EXCLUDED FROM ELECTORAL COMMISSION, IBK'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001154

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS PARM ML
SUBJECT: EXCLUDED FROM ELECTORAL COMMISSION, IBK'S
POLITICAL ISOLATION DEEPENS

REF: BAMAKO 001031

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: With the 2007 presidential elections now
less than six months away, President Amadou Toumani Toure's
(ATT) allies in the National Assembly and the National
Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) have maneuvered to
further isolate National Assembly leader and presumed
presidential challenger Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK). On
October 5 a broad coalition of political parties entitled
"Friends of ATT" ignored IBK's plea to avoid the "demons of
division" and excluded IBK's Rally for Mali (RPM) for the
second year in a row from the National Assembly's 18 rotating
leadership positions, leaving IBK with just the Presidency of
the National Assembly - a five year position that was not up
for renewal. This followed the RPM's September 27 exclusion
from the CENI due to a dispute with two parties, the Movement
for Renewal (MPR) and the National Committee for Democratic
Initiatives (CNID),formerly allied with IBK but now
supporting ATT. Although the RPM has attributed the setbacks
in the Assembly and the CENI to illegal actions by ATT and
his allies, IBK appears to be more a victim of shrewd
politics and his own inability to forge political alliances.
End Summary.

-------------- -
National Assembly Moves to Further Isolate IBK
-------------- -

2.(U) During an unexpectedly conciliatory speech to open the
new National Assembly session on October 2, National Assembly
President IBK urged his fellow Deputies to overcome the
"demons of division" and elect new Assembly officers based on
consensus rather than partisan politics. In October 2005 the
RPM refused to accept two officer posts in place of the four
it had demanded, thereby ending up with no positions in last
year's Assembly executive office. This year, members of a
new coalition of Deputies known as the "Friends of ATT"
didn't even bother to consult with their RPM colleagues.
Mustering an overwhelming majority, the Friends of ATT simply
renewed, for the first time in Assembly history, the annual
mandates of the outgoing 18 officers. As a result, once
again none of the Assembly's 8 vice-presidents, 8 secretaries
and 2 administrative officer posts were allocated to the RPM.


3.(U) Although the RPM holds more seats than any other party
in the 147 seat Assembly, without any significant political
alliances the 41 RPM Deputies could do nothing more than
stage a ceremonial boycott of the vote. Outside the Assembly
building an RPM spokesman read a statement condemning rival
Deputies for failing to even inform the RPM of their
intentions. "Voting to return the outgoing executive
office," declared the RPM's statement, "defied all of the
Assembly's democratic procedures" and violated internal
regulations stipulating that the Assembly's office "reflect
the configuration of parliament."

4.(C) IBK's remarkably moderate October 2 speech to open the
new Assembly session appeared to many as an attempt to
re-build political bridges. Judging from the allocation of
Assembly officers, IBK's speech failed to yield any new
alliances and his political capital within the Assembly may
have reached an all-time low. With colleagues from rival
parties eager to show their support for ATT, IBK may have
succeeded only in deflating many of his own supporters who
had anticipated a full-blown campaign speech attacking ATT.


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RPM Challenges Exclusion From Electoral Commission
-------------- --------------

5.(C) In another setback for IBK, the Ministry of
Territorial Administration left the RPM off of the 15 member
National Independent Electoral Commission announced September

27. The RPM immediately challenged the decision, declaring
that Minister of Territorial Administration Kafougouna Kone's
failure to include the RPM was not "an isolated act" and
"revealed a clearly expressed willingness to exclude certain
actors from the electoral process." According to the RPM,
Minister Kone's decision "placed in doubt the sincerity and
transparency of the coming elections and endangered the
stability of the country."

6.(C) Normally the CENI is composed of 5 members of the
majority party, 5 members of the political opposition and 5
representatives from civil society. Since there is no
official opposition party in Mali and alliances between major

BAMAKO 00001154 002 OF 002


parties remain in flux, political leaders agreed to base the
composition of this year's CENI on the political alliances
that existed during the 2002 presidential election. The new
CENI consequently consists of 2 representatives from each of
the three main political coalitions circa 2002, plus 2 spots
for political independents, one space for the Union for the
Republic and Democracy (URD),one space for a largely
insignificant group that styles itself as an "opposition"
party, and 5 seats for civil society.

7.(C) Although IBK and the RPM agreed to this structure, the
coalition known as "Hope 2002" to which they belonged five
years ago has since disintegrated. As Hope 2002's former
president, IBK apparently assumed he would be able to ensure
that the coalition selected two individuals from the RPM as
its CENI nominees. But Hope 2002's two other key members,
the MPR and CNID, refused to play along. The MPR is led by
ATT's Minister of Trade Choguel Maiga. The CNID's president
is Mountaga Tall, the 1st vice-president of the National
Assembly. Maiga and Tall have endorsed ATT's 2006
re-election bid. With both the RPM and the MPR-CNID claiming
to represent Hope 2002, each faction submitted its own list
of nominees for the coalition's two seats on the CENI.
Rather than split the difference and take one from each list,
Minister of Territorial Administration Kone discarded the
RPM's nominations and named the MPR-CNID nominees to the
electoral commission.

8.(C) In response, on October 10 the RPM asked the Malian
Supreme Court to strike down the presidential decree naming
the members of the Independent Electoral Commission.
Convinced that Minister Kone violated Mali's electoral law by
discarding the list of nominees submitted by IBK in his role
as president of Hope 2002, the RPM's communications director
stated: "We are going to challenge and obtain the CENI's
annulment." "An incomplete CENI," explained another RPM
leader, "is worthless. It is not Kafougouna Kone's place to
delve into the management of political coalitions. That he
did this constitutes a misuse of excessive power. He
overstepped his authority."

9.(C) A few hours after the RPM lodged its complaint with
the Supreme Court, the leaders of the MPR and CNID released a
lengthy statement commending Minister Kone's management of
the situation and condemning IBK for "posing once again as a
victim." After accusing IBK of trying to set the stage for
an eventual protest of the 2007 electoral results, the
statement concluded by offering the MPR-CNID's two CENI seats
to the RPM in order to "preserve" peace and stability. It
remains unclear whether the RPM will accept the two CENI
positions apparently vacated by the MPR-CNID or pursue the
annulment of the entire CENI before the Supreme Court. On
October 15 the RPM's communication's director linked the
events surrounding the composition of the CENI to the officer
elections within the National Assembly and said the RPM would
not drop its case before the Supreme Court. "We are
attacking a decree," said RPM communications director and
National Assembly Deputy Boubacar Traore. "If this decree is
annulled, there is no CENI. There will then be a new decree
that will create and designate new CENI representatives."

--------------
Comment
--------------

10.(C) By closing the RPM out of both the National
Assembly's executive bureau and the CENI, ATT further
increased IBK's political isolation. IBK's complaint that
the electoral deck is stacked against him has some credence,
but is largely attributable, not to misdeeds by ATT, but
shrewd presidential politics and IBK's own miscalculations.
With only 41 out of 147 seats in the National Assembly and
its previous political alliances crumbling, the RPM's failure
to win leadership posts within the Assembly is unsurprising.
ATT, on the other hand, has proved remarkably adept at lining
up coalitions of diverse political groupings to out-flank IBK
at nearly every turn. IBK's assumption that the members of
the long defunct Hope 2002 alliance would support his chosen
nominees for the CENI is particularly hard to fathom given
that the political sentiments of MPR and CNID leaders Choguel
Maiga and Mountaga Tall were well known in advance. By
submitting their own list of CENI nominees, Maiga and Tall
succeeded in throwing IBK further off balance. The
MPR-CNID's allegations that the RPM is trolling for a legal
justification to support claims of electoral malfeasance
should be taken seriously, however. As reported previously
(reftel),it appears increasingly likely that IBK will play
the fraud card, whether warranted or not, should the 2007
election not go his way.
LEONARD