TUAREG AND GOM OFFICIALS PROVIDE DETAILS ON GSPC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001244

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS PGOV ML
SUBJECT: TUAREG AND GOM OFFICIALS PROVIDE DETAILS ON GSPC
ATTACK AND ACCORDS

REF: BAMAKO 1112

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(S) Summary: On October 26 Acherif ag Mohammed, a
presidential advisor on Tuareg affairs, provided the Embassy
with further details regarding the October 23 battle between
the Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) and the GSPC.
Acherif remains in close contact via telephone with ADC
leaders Iyad ag Ghali, Ahmada ag Bibi and others. Acherif
described the October 23 battle that left at least 7 ADC
fighters dead as an "accident" with "extremely worrisome"
consequences. Also on October 26, a key official within the
Ministry of Territorial Administration who is also reportedly
close to President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) candidly told
the Embassy that the GSPC's recent vow to eliminate the ADC's
leadership worked to the GOM's advantage, stating that "the
enemy of my enemy is my friend." While this latter view
reflects widespread anger in southern Mali toward the Tuareg
rebels, it does not have great currency within the senior
Malian leadeship. Minister of Territorial Administraion Kone
told the Ambassador recently that the GSPC must be eliminated
from northern Mali by the Malian army, and President Toure
has said that the GSPC is a problem that must be addressed by
security forces from the sub-region. End Summary.

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An "Accident" with Serious Consequences
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2.(S) Acherif ag Mohammed, presidential advisor and
confidant of Tuareg rebel leader Iyad ag Ghali, described the
October 23 battle between the ADC and GSPC as an "accident."
According to Acherif, the ADC patrol that has tracked the
GSPC since the first skirmish on September 19 was "looking
but not looking" for the GSPC. In other words, ag Ghali had
ordered the patrol to follow the GSPC but avoid contact. The
patrol was also apparently instructed not to travel beyond
the zone of Kidal and into region of Timbuktu which is
controlled by Arab/Berabich smugglers. On the morning of
October 23, however, the ADC patrol unexpectedly came across
recent GSPC tire tracks leading into the Timbuktu zone.
After a brief argument, two vehicles comprised of, in Acherif
words, "undisciplined" ADC elements, sped off into the region
of Timbuktu in search of the GSPC. A few minutes later the
two ADC vehicles crested a ridge and unexpectedly drove into
the GSPC camp, with disastrous results. Hearing the gun-fire
and possible RPG explosions, the rest of the ADC contingent
quickly traversed the Kidal-Timbuktu frontier to support the
two vehicles already engaged. ADC fighters reported that the
GSPC had 8 to 10 vehicles. It appears that the ADC has
recovered the body of at least one of the two Tuaregs taken
prisoner by the GSPC during the fight.

3.(S) By entering the Berabich controlled zone of Timbuktu
to engage and pursue the GSPC, the ADC violated what appears
to have been a long-standing informal understanding between
Tuareg and Berabich groups to steer clear of each other's
territory. Acherif said that he could not predict the
Berabich response to this incursion. Echoing the statement
posted to the ADC's web site following the October 23 attack,
Acherif said some Berabich living in and around the town of
Timbuktu were known GSPC supporters. When asked if he found
the apparent widening of the conflict in the north worrisome,
Acherif said it was "more than a little worrisome. It is
extremely worrisome."

4.(S) Acherif reported that ATT dispatched the president of
the Algiers Accords oversight committee, Mamadou Diagouraga,
and the Governor of Kidal to meet with Iyad ag Ghali nearly
three weeks ago. Ag Ghali told the delegation that until the
Algiers Accords were implemented, he had no interest in
talking with ATT. Acherif also reported that there were many
rumors regarding the "presence of American forces in
Taoudenni," (sic) in the northernmost portion of the region
of Timbuktu. He said that many in northern Mali believed
that the ADC was receiving aid from the U.S. in addition to
the military hardware provided by Algeria. (Note: Although
a JCET exercise is ongoing in Mali, there are no U.S. forces
north of Timbuktu. A planned Defense Attache visit to
Taoudenni via U.S. military aircraft in late September was
canceled at the request of Malian military leadership in
Timbuktu, on grounds of insufficient time to implement
appropriate security. End note.)

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Role of GOM
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5.(S) The GOM has neither taken an official position on the
ADC-GSPC fighting in the north, nor publicly commented on
Algeria's role in supporting the ADC, apparently undercutting
the portion of the Algiers Accords requiring the rebels to
turn back their arms to the GOM. On October 26 a key
official and ATT confidant in the Ministry of Territorial
Administration (which is charged, under the leadership of
Minister Kafougouna Kone, with implementing the Algiers
Accords) told the Embassy that hostilities between the GSPC
and the ADC worked to the GOM's advantage. The GSPC, said
the official, vowed to eliminate all of the ADC's leadership.
"The enemy of my enemy is my friend," said the individual,
and he did not respond further when asked if this meant the
GOM was favoring the GSPC. While this latter view reflects
widespread anger in southern Mali toward the Tuareg rebels,
it does not have great currency within the senior Malian
leadeship. Minister of Territorial Administraion Kone told
the Ambassador recently that the GSPC must be eliminated from
northern Mali by the Malian army, and President Toure has
said that the GSPC is a problem that must be addressed by
security forces from the sub-region.

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Comment: Saving the Accords
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6.(S) The heavy losses suffered by the ADC on October 23,
their incursion into what was previously regarded as Berabich
territory, and vows of revenge by the GSPC have significantly
weakened the Algiers Accords implementation process, and the
cantonment of the rebels set for October 28 did not take
place as planned. The hostilities between the ADC and GSPC,
and Algeria's role in supporting the ADC, have likely
rendered the Accords' provision regarding rebel disarmament
problematic. The comment by the Territorial Administration
Official crediting the GSPC's actions against the ADC as a
helpful contribution to Mali's Tuareg rebel problem is
jarring. It also contrasts sharply with Minister Kone's
recent remarks to the Ambassador (reftel) that Mali is
impatient with Algeria's choice of the ADC vice the Malian
military in fighting the GSPC. The dichotomy of views
between two Presidential insiders gives insight into the torn
sentiments at senior GOM levels, based in lingering mistrust
of the Tuaregs, and frustration over GOM ability to control
its territory. Whether the GOM is secretly content to let
the ADC keep arms to weaken the GSPC, or the ADC is
emboldened by Algerian support to refrain from disarming,
neither tendency is promising for the disarmament piece of
the Algiers Accords. The deteriorating security situation
also makes the repositioning of Malian military forces around
and within Kidal increasingly unlikely. For Acherif, the
only way to save the accords is to skip the provisions on
disarmament and military repositioning and proceed directly
to the creation of "all-nomad" military units. Were the GOM
able to grandfather the ADC into the military as
"specialized" units, it would convert the ADC from an
Algerian proxy force into an arm of the Malian military.
Such a course would reassure a variety of GOM concerns in the
north.
McCulley