Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAKU1819
2006-12-14 07:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

DASD MACDOUGALL'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MOPS PHUM IR AJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140728Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1978
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1912
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0616
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0543
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 001819 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS PHUM IR AJ
SUBJECT: DASD MACDOUGALL'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL
FOREIGN ADVISOR NOVRUZ MAMMADOV

REF: A. BAKU 01533


B. BAKU 01582

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 001819

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS PHUM IR AJ
SUBJECT: DASD MACDOUGALL'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL
FOREIGN ADVISOR NOVRUZ MAMMADOV

REF: A. BAKU 01533


B. BAKU 01582

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: In a December 9 discussion with Department
of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary James MacDougall and
the Ambassador, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz
Mammadov said that as recent regional developments have again
underscored, Azerbaijan has "no alternative" to friendship
and partnership with the West and is committed to pursuing
this path of development "carefully, to avoid creating
problems or obstacles." Mammadov underscored the GOAJ,s
concern over recent Russian and Iranian pressure, pointing
with alarm to recent open threats and territorial claims in
the press from Iranian religious leaders who stated that
"even the US cannot protect you" if Iran decides to attack.
Mammadov said that Azerbaijan "needs a USG reaction to
Iran,s recent statements -- at least one sentence --
otherwise, it leaves the impression that Azerbaijan can be
attacked and no one will react." He said the GOAJ "is afraid
to make bold statements because we are not confident we will
be supported." Mammadov said that while Azerbaijan strives
to maintain good relations with Russia, "we know inside what
they really think and we see their real intentions" as they
are trying "to restore the political and strategic position
they lost ten years ago." He said that in light of recent
Russian pressure on gas and migrant workers, Azerbaijan is
considering raising the rent for Russian access to the Gabal
radar station. Mammadov appreciated MacDougall's update on a
potential Train and Equip program. Mammadov also welcomed
MacDougall's information about an upcoming USG delegation to
discuss Iran with the GOAJ. Mammadov considered First Lady
Mehriban Aliyeva's visit to the US a success, despite the
recent closure of the ANS television station. Mammadov
acknowledged that as a relatively new government, the GOAJ

did not always "properly assess the impact of our decisions"
and the likely consequences. End Summary


2. (C) Department of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary
James MacDougall and the Ambassador, accompanied by the
DATT, met with Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz
Mammadov on December 9.

Affirming Western Orientation, Bilateral Cooperation
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Mammadov said the bilateral relationship is "very
important for us" from the political, security, and
economic points of view. Mammadov affirmed the GOAJ's policy
of integration with the West, saying Azerbaijan "has no
alternative to friendship and partnership with the West, the
EU and the US," as recent regional developments have
underscored. Azerbaijan is committed to continuing this "path
of development," but with an obvious eye to its neighbors,
will do so "carefully: we should take these steps in a way
that they will not create problems or obstacles." Echoing
President Aliyev,s earlier comments that Azerbaijan,s
success "irritates" Iran, Mammadov suggested that
"Azerbaijan's success" is creating "jealousy" among some
other states in the region.

We Understand Russia's Real Intentions
--------------


4. (C) Mammadov remarked that Azerbaijan has "very good
relations with Russia," but recent developments demonstrate
that "we must also be careful...as neighbors, we try to keep
good relations, but we know inside what they really think and
we see their real intentions." The Russian decree on
migration restrictions is an example of Russia's feelings
toward Azerbaijan. During President Putin and Aliyev's last
meeting, Putin said that the status of Azerbaijanis living in
Russia must be legalized or they will be forced to leave,
according to Mammadov. Russia is acting in this manner
because it has felt "more confident" in the past several
years, and "thinks it now can
restore" the political and strategic position it lost ten
years ago, Mammadov said. He said Russia's "resurgence" is
"now more obvious on the global stage, to the EU and to the
US." However, it is "more a threat to Azerbaijan than to the
EU or the US."

BAKU 00001819 002 OF 004



"Tense" Relations with Iran
--------------


5. (C) Mammadov characterized relations with Iran as
"tense." Azerbaijan,s development path "creates jealousy,"
in Iran. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan tries to be careful
in its relations with Iran, Iranian religious leaders
including Khameini have made "open threats" and "territorial
claims" recently in the press. For example, one Iranian
article referred to Azerbaijan as a former Iranian province
which could be taken back, while another article said that
Iran could organize terrorist acts in Azerbaijan. Mammadov
noted that one article quoted Khameini stating bluntly that
if Iran decides to act, "even the US cannot protect you."
Mammadov passed several articles to the Ambassador. Mammadov
noted that President Ahmadinejad had told President Aliyev
directly, as well, that if Azerbaijan threatens Iran, Iran
will strike, and "the US cannot help." (Comment: Aliyev has
told us the same -- reftel. End comment.)


6. (C) Mammadov said that despite these threats, President
Aliyev is "firm -- we are committed to our course. We will
survive and overcome these pressures, whether from the north
or south." Indeed, these pressures "will push us more to the
West," Mammadov observed.

Consultations on Iran
--------------


7. (C) MacDougall told Mammadov that the US is preparing to
send a State-DoD team at the Assistant Secretary level
to discuss Iran-related issues with the GOAJ. The purpose of
the discussion is to share views about what is going on
inside Iran and to discuss how to deal with the security
threats posed by Iran. The USG intends to do this quietly to
avoid increasing tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran. The
Ambassador noted that President Aliyev welcomed this proposal
during a recent meeting. Mammadov supported the visit,
stating that "we understand each other" and such visits could
play an important role in the bilateral relationship: "such
visits are excellent, of great importance, are support for
our country, they give new energy to the relationship."


8. (C) Mammadov highlighted two factors that make dealing
with Iran even more challenging. Ahmadinejad's
"adventuresome behavior" gives confidence to the Iranian
people. International developments also encourage
Ahmadinejad. Mammadov then asked MacDougall and the
Ambassador about reports that some US elites believed the
USG should enter into a dialogue with Iran and Syria to help
bring stability to Iraq. Mammadov noted that exactly what
this means was "not clear to me," but that his position is
that "we can talk to them." MacDougall explained that this
was one recommendation of an independent commission and did
not represent a shift in USG policy.


9. (C) Mammadov said the GOAJ is not confident that the West
and the USG will support Azerbaijan if Tehran increases its
pressure against Baku. He recounted the 2001 incident when
Iran refused to allow British Petroleum workers to approach
and explore the disputed Alov oil field. He noted that
neither the UK nor the US "said anything, diplomatically"
about Iran's behavior. Mammadov said that Azerbaijan "needs
a USG reaction to Iran,s recent statements -- at least one
sentence -- otherwise, it leaves the impression that
Azerbaijan can be attacked and no one will react." He said
the GOAJ "is afraid to make bold statements because we are
not confident we will be supported." Mammadov pointed out
that even in Azerbaijan,s complex relations with Russia,
Putin has agreed that on certain subjects, he will publicly
support Azerbaijan. Even on the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK)
conflict, Russia takes a positive public line, "even though
we know they will not want to solve NK in Azerbaijan,s
interest."


10. (C) MacDougall acknowledged this was an important point
and one that should be discussed at the planned meeting on
Iran issues.

Potential Train and Equip
--------------

BAKU 00001819 003 OF 004




11. (C) MacDougall said he was pleased with his earlier
meetings with Defense Minister Abiyev and Deputy Foreign
Minister Azimov. Following up with Aliyev's request to
former SECDEF Rumsfeld, MacDougall noted that the USG is
still developing a plan for a potential Train and Equip
program for Azerbaijan. MacDougall noted that the funding
for any potential program would likely come from Coalition
Support Funds, which are designated for the Global War on
Terror (GWOT),and any potential program would require
Congressional support. The USG would require that any
Azerbaijani military units receiving this training be
deployed in support of a GWOT mission. MacDougall said
that since the Azerbaijani military is moving toward NATO
standards, perhaps the potentially trained units could be
sent to Afghanistan to assist the NATO-led mission there.


12. (C) Mammadov acknowledged the proposal, noting that it
should be discussed with Defense Minister Abiyev and
Foreign Minister Mammadyarov. Mammadov suggested that
Azerbaijani troops trained under the auspices of a
potential Train and Equip program could also replace
Azerbaijani units currently serving in Afghanistan, Iraq,
or Kosovo.


13. (C) Mammadov also said that in the coming one to five
months, the USG could have "a window for favorable conditions
for this mission." Mammadov stated that the GOAJ does not
know what the future of relations with Russia will be like.
If Russia continues to increase its pressure on Azerbaijan,
the GOAJ intends to raise the rent for Russia to have access
to the Gabal radar station. Mammadov referred to the current
rent the GOAJ receives as "merely symbolic," and the GOAJ
could increase the rent to 100 million dollars.

National Security Concept
--------------


14. (C) MacDougall congratulated Mammadov on the GOAJ's
"serious effort" in drafting its National Security Concept
(NSC). The Ambassador noted that Deputy Foreign Minister
Araz Azimov told her several days ago that he wants the USG
to be engaged in the drafting of the follow-on documents,
including the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy
Strategy. Specifically, Azimov said he wants a
government-to-governmental dialogue, not a US non-government
advisor assisting in the drafting process (septel). The
Ambassador noted that she would be working with Washington to
see how the USG can assist. Mammadov thanked the Ambassador.
He remarked that the NSC would have been finished earlier,
but the NK conflict slowed down the process. He said that if
the NK conflict were settled, "within one month" Azerbaijan
would begin implementing the NSC.

First Lady Visit and ANS Closure
--------------


15. (C) Mammadov thought the visit of Mehriban Aliyeva, the
Azerbaijani First Lady, to the US was successful. He
said that before the visit, there was concern within the GOAJ
that Aliyeva would be asked about the closure of the
ANS television station. The Ambassador noted that this
issue was indeed raised in the First Lady,s meetings, which
should have come as no surprise. MacDougall and the
Ambassador noted that steps inconsistent with Azerbaijan,s
stated commitment to democratic development quickly develop
into a large problem. Mammadov said that given that
Azerbaijan has been independent for only 15 years, and the
GOAJ's "limited statehood and bureaucratic experience,
sometimes we cannot properly assess the decisions we make and
assess the consequences properly." He also stated that the
ANS problem could have been solved in a "different forum,"
which would not have "drawn such negative consequences." He
concluded that "you fall and you learn -- we should have
prepared better." The Ambassador noted the importance of
addressing the issues related to ANS' closure as soon as
possible. The situation highlighted the
significance of A/S Lowenkron's upcoming visit as a foum for
discussing how to develop the independent edia in
Azerbaijan. The Ambassador also said tht President Aliyev
recently affirmed his opennes to this dialogue.


BAKU 00001819 004 OF 004


Comment
--------------


16. (C) Mammadov's comment on the GOAJ's lack of confidence
that the West would support Azerbaijan if it is
threatened by Iran is a concern that we have heard with
increasing frequency from the most senior levels of
Azerbaijani government, including President Aliyev. It will
be a key dynamic underlying bilateral discussions on
Iran; we urge again that the USG prepare to address this
question during the upcoming consultations.


17. (U) DASD MacDougall cleared this message.
DERSE