Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAMAKO1359
2006-11-28 17:05:00
SECRET
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

MALI'S UNSETTLED NORTH: RESTIVE TUAREGS, RESTIVE

Tags:  PREL PINR PINS PGOV ML 
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INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0297
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0230
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RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLMC/MCC WASHINGTON DC 0011
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001359 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUCOM FOR POLAD
SOCEUR FOR RADM MCRAVEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS PGOV ML
SUBJECT: MALI'S UNSETTLED NORTH: RESTIVE TUAREGS, RESTIVE
PRESIDENT

REF: A. BAMAKO 1244

B. BAMAKO 1243

BAMAKO 00001359 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Terence P. McCulley, Embassy Bamako,
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001359

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUCOM FOR POLAD
SOCEUR FOR RADM MCRAVEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS PGOV ML
SUBJECT: MALI'S UNSETTLED NORTH: RESTIVE TUAREGS, RESTIVE
PRESIDENT

REF: A. BAMAKO 1244

B. BAMAKO 1243

BAMAKO 00001359 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Terence P. McCulley, Embassy Bamako,
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(S) Summary: The Tuareg rebel group known as the Alliance
for Democracy and Change (ADC) has reportedly recalled its
three representatives from the Algiers Accords nine-person
steering committee. The action followed a five day, November
6 - 11, meeting in Algeria between the ADC, the GOM, the
Algerian Ambassador to Mali and other Algerian officials. In
the Ambassador's subsequent meeting with President Amadou
Toumani Toure (ATT),the President expressed frustration with
contradictory Algerian actions which on the one hand
purported to support the Accords and on the other could
effectively turn northern Mali into a battlefield. ATT told
the Ambassador he would soon make a State visit to Algeria,
during which he would propose that President Bouteflika
convene a meeting at the Chief of State level including Niger
and Mauritania on how to best address the issue of the GSPC
presence in the trans-Sahara region. ATT would welcome
expanded U.S. training for Malian military forces in Tessalit
and the new "motorized camel corps" foreseen in the Algiers
accords, but highly prizes a distinctly regional flavor to
any eventual plan. The Algerian Ambassador to Mali claims
that the ADC has not abandoned the Algiers Accords, and a
combined Algerian civilian-military delegation arrived in
Bamako on November 25 to hold talks with key Government of
Mali interlocutors. End Summary.

--------------
ADC Pull-out from Algiers?
--------------


2. (U) According to various press sources, in withdrawing
from Algiers the ADC accused Malian authorities of failing to
respect the spirit or fulfill the provisions of the Accords.
The ADC specifically noted failures to:

--create a new regional council in Kidal;

--reposition Malian military bases to the outskirts of Kidal;
and,

--pull back Malian military reinforcements sent to Kidal

following the May 23 attacks.


3.(C) The ADC indicated that other steps, including the
redeployment of Malian soldiers, the return of weapons stolen
on May 23 and the creation of all-nomad military units, would
not proceed until these benchmarks were met. Some local
media reports have gone so far as to proclaim the Accords as
dead, attributing their failure to the ADC's refusal to
comply with provisions concerning rebel disarmament. The ADC
said it was recalling its three representatives to the
steering committee because they were "neither respected, nor
listened to nor implicated in decisions." As a result, the
ADC preferred to "provisionally" recall its representatives
pending further clarification of their official role as
steering committee members. The Algerian Ambassador to Mali
told Ambassador that a combined Algerian civilian-military
delegation had arrived in Bamako on November 25 for talks
with ATT and Minister of Territorial Administration
Kafougouna Kone, in an effort to put the implementation of
the Algiers Accords back on track.

--------------
Conflicting Goals
--------------


4. (C) The ADC's challenges to GOM good faith
notwithstanding, it is increasingly unlikely that the ADC
would agree to any form of disarmament in the near-term given
its on-going feud with the GSPC. Algeria's decision to
provide material support to the ADC has seriously complicated
Algeria's role as an independent mediator and undercut the
Accords' provision regarding rebel disarmament.


5. (S) In a November 10 meeting with the President, the
Ambassador asked for his interpretation of the seeming

BAMAKO 00001359 002.2 OF 002


duality within the Government of Algeria, with its Foreign
Ministry overseeing Accords that military support to the the
ADC against the GSPC patently undermined. In reply, ATT
announced his intention to make a long-scheduled State visit
to Algeria in which he would propose a heads of state meeting
among Mali, Algeria, Niger, and Mauritania. The goal of the
meeting would be to devise a cohesive plan for these four
actors to manage/remove the GSPC presence from the Sahel.
ATT expressed frustration with the Algerians in particular,
noting it was their fault the GSPC was in northern Mali in
the first place. "If they had done their job, the GSPC would
never have left Algeria." He found it absurd that the
Algerians would suppose "ragtag Tuareg rebels" could
successfully complete the task at which the altogether
credible force that is the Algerian military had failed,
namely dispatching the GSPC. Not only, therefore, was their
support to the ADC unlikely to achieve that end, but it has
the unfortunate side effect of emboldening the Tuaregs
against key disarmament provisions of the Algiers accords.
Worst, concluded ATT, "the Algerians could turn my country
into a battlefield."


6. (C) As for next steps, ATT acknowledged that the GSPC is
a real threat, but one that must be addressed in concert with
Mali's partners in the region, thus his planned proposal to
President Bouteflika for renewed strategizing among the
affected neighbors. ATT was cautious about any direct Malian
military action in a short term, because the current
volatility of the situation in the north meant such action
could itself create a northern battlefield. Moreover, as the
GSPC had as yet not attacked any Malian installations, he was
loathe to risk GSPC retaliation that could injure or kill
Malian civilians. He also noted that the Malian military had
attempted an action against the GSPC in 2003, and sustained
serious casualties.


7. (C) As for eventual U.S. assistance towards the northern
Mali problem, ATT reiterated his intention to welcome Tuareg
militants who accepted the accords to transit camps, from
which they would be dispersed into regular military units, as
well as to create one specialized unit to operate in the
north. He expressed keen interest in continued regular
training events with U.S. forces such as the ongoing JCET,
and requested that this training be expanded at the
appropriate time to include units in Tessalit, and even,
eventually, the new special unit for the north.

--------------
Comment:
--------------


8. (S) As he prepares to launch his campaign for re-election
in 2007, ATT remains restive about the possibility that
intemperate actions from any number of the concerned parties
could destabilize Mali's delicate north. While his plan to
seek high-level concertation on next steps is a genuine
reflection of that concern, it has the probable ancillary
benefit of prolonging the lack of a definitive resolution.
Presidential candidate ATT has good reason to hope to limp
along without northern fireworks until after the Presidential
elections, now less than six months away. As for the U.S.
role, we need to balance our goal of denying space to or
eliminating the GSPC from northern Mali with our larger
long-term objectives of supporting a stable and democratic
Mali and enhancing the country's capacity to address multiple
security threats in the north. While we should explore how
to expand our training calendar with Malian security forces,
we must tread carefully to keep the U.S. footprint as light
as possible. Mali's civilian and military leadership is
unanimous in seeking expanded engagement with U.S. forces,
but President Toure is manifestly reluctant to consider a
sustained U.S. presence in northern Mali, particularly if
this could throw his military into a conflict with the GSPC.
McCulley