UPDATE ON AZERBAIJAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001753

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS MARR MASS AJ
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON AZERBAIJAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT

REF: A. BAKU 001622


B. BAKU 001712

C. BAKU 1270

Classified By: Ambassador Anne Derse for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (U) This is an action request, see para 11.


2. (C) Summary: Azerbaijan is continuing to move forward in
its efforts to finalize its National Security Concept (NSC).
Retired UK General Sir Garry Johnson, who as part of the
foreign experts advisory group has been advising the GOAJ on
the NSC, pointed to the draft's clear language on Baku's goal
of integration with the West, saying the document will serve
as an "anchor point" for encouraging the GOAJ to embrace
reforms. The GOAJ interagency process that produced the draft
NSC was a positive precedent for a government with little
skill in interagency coordination. Johnson judged that the
draft Military Doctrine "is not a good piece of paper," and
"it will be a difficult process" to make it better. He
assessed that the US could play the key role in engaging with
the MOD to bring about substantive reforms, especially in
pushing for enhanced civilian control. Sir Garry and the UK
Ambassador said, in sum, the GOAJ draft is better than
expected, as good as it can be at this stage, and NATO needs
to endorse it and move on to serious work with Azerbaijan on
the related, and more substantive documents. In order to
advance our goal of progress in Azerbaijan,s IPAP
implementation, we need to fully support and endorse this
document when it becomes public. While the vast majority of
the NSC is straightforward and acceptable, we note the
document,s allegations of Armenian "genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity." We request that the Department
provide a careful, expert-level review of the draft NSC by
December 5, so we can raise any concerns--particularly on NK
issues--before the document is presented in mid-December to
President Aliyev. End Summary.


3. (C) The Ambassador attended a November 27 meeting of the
GOAJ's interagency working group on the National Security
Concept (NSC),chaired by Deputy Foreign Minister Araz
Azimov. At the meeting, the GOAJ's long-awaited draft NSC
was circulated for final review. In two weeks, it will be
sent to President Aliyev for approval and then on to
Parliament for approval. (Full text of draft NSC emailed to
desk November 24.) The UK, German, and Turkish Ambassadors,
along with the International Advisors Working Group (IAWG)
also attended the meeting. (NOTE: The IAWG was created to
advise the GOAJ on drafting the NSC and is comprised of
security experts from Germany, Turkey and the UK, and a chair
for the US, which has been vacant. See ref A.) The working
group meeting provided a fascinating insight into the GOAJ,s
fledgling interagency process. DFM Azimov forcefully argued
that the GOAJ needed a formal, well-staffed interagency
process, such as the United States, National Security
Council, in order to continue the strategic planning process
begun by the drafting of the National Security Concept, and
more rationally implement GOAJ policy decisions. A
representative from the Presidential Apparat responded simply
"send me a letter." (For a long time, Azimov has been trying
to create an interagency process but has been stymied both
by bureaucratic inertia and the personal politics that
dominate Azerbaijan,s decision-making process.)


4. (C) The Ambassador--accompanied by the DATT--had a
follow-up meeting November 28 with British Ambassador Bristow
and retired UK General Sir Garry Johnson, the British IAWG
representative, to discuss the draft NSC. Bristow and
Johnson agreed the draft was a good document and better than
expected. The document contains clear language on Baku's
goal of integration with the West and commitments to
democratic development, which will serve as "an anchor point"
for pushing the government on reform, they said. Bristow
opined that the draft combined values and strategy to focus
Azerbaijan's foreign policy in a Western orientation.
Bristow and Johnson acknowledged that the draft "was not
perfect" because it lacked precision and failed to prioritize
national security threats. Still, the text "is better than
expected, and as good as we're going to get," according to
Johnson, who has been working with the GOAJ for three years
to prepare the NSC.


5. (C) Johnson judged that the purpose of Azimov's November

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27 IAWG meeting was to ensur that key Western governments
agree with the docment. Baku, however, is probably not open
to large scale changes in the draft because the document is
nearly complete. Johnson noted Azimov's plan to send the
draft to President Aliyev's
office by the end of the year, and said it is likely the NSC
will be approved quickly. The Parliament probably will take
up the draft in February 2007. After Parliament approves the
draft, it will be sent to NATO. Bristow said that the draft
is good and probably would not raise any major concerns among
NATO members. The key potential problem could be the draft's
language on Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). Bristow
and Johnson thought that the language on Armenia and the NK
conflict was careful enough, however, not to cause a storm
within NATO, and underscored it was a "lot worse" in earlier
drafts. Johnson said the NK language had been pared back and
was probably the minimum the GOAJ would get away with in
terms of its domestic audience.


6. (Comment: In general, we agree. The vast majority of
NSC language regarding the NK conflict is straightforward.
The NSC also contains very good language about Azerbaijan,s
commitment to the peaceful settlement of the conflict in the
framework of the OSCE Mink Group, and a clear statement of
Azerbaijan,s desired principles for the peaceful
settlement--Armenian withdrawal, re-establishment of
Azerbaijani sovereignty, return of IDPs, defining legal
status for the two communities of NK, and establishing
conditions for the region,s overall development and
integration. However, the NSC also contains relatively
strong allegations of Armenian "war crimes," including
"genocide." The NSC spells out Azerbaijan,s commitment to
seek international "prosecution of the genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity committed during the aggression
and occupation." This last point reflects current
Azerbaijani policy, which was articulated in President
Aliyev,s August address to Azerbaijan,s Ambassadors, ref c.
We are concerned that this language could be counter both to
US policy and the current spirit of confidence-building
between Azerbaijan and Armenia.)


7. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question of whether
the USG should identify a new USG rep to take up the US seat
on the IAWG, Johnson said doing so at this stage, when the
NSC is almost final, could be counterproductive. The USG has
not been active on the IAWG and Azimov probably seeks to keep
a low-profile on western advice on the document. Johnson
said Azimov probably would not solicit US assistance,
although Azimov also would be unlikely to refuse a US request
to be
involved in the process.

GOAJ Interagency Process a Positive Precedent
--------------


8. (C) Bristow and Johnson were eager to see what role
Azimov's interagency working group and the IAWG might play in
drafting the Military Doctrine and Foreign Policy Strategy.
They noted that the interagency process behind the drafting
of NSC was a positive step. They remarked that Azimov had
"maneuvered the process quite well." Both were also
concerned that absent a similar coordinating body for the
Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Strategy, the
drafting process would be fragmented and slow. Johnson said
Azimov wants the interagency working group and the IAWG to
participate in coordinating the drafting process for the
follow-on documents, pointing to the authority granted to the
IAWG in the Presidential decree creating it. Bristow
observed, however, that Azimov probably will be sidelined in
the drafting of the Military Doctrine. If this occurs, it
will be more difficult to gain insight into the drafting
process of these two documents, particularly if the IAWG does
not play a role.

Perspectives on the Military Doctrine
--------------


9. (C) Turning to the Military Doctrine, Johnson said "it is
not a good piece of paper," and "it will be a difficult
process" to make it better. Johnson said that the military
doctrine will be a critical tool in pushing for substantive
defense reforms.

10. (C) As the US and European countries seek to assist Baku

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in drafting these documents, the Ambassadors agreed on the
importance of deconflicting. For example, EU countries have
expertise in working with the police and Ministry of
Interior, while the US has unique expertise in engaging with
the MOD. Bristow remarked that deconfliction was especially
important in working with the Azerbaijani MOD, which is not
eager to embrace reforms. Johnson said the US military could
be effective in encouraging greater civilian control of the
MOD. Johnson observed that the sheer weight of practical US
DoD engagement with the MOD could be a key lever in pushing
the MOD to undertake needed reforms, much as DoD engaged in
Georgia, and that may be the best value the US can provide to
the process at this time. Johnson advised that the best time
for stepped-up US engagement with the MOD would be after the
Military Doctrine has been drafted and when the MOD begins
its Strategic Defense Review. He judged that the earliest
time frame for the Military Doctrine to be finished is two
years.


11. (C) The participants noted the need to package US
assistance to the MOD carefully. Bristow suggested that US
assistance would be best cast within the framework of
Azerbaijan's IPAP. All agreed that increased English
language classes for the MOD could make a great impact over
time. Bristow said the UK has been funding English courses
for the MOD, but the funding will stop in several years.
Bristow suggested that perhaps the US could encourage
additional courses and get the GOAJ to pay for the classes.

Comment and Action Request
--------------


12. (C) In order to advance our goal of securing progress in
Azerbaijan,s IPAP implementation, the USG and other NATO
allies need to be able to fully support and endorse the
National Security Concept when it becomes public. In
general, we view the NSC as a well-reasoned document that
lays out solid, and internationally acceptable, national
security goals. However, we note that the NSC language
regarding alleged Armenian "genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity" potentially could limit our ability to
strongly endorse this document. We request that the
Department provide an expert-level review and guidance on the
USG view of the draft NSC by December 5. If there are any
problems regarding the draft NSC language--particularly
regarding the NK conflict--we will need to raise them
privately with the GOAJ as soon as possible, to ensure they
are resolved before the document is presented to President
Aliyev in mid-December.
DERSE