Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAMAKO521
2006-05-08 16:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

FALLOUT FROM QADHAFI'S VISIT CONTINUES AS TUAREGS

Tags:  PREL PINR PGOV EINV ASEC ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7297
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0521/01 1281616
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081616Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5364
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0248
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0022
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 0013
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0243
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0189
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0084
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000521 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
PARAMARIBO FOR DCM MARY BETH LEONARD
LIBREVILLE FOR GLENN FEDZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV EINV ASEC ML
SUBJECT: FALLOUT FROM QADHAFI'S VISIT CONTINUES AS TUAREGS
DEBATE AUTONOMY FOR KIDAL

REF: A. BAMAKO 00443

B. BAMAKO 00208

BAMAKO 00000521 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, U.S. Embassy
Bamako, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000521

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
PARAMARIBO FOR DCM MARY BETH LEONARD
LIBREVILLE FOR GLENN FEDZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV EINV ASEC ML
SUBJECT: FALLOUT FROM QADHAFI'S VISIT CONTINUES AS TUAREGS
DEBATE AUTONOMY FOR KIDAL

REF: A. BAMAKO 00443

B. BAMAKO 00208

BAMAKO 00000521 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, U.S. Embassy
Bamako, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The fallout from Qadhafi's tumultuous
mid-April visit to Timbuktu (ref A) continued to spread as
members of the National Assembly expressed concern over
Libya's intentions and some Tuareg leaders requested autonomy
for Kidal. On April 19 a group of National Assembly Deputies
suggested calling Prime Minister Issoufi Maiga before the
Assembly to answer questions regarding Libya's role in
northern Mali. Meanwhile, Qadhafi's Cabinet Director, Becher
Salah, arrived in Kidal to meet with former National Guard
deserter Hassan Fagaga. During the meeting, Fagaga and a
handful of northern leaders demanded autonomy for the Kidal
region - an old idea that seems to have resurfaced concurrent
with Qadhafi's sometimes bizarre interventions in the north.
End Summary.

--------------
Deputies Question Qadhafi's Motives
--------------


2. (C) On April 19 a group of National Assembly Deputies from
the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) suggested calling
Prime Minister Issoufi Maiga before the Assembly to respond
to questions regarding Mali's relationship with Libya. This
coincided with an official request by the Assembly for
testimony from the Ministers of Justice and Investment on
matters unrelated to the north. According to reports, the
Deputies hoped to ask the Prime Minister to explain the
reasoning behind Libya's newly opened consulate in Kidal
given the absence of any Libyan citizens in the region.
Reports indicated the Deputies were also eager for details of
Qadhafi's secretive meeting in Timbuktu with former National
Guard deserter Hassan Fagaga.


3. (C) An Embassy contact within the National Assembly
subsequently stated that the Assembly had no intentions of

formally calling the Prime Minister to testify. After what
appears to have been a quick intervention by the Presidency,
the Assembly's requests for testimony from the Justice and
Investment Ministers were also tabled.

--------------
No Hidden Agenda
--------------


4. (C) During an unusually candid press conference on April
30, however, Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane responded to
questions regarding Libya's role in the north. The
responsibilities of a consulate, Ouane told the national
press, go beyond serving the needs of citizen nationals.
According to Ouane, the Libyan consulate in Kidal serves as
an extension of the Libyan Embassy in Bamako by increasing
the reach of Libyan diplomacy and strengthening bilateral
cooperation. Ouane noted that during the consulate's opening
ceremony he met with his Libyan counterpart, the Libyan
Consul and the Governor of Kidal to ensure that the consulate
played by the "rules". Ouane did not specify what the
"rules" entailed. Ouane concluded by saying that there was
"no hidden agenda" behind the opening of the consulate in
Kidal.


5. (C) Comment. Ouane's remarks are interesting given his
initial opposition to Libya's request to open a consulate in
Kidal (see ref B). During his brief exchange with the press,
Ouane compared the Libyan consulate in Kidal to the Algerian
consulate in Gao and observed that while it was true no
Libyan citizens lived in Kidal, no Algerians lived in Gao
either. This is not altogether correct, however, since there
are a number of Algerian citizens in northern Mali and the
largely nomadic populations of northern Mali and southern
Algeria are closely linked. Unlike the Libyan Consul in
Kidal, moreover, the Algerian Consul in Gao administers no
development programs. End comment.


BAMAKO 00000521 002.2 OF 003


-------------- --------------
A Second Libyan Visit and Demands for Autonomy in Kidal
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Qadhafi's Cabinet Director, Bechir Salah, arrived in
Kidal on April 21 to celebrate the end of Lieutenant Colonel
Hassan Fagaga's "rebellion" and pursue "peace talks"
initiated during the private meeting between Fagaga and
Qadhafi held in Timbuktu one week earlier. Assuming the role
of facilitator, Salah presided over a meeting between Fagaga
and Kidal representatives, the Minister of Territorial
Administration Kafougouna Kone, the Governor of Gao, and the
Director of the Malian Office for Northern Development.


7. (C) Minister Kone - a former Minister of Defense and
active military General - was President Amadou Toumani
Toure's (ATT) commanding officer in 1991 when ATT led the
uprising that unseated former dictator Moussa Traore. Kone
is regarded as a close ATT confident and military advisor.
Dispatched from Bamako, Kone apparently intended to meet
Salah's plane in Gao but the Libyan delegation decided at the
last moment to fly directly to Kidal instead, enabling Salah
to precede the arrival of his Malian host just as Qadhafi
preceded the arrival of ATT in Timbuktu.


8. (C) During the meeting Fagaga and his followers
articulated a demand for greater autonomy for the Kidal
region. Kone rejected this idea, stating that such a move
would signal a step toward succession and the partition of
Mali. The Minister also rejected a request for financial
compensation for former rebels to ease their reintegration
into the Malian armed forces. In response, Salah offered
Libyan funding for rebel reintegration. Kone opposed this as
well and noted that, even if Libya were to provide
reintegration support, the funds would be given to the Malian
Office of Northern Development for distribution throughout
the northern regions.

--------------
Northerners Divided on Question of Autonomy
--------------


9. (C) Following the call for northern autonomy, a National
Assembly Deputy from the region of Menaka, Bajan Ag Hamatou,
stated publicly that he was "not in agreement with the people
of Kidal" regarding the question of autonomy and would "never
be associated with any project geared toward the partition of
Malian territory." Three days later, on April 28, Hamatou
retracted this statement and affirmed that he was, in fact,
in favor of autonomy if it would lead to improved development
for the north. On May 2 an influential former rebel leader,
Ilias Ag Ayouba of the Idaksahak group from the region of
Gao, issued a statement opposing greater autonomy for the
north. Ayouba then asked the Libyan Consul to intervene to
unite Tuareg communities behind the Malian republic and ATT.
On May 3 several former rebel leaders and northern
representatives met with northern National Assembly Deputies
in the office of the Assembly's 2nd vice-president, Assarid
Ag Imbarcawane. The northerners warned that the up to now
silent GOM needed to make an official statement vis-a-vis
Kidal autonomy or risk being overtaken by events.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) The Malian press initially reported that Bechir Salah
would arrive in Kidal with a shipment of weapons to be
incinerated in a symbolic bonfire akin to the 1996 "Flame of
Peace" in Timbuktu that marked the end of the last Tuareg
rebellion. Although the arms and bonfire never materialized,
Qadhafi's foray into the politics of northern Mali has
re-ignited a somewhat familiar national debate. Periodic
demands for northern autonomy are not new. The concept's
sudden re-emergence, however, in conjunction with intensified
Libyan interest and increased oil speculation in the north,
provides a new and rather uncertain dynamic. Indeed, some
national commentators have suggested that current rumblings
over northern autonomy "smell of oil". Whether this is

BAMAKO 00000521 003.2 OF 003


actually the case, the renewed calls for autonomy, Libya's
role as a suspected supporter of past Tuareg revolts,
Qadhafi's recent references to a "Greater Sahara", and
promises of large-scale Libyan funded development projects
have sparked a genuine sense of concern within the GOM.
McCulley