Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAKU660
2006-05-01 12:24:00
SECRET
Embassy Baku
Cable title:
EU SPECIAL REP SEMNEBY ON EU SOUTH CAUCASUS POLICY
how-toVZCZCXRO9718 PP RUEHAG RUEHDBU DE RUEHKB #0660/01 1211224 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 011224Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAKU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0260 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000660
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PREF PBTS PNAT AJ GG RU MD
SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL REP SEMNEBY ON EU SOUTH CAUCASUS POLICY
Classified By: acting DCM Joan A. Polaschik, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000660
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PREF PBTS PNAT AJ GG RU MD
SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL REP SEMNEBY ON EU SOUTH CAUCASUS POLICY
Classified By: acting DCM Joan A. Polaschik, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: EUR Senior Advisor Steven Mann met with EU
Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby
(Sweden) on April 22. Semneby provided a readout of his
recent conversation with Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister
Azimov, outlined the EU process for committing peacekeepers,
and advocated close coordination and a strong line on the
Georgian separatist conflicts. END SUMMARY
-------------- --------------
NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING INSIGHTS FROM AZIMOV
-------------- --------------
2. (S) Semneby gave a readout of his April 21 meeting with
Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, who shared
several ideas about the composition of a potential
peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K): it should not
include Russians, preferably be UN-led (to ensure an
Azerbaijani voice),and roughly resemble the provincial
reconstruction teams crrently active in Afghanistan. Azimov
told Semnby he would like to see peacekeepers assist in the
return of refugees and internally displaced persons.
Conceding that a military force would be required initially,
Azimov reportedly envisioned a drawdown to a police force as
N-K evolved into a semi-autonomous region of Azerbaijan with
self-government capacities similar to those of the
Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan. More generally, Azimov
told Semneby that the G-8 might be a realistic target for
working out an N-K deal, but he complained that proposed
working groups on the modalities of a referendum on the final
status of N-K could not delay progr
ess on other measures.
--------------
N-K PEACEKEEPING: THE EU PERSPECTIVE
--------------
3. (S) Semneby said he had contacted the chief EU military
planner the previous week to request a report on peacekeeping
options by the end of May. He planned to involve the
national intelligence services of EU member states in the
planning phase, as well. He said he would report to the EU
on peacekeeping options by the end of May in an effort to
sensitize member states to the issue and ensure they will be
able to make a decision when the time comes. From the
signing of a peace agreement, Semneby said the EU would
require six weeks of "pre-planning," an undetermined length
of time for member states to reach a political decision, and
two additional months to get boots on the ground. If an N-K
peacekeeping force were to be EU-led, Semneby said it would
be led out of one of the EU's four international command
centers: in Germany, the UK, France, or Greece.
4. (S) Semneby returned to the peacekeeping issue at the end
of the meeting with a plea for as much detail as possible on
peacekeeping in any agreement between Presidents Aliyev and
Kocharian. He said the EU will require a formal trigger to
start the planning process and that the two sides will need
to state exactly what they want. He asked specifically if a
law-enforcement component was envisioned. Mann outlined a
vision of a 5000-man force for approximately three years that
would ultimately be drawn down to a monitoring force. He
told Semneby that any successful peacekeeping force in N-K
and the occupied territories would need to be asymmetric
(i.e. deployed in greater numbers in the most politically
sensitive areas) and might able to rely on remote sensor
technologies to enhance monitoring efforts.
-------------- --------------
GEORGIAN SEPARATIST CONFLICTS: MORE VISIBILITY NEEDED
-------------- --------------
5. (C) On Georgia, Semneby said he believes Abkhazia is
closer to annexation than South Ossetia but that both
conflicts need to be raised "at the highest levels all the
time." He plans a trip in the next few weeks to South
Ossetia with Georgia OSCE Head of Mission Roy Reeve. Semneby
is keen on getting international media attention on the
Georgia conflicts: "people need to see it," he said. Having
worked at the OSCE mission in Tbilisi in 1992-93, Semneby
called it an "outrage" that no progress has been made on the
conflicts in the last thirteen years. Tangentially, he
called for closer coordination with EU Special Representative
for the Transnistria conflict, Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged.
BAKU 00000660 002 OF 002
More centrally, he bemoaned the fact that the EU continues to
have a problem reaching consensus on its Russia policy.
6. (C) Semneby said he spoke recently to Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili, who advocated renegotiating the Sochi
Agreement in order to transform negotiations on South Ossetia
into "a real dynamic process." Semneby reportedly argued for
patience on this point, urging Saakashvili not to act too
quickly and jeopardize the upcoming South Ossetia donors'
conference. Semneby was focused on the benefits of the South
Ossetia needs assessment survey and impending donors
conference, arguing that they would ensure an international
presence in the region and lead to a change in format with
financial contributors leading the charge to resolve the
conflict.
7. (U) Ambassador Mann has cleared this cable.
HYLAND
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PREF PBTS PNAT AJ GG RU MD
SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL REP SEMNEBY ON EU SOUTH CAUCASUS POLICY
Classified By: acting DCM Joan A. Polaschik, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: EUR Senior Advisor Steven Mann met with EU
Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby
(Sweden) on April 22. Semneby provided a readout of his
recent conversation with Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister
Azimov, outlined the EU process for committing peacekeepers,
and advocated close coordination and a strong line on the
Georgian separatist conflicts. END SUMMARY
-------------- --------------
NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING INSIGHTS FROM AZIMOV
-------------- --------------
2. (S) Semneby gave a readout of his April 21 meeting with
Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, who shared
several ideas about the composition of a potential
peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K): it should not
include Russians, preferably be UN-led (to ensure an
Azerbaijani voice),and roughly resemble the provincial
reconstruction teams crrently active in Afghanistan. Azimov
told Semnby he would like to see peacekeepers assist in the
return of refugees and internally displaced persons.
Conceding that a military force would be required initially,
Azimov reportedly envisioned a drawdown to a police force as
N-K evolved into a semi-autonomous region of Azerbaijan with
self-government capacities similar to those of the
Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan. More generally, Azimov
told Semneby that the G-8 might be a realistic target for
working out an N-K deal, but he complained that proposed
working groups on the modalities of a referendum on the final
status of N-K could not delay progr
ess on other measures.
--------------
N-K PEACEKEEPING: THE EU PERSPECTIVE
--------------
3. (S) Semneby said he had contacted the chief EU military
planner the previous week to request a report on peacekeeping
options by the end of May. He planned to involve the
national intelligence services of EU member states in the
planning phase, as well. He said he would report to the EU
on peacekeeping options by the end of May in an effort to
sensitize member states to the issue and ensure they will be
able to make a decision when the time comes. From the
signing of a peace agreement, Semneby said the EU would
require six weeks of "pre-planning," an undetermined length
of time for member states to reach a political decision, and
two additional months to get boots on the ground. If an N-K
peacekeeping force were to be EU-led, Semneby said it would
be led out of one of the EU's four international command
centers: in Germany, the UK, France, or Greece.
4. (S) Semneby returned to the peacekeeping issue at the end
of the meeting with a plea for as much detail as possible on
peacekeeping in any agreement between Presidents Aliyev and
Kocharian. He said the EU will require a formal trigger to
start the planning process and that the two sides will need
to state exactly what they want. He asked specifically if a
law-enforcement component was envisioned. Mann outlined a
vision of a 5000-man force for approximately three years that
would ultimately be drawn down to a monitoring force. He
told Semneby that any successful peacekeeping force in N-K
and the occupied territories would need to be asymmetric
(i.e. deployed in greater numbers in the most politically
sensitive areas) and might able to rely on remote sensor
technologies to enhance monitoring efforts.
-------------- --------------
GEORGIAN SEPARATIST CONFLICTS: MORE VISIBILITY NEEDED
-------------- --------------
5. (C) On Georgia, Semneby said he believes Abkhazia is
closer to annexation than South Ossetia but that both
conflicts need to be raised "at the highest levels all the
time." He plans a trip in the next few weeks to South
Ossetia with Georgia OSCE Head of Mission Roy Reeve. Semneby
is keen on getting international media attention on the
Georgia conflicts: "people need to see it," he said. Having
worked at the OSCE mission in Tbilisi in 1992-93, Semneby
called it an "outrage" that no progress has been made on the
conflicts in the last thirteen years. Tangentially, he
called for closer coordination with EU Special Representative
for the Transnistria conflict, Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged.
BAKU 00000660 002 OF 002
More centrally, he bemoaned the fact that the EU continues to
have a problem reaching consensus on its Russia policy.
6. (C) Semneby said he spoke recently to Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili, who advocated renegotiating the Sochi
Agreement in order to transform negotiations on South Ossetia
into "a real dynamic process." Semneby reportedly argued for
patience on this point, urging Saakashvili not to act too
quickly and jeopardize the upcoming South Ossetia donors'
conference. Semneby was focused on the benefits of the South
Ossetia needs assessment survey and impending donors
conference, arguing that they would ensure an international
presence in the region and lead to a change in format with
financial contributors leading the charge to resolve the
conflict.
7. (U) Ambassador Mann has cleared this cable.
HYLAND