications involving a UNIFIL
contribution. Dato Haji Shofry, Permanent Secretary for
Bilateral Relations at the MFAT, told us that the GOB
understands the political environment and knows about
BANDAR SER 00000440 002 OF 002
Israel's objections to accepting contributions from some
Muslim nations. That is why Brunei has not made a formal
offer of forces and is waiting for a request from UNSYG Kofi
Annan. Shofry said that normally the receiving country
approved PKO participants, but on a practical basis, the GOB
understood Israel's desire as a combatant to vet the PKO
force. He avoided a direct answer to our question about
whether the GOB would be willing to move forward with a
deployment over Israeli objections, but said it would be
reluctant to see "our boys" in a situation where one of the
recent combatants was opposed to the Bruneian presence.
COMMENT
--------------
6. (C) With a clear readiness to make good on the Sultan's
commitment to contribute forces to UNIFIL, the GOB has
accepted a realistic "wait and see" attitude to deal with
this operation's political complexities. Our interlocutors
all expressed a desire to participate in the mission, but
were careful to indicate that their willingness not be seen
as an attempt to force anything on Israel. Current efforts
to improve training and readiness of the RBAF's PKO-capable
units are a clear sign that the GOB is serious about its
commitment to play a wider role in international multilateral
operations.
SKODON