SECOND TUAREG - GSPC BATTLE PLACES ALGIERS ACCORDS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001243

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS PGOV ML
SUBJECT: SECOND TUAREG - GSPC BATTLE PLACES ALGIERS ACCORDS
IN DOUBT

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: Concern over the status of the Algiers
Accords deepened following a second battle between the Tuareg
Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) and the Salafist
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). One day before the
ADC-GSPC October 23 fight, an official within the Malian
Ministry of Territorial Administration told Radio France that
rebel disarmament and the repositioning of Malian military
units in Kidal would begin on October 28 under Malian and
Algerian supervision. The same day, the ADC claimed to have
no knowledge of the October 28 deadline and described the
GOM's "unilateral" decision as a "provocation." After the
ADC-GSPC firefight, the ADC released a second statement
accusing the GOM, First Lady Toure Lobbo Traore and the
Malian Arab/Berabich community of using the GSPC as a proxy
to weaken Tuareg rebels (this posting was later removed from
the ADC website). Embassy contacts from the Arab and Tuareg
community stressed that without the re-establishment of a
direct channel of communication between President Amadou
Toumani Toure (ATT) and ADC leader Iyad ag Ghali, the
situation could deteriorate further. As of this writing, ADC
disarmament and cantonment in Kidal had not taken place. End
Summary.

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The ADC's Statement
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2.(C) Following the October 23 battle between members of the
ADC and the GSPC in the Timbuktu region of northern Mali, the
ADC released a statement accusing the Malian military of
helping the Arab/Berabich community support the GSPC; the ADC
threatened action in response, albeit in the the realm of
international opinion, of the potential negative consequences
of such support. As reported via other channels, seven ADC
members were reportedly killed, with three seriously wounded
and two individuals taken prisoner. The text of the ADC's
statement was posted on the ADC's website
(http://azawad-union.blogspot.com) on October 24 and then
removed a few hours later. (Text follows at paragraph 9.)

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Accords on the Rocks
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3.(C) The leak to French radio of Territorial Administration
Minister Kafougouna Kone's apparent deal with Algeria to
reposition Malian forces and begin collecting the ADC's
weapons on October 28, together with the ADC's heavy losses
at the hands of the GSPC on October 23, further threatened
the Accords implementation process. The process has been
stalled for several months due to the Accords' failure to
indicate whether the Malian military must withdraw to the
outskirts of Kidal before or after the rebels return the
weapons stolen during the May 23 Kidal and Menaka attacks.
The ADC was apparently not part of Kone's recent arrangement
with Algeria regarding the timetable for disarming the rebels
and the repositioning of Malian military units, and described
the decision as a "provocation."

4.(C) Following the ADC's October 24 statement, many
observers suggested the status of the Accords was now in
doubt. In this view, the ADC would refuse to disarm if they
believed the GOM was arming their GSPC opponents.
Additionally, some have noted the irony of the Algerians who
facilitated the accords providing logistic support to Mali's
"armed bandits" so that they can attack the Algerian
Salafists. Others have questioned whether it is purely
coincidence that the ADC launched its campaign against the
GSPC at the very moment the ADC was supposed to have begun
turning in its weapons. According to one local media
account, the GSPC finds itself "caught between the fire of
the Kidal insurgents and the Algerian army, and is under
close surveillance by the Americans who have tracked the
GSPC's movements for years." The GOM, on the other hand, is
reportedly "embarrassed by the unfolding of a situation that
risks to delay, if not completely compromise, the
implementation of the Algiers Accords."

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The Need for Dialogue
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5.(C) Amidst the heightened level of uncertainty and concern
following the ADC-GSPC confrontations, Arab and Tuareg
contacts have stressed the need for resumed dialogue between
President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) and Iyad ag Ghali. A
Bamako-based Tuareg who remains in close contact with Iyad ag
Ghali and Ahmada ag Bibi told the Embassy that to resolve the

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current conflict and ease tensions in the north, ATT needed
to re-open direct channels of communication with Iyad ag
Ghali. Talks between the two men reportedly ceased more than
a month ago. Timbuktu Arabs express a similar point of view.
For the Arab community, Iyad and the ADC are increasingly
unpredictable. The worst thing ATT can do, one contact told
the Embassy, is ignore Iyad.



6. (U) Text of statement posted (and then withdrawn the
same day) on ADC website, October 24:

"24 October 2006, When A State Supports Terrorists:
Doesn't one often say that the friend of my friend is my
friend: Mali is supporting the Berabich who are aiding the
GSPC and therefore by association Mali is aiding the GSPC.
The government created an Arab militia largely composed of
Berabich and allied nomadic fractions following the famous
Gossi meeting (of Malian Arabs held in May 2006) that was
widely publicized and covered by the Malian media. The
origin of this idea comes, we know, from the First Lady of
Mali Lobbo Traore who has family ties to these Arab groups
and who thought of creating an anti-Alliance militia. It so
happens that the Berabich are helping the terrorists. In any
case, one truth is apparent: on May 23 we gained a sufficient
quantity of arms and ammunition to spark a war and begin
long-term hostilities, but because of our love and attachment
for our meager territory we opted for dialogue and peace. In
contrast, in a spirit still loyal and patriotic, we decided
to expel the GSPC and all Islamic actors or terrorist
elements from our northern regions, these foreign actors who
have tarnished our image and our customs (by) hostage taking,
repeated acts of banditry and smuggling, it is unfortunate
that in the course of this struggle with these terrorists we
once again meet the hand of the Malian government. In the
deadly ambush of Monday, October 23, of which we were victims
we recognized and identified machine-guns belonging to the
Malian army. We will take action and you can be assured that
this is only the beginning. We intend to attract the
attention of international opinion in regard to the very
serious consequences the Malian security forces' plans can
provoke."
McCulley