AZERBAIJAN'S OPPOSITION SKEPTICAL OF N-K PEACE AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000195

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN; EUR/SNEC
PARIS PLEASE PASS AMBASSADOR MANN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S OPPOSITION SKEPTICAL OF N-K PEACE AS
RHETORIC ON ALL SIDES HARDENS

REF: BAKU 170

Classified By: Ambassador Reno L. Harnish for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: From separate conversations with
working-level contacts among Azerbaijan's opposition
political leaders, it is evident that not only do many
political activists discount the sincerity of GOAJ efforts to
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but few have any
concrete ideas of their own. Most trot out rote statements
on the need to protect Azerbaijan's territorial integrity
(i.e. return to GOAJ control of all seven occupied
territories and the former autonomous region of Nagorno
Karabakh),a message that resonates with the general public.
While one group of civil society activists has focused on the
need to reduce radicalism on both sides, even this group of
political intellectuals has been unable to agree on concrete
steps they can take to move the peace process forward.
Without any government officials publicly advocating a
"realistic" peace plan, the GOAJ could find itself vulnerable
if and when it makes concessions to resolve the conflict.
Opposition parties could play a spoiler role on N-K, seizing
upon the GOAJ's "betrayal" as the platform they need to
regain support following November parliamentary elections.
END SUMMARY.

OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE LITTLE TO OFFER
--------------


2. (SBU) Discussions the first week of February with various
opposition party deputy chairmen revealed that the parties
have little to offer on a resolution to N-K beyond the
campaign rhetoric of last year. Asked for their thoughts on
the process and the prospect for peace, most responded with
doubt that the current regime could pull off a resolution.
According to opposition hard-liners, the current regime is
not democratic, does not represent the people and is seen as
illegitimate. According to the opposition's thinking, any
peace deal negotiated by the Aliyev government therefore
would not have the best interest of the people at heart. For
this reason, according to Fuad Mustafayev (Popular Front
Party),the people will reject any peace deal the GOAJ
negotiates. However, if the GOAJ were democratic, Mustafayev
surmised that the people would give the GOAJ a carte blanche
to negotiate in its interest.


3. (SBU) In this vein the opposition also criticized the GOAJ
for its lack of openness with the people and stated that
while it was understood the negotiating strategies of a
government cannot be public, the current regime has shared
nothing. This leaves the opposition little with which to
work, therefore contributing to the rampant (and probably
often unfounded) speculation in opposition newspapers. The
lack of information is also used by most with whom we spoke
to justify their lack of ideas on how to solve the conflict.
Chairman of the Umid Party and current MP Igbal Aghazade said
the opposition should be seen as an informal partner and
could provide feedback to the current government if allowed
to cooperate on some aspects of negotiation points.
Harder-line opposition contacts Mustafayev and Sulhaddin
Akhbar (Musavat) simply accused the GOAJ of manipulating the
conflict for political gain.


4. (SBU) Our contacts also had little to offer in terms of
what a resolution acceptable to Azerbaijanis would look like.
All unequivocally stated that Azerbaijan's territorial
integrity must be upheld, a point that seems to have almost
universal resonance in Azerbaijan. The idea of peacekeeping
troops once a resolution is reached was not outright
rejected, as long as the Russian Federation would not supply
those troops. (NATO was referenced as an acceptable
alternative). The issue of a referendum was also generally
not outright rejected, but most with whom we spoke were less
certain what ultimately would be "workable," i.e. a plan that
would serve the Azerbaijani interest of maintaining control
ovr N-K. The return of Azerbaijani IDPs to their hoelands
(Shusha and the occupied territories) is een as part and
parcel with preserving Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
Mustafayev, Aghazade, and YES Bloc leader Eldar Namazov all
underscored additionally that Azerbaijanis are tolerant
people; therefore, Armenians would not need to fear for their
security at Azerbaijani hands. Beyond these ideas, however,
our contacts had little conception (or would not share) what
a realistic, workable peace deal would look like.


5. (C) Unique among opposition contacts was Musavat's

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representative, Sulhaddin Akhbar. Although a regular embassy
contact, he refused to engage on the issue. Instead, he
chose to highlight how US security concerns, Iranian and
Russian pressure, and the intensifying debate over Iran's
possible nuclear weapons as reasons why the international
community and the GOAJ are unlikely to reach a resolution to
the conflict. The only constructive points he gave were that
if the following five points played any role in the
resolution, the deal would be rejected by Azerbaijanis: N-K
keeping any of its state symbols, N-K keeping military
forces, Lachin and Kelbajar being used as "hostages," (we
assume he was referring to a 5 1 1 resolution),any ban on
the entry of Azerbaijani military forces to the region, and
negotiating access for Armenia through the Lachin corridor.
He stated from a position of "authority" that the N-K talks
currently focused on Russia's demand for monetary
compensation prior to agreeing to any sort of resolution.
While Akhbar likely does not speak for the Musavat party
itself, he is a close advisor to party chairman Isa Gambar.
His conspiracy theories and lack of constructive feedback are
worrisome if this is the manner in which the leadership of
Musavat (one of the two largest opposition parties) is
discussing the N-K conflict with its supporters.

CIVIL SOCIETY: WALKING THROUGH A MINEFIELD
--------------


6. (SBU) While opposition leaders focus purely on rhetoric,
civil society figures tend to have more constructive
approaches to the N-K issue. Various groups have been
holding almost weekly roundtables and press conferences in
Baku to discuss the conflict. One group toiling outside the
public's eye is composed of influential civil society and
opposition figures such as Arzu Abdullayeva, Eldar Namazov,
Zardusht Alizade, Rasim Musabayov and Ilgar Mammedov (former
Embassy employee and former country director of the
International Crisis Group). At the group's February 6
Meeting, discussion dissolved into a disagreement over the
most effective means for civil society to participate in the
peace process. While no one expected civil society to
participate in the talks, the group debated to what extent
civil society initiatives, such as people-to-people diplomacy
and draft agreements, could affect the outcome of the
process. Expressing concern about the increasing
radicalization of both sides, the one point the group agreed
on was the need to counter official GOAJ propaganda vilifying
Armenia. The group finally agreed to begin work on a draft
constitution for Nagorno Karabakh with input from all parties
to the conflict, in hopes that it would stem growing
radicalism on both sides.


7. (SBU) However, work such as this comes with its own
dangers; several members of the group have been criticized
and publicly branded as "Armenian spies" for past work
involving bridge building with Armenians. These types of
accusations crop up in the press periodically. The most
recent incident involved the independent scholar Arif Yunus
(husband of NGO activist Leyla Yunus). Yunus has been
branded as a traitor and an "Armenian" for an interview he
gave criticizing corruption within the Ministry of Defense.
The independent TV channel ANS picked up the issue and has
been calling his statements treasonous, highlighting that an
Armenian press agency republished the interview. On January
30 the Minister of Defense reportedly said that only
Azerbaijanis of "pure" Azeri origin can criticize the
country's armed forces. The next day a group of veterans of
the Karabakh conflict stated that any criticism of the armed
forces is treasonous.


8. (SBU) ANS's February 8 coverage (two days before the
Rambouillet talks) continued its negative propaganda,
featuring a story on an Azerbaijani musician who traveled to
Yerevan with the support of several NGOs to perform an Azeri
song at a concert. GOAJ officials lambasted the musician on
air, including Deputy Foreign Minister Khalafov and
Ombudswoman Elmira Suleymanova saying that they did not agree
with his actions, but the people should judge the morality of
it. Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev went further,
saying that Azerbaijan should change its laws to prevent
these kinds of incidents from happening in the future.
During the story ANS also caried very disturbing footage of
alleged Armenianatrocities, including dead bodies and naked
wome and children. This type of propaganda, disseminated by
both independent and GOAJ sources, severely undermines
attempts at mutual understanding, reconciliation, and an
eventual resolution to the conflict.

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COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Given the close-hold nature of the N-K talks, the
complete lack of serious public debate on the issue, and the
Azerbaijani public's passionate insistence on the concept of
territorial integrity, the GOAJ will face a hard sell in the
event it reaches a negotiated settlement with Armenia. The
GOAJ's position could be further complicated by the
opposition parties, which are bruised and in search of a
platform following the difficult November parliamentary
elections. Without any prominent political voices speaking
out in favor of compromise and mutual understanding, N-K
could emerge as exactly the platform the opposition parties
need to rally support and regain a political following.
HARNISH