Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAKU1709
2006-11-24 13:22:00
SECRET
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

ISRAELI READOUT ON MOD GILAD'S VISIT TO AZERBAIJAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV ETTC MASS IR IS AJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1855
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0042
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0508
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 001709 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC AND NEA - JEFFREY; FOR NP/ECC - PVANSON,
ACHURCH AND JGABRYSZEWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC MASS IR IS AJ
SUBJECT: ISRAELI READOUT ON MOD GILAD'S VISIT TO AZERBAIJAN

REF: A. STATE 182032 (NOTAL)


B. BAKU 1541

BAKU 00001709 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 001709

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC AND NEA - JEFFREY; FOR NP/ECC - PVANSON,
ACHURCH AND JGABRYSZEWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC MASS IR IS AJ
SUBJECT: ISRAELI READOUT ON MOD GILAD'S VISIT TO AZERBAIJAN

REF: A. STATE 182032 (NOTAL)


B. BAKU 1541

BAKU 00001709 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: According to Israeli Ambassador to
Azerbaijan Arthur Lenk, Israeli MOD DG for Political-Military
Affairs Amos Gilad's October 30-31 visit to Azerbaijan was
low-profile and short on substance. Gilad engaged
Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Abiyev in a detailed
discussion of Iran's military and political structures, but
his other GOAJ meetings - mainly at the deputy minister level
-- were a perfunctory overview of the ministries' activities.
While Azerbaijan and Israel signed a new bilateral defense
cooperation agreement during Gilad's visit, Lenk did not
expect that the agreement would prompt any immediate changes
in the bilateral relationship or degree of assistance
provided by Israel. Lenk pledged specifically that Israel
would not pursue new bilateral defense assistance initiatives
in Azerbaijan without consulting the USG. He also said that
Israel had reconsidered its earlier plans to assign an
Ankara-based Defense Attache and now planned only to send a
Tel Aviv-based MOD official on quarterly visits. Both the
GOAJ and the GOI seem fully aware of the risks that could be
posed by an elevated bilateral security relationship and we
are confident Israel will not undertake new unilateral
intiatives. However, well thought-out, targeted technical
assistance in an area such as border controls, conducted as
part of an international initiative, could be helpful and
politically viable. End summary.

MEETING WITH MINDEF ABIYEV
--------------


2. (C) During a November 15 meeting with DATT and P/E Chief,
Israeli Ambassador to Azerbaijan Arthur Lenk provided a
readout of Israeli MOD DG for Political-Military Affairs Amos
Gilad's October 30-31 visit to Azerbaijan. Gilad met twice
with Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev, first for

what Lenk described as far-reaching review of Azerbaijan's
security environment -- including a lengthy exchange on Iran
-- and a second time to sign a new bilateral defense
agreement. Lenk reported that Abiyev and Gilad engaged in a
detailed discussion of Iran's military and political power
structures, with Abiyev arguing that Iran's Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense have effectively
been merged and are under the combined, direct command of
Supreme Leader Khamenei. Lenk commented that Abiyev was
noticeably reticent on the subject of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, his usual favorite topic with visiting dignitaries.


3. (S) Lenk did not reveal details of the new bilateral
defense cooperation agreement, but said he did not expect any
immediate follow-up. (In a previous meeting, Lenk had
described the agreement as "short on substance but a good
start" - see ref b). An official from the Israeli Ministry
of Defense will travel to Baku in late November to exchange
signed copies of the agreement, and Lenk hinted that further
discussions about the parameters of new assistance could take
place at that time. However, Lenk noted that the USG had
raised concerns about possible new Israeli defense assistance
programs in both Baku and Tel Aviv (reftels),and said that
Israel understands that any new initiatives should be closely
coordinated with the USG. (Drawing from ref a, pol/econ
chief explained that the USG welcomed and encouraged Israeli
outreach to the Muslim world, but wanted to ensure that any
new initiatives did not complicate existing, excellent GOAJ
cooperation in the Global War on Terror.) The new
Israeli-Azerbaijani bilateral defense agreement was not
publicly announced.

REVISED DATT PLANS
--------------


4. (C) Lenk said that Israel had reconsidered its plans to
accredit an Ankara-based Defense Attache to Baku. Instead,
Israel plans to send a Tel Aviv-based MOD official to
Azerbaijan on a quarterly basis "to test the waters." Lenk
said the press of work in Ankara made it difficult for an
Ankara-based official to take on responsibilities for Baku,

BAKU 00001709 002.2 OF 002


but he also hinted that the Israeli decision could be based
on concern about how an Israeli DATT would be received. In
response to a question from our DATT, for example, Lenk said
that Israel would not list the Tel-Aviv based MOD official on
its diplomatic list and planned to introduce the DATT only to
his US and UK counterparts.

OTHER GOAJ MEETINGS
--------------


5. (C) While in Baku, Gilad also met with the Head of
Azerbaijan's State Border Service, General Guliyev, who
provided an overview of Azerbaijan's border service
capabilities and activities. Lenk said that he and Gilad
were left with the impression that, due to a lack of
resources and capacity, Azerbaijan's borders were quite open.
Lenk commented that Israel could provide expertise in this
area, offering training and technical assistance to increase
the GOAJ's capacity, but affirmed that he would not consider
undertaking new assistance programs without consulting the
USG. He wryly noted that he was fully aware of likely GOAJ
sensitivities regarding possible Israeli assistance on
Azerbaijan's southern border.


6. (C) Gilad also had separate meetings with President
Aliyev's National Security Advisor Vahid Aliyev, and the
deputy ministers of Internal Affairs, Emergency Situations,
and National Security. According to Lenk, none of these
meetings were terribly substantive; the Deputy Minister of
Defense Industry, for example, made small talk while never
explaining that the Minister (whom Gilad had been scheduled
to meet) had been called away to meet the Prime Minister.
Lenk said the two sides did not discuss arms sales. The
deputy ministers of Internal Affairs and National Security
simply provided an overview of their ministries. Lenk noted
that Israel had provided crowd control/riot police training
to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the run-up to
Azerbaijan's 2005 parliamentary elections, and felt that had
been an effective bilateral initiative.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Comment: Both the GOAJ and the Government of Israel
seem fully aware of the risks that could be posed by a new,
elevated security relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan.
Judging from the relatively low-level and low-profile
reception offered to Gilad, the GOAJ did not want to do
anything during this visit that could be viewed as
provocative by Iran. Based on Lenk's haste to reassure us of
Israel's commitment to close consultations with the US on
this issue, we are confident that Israel will not pursue new,
unilateral initiatives that could jeopardize our own
security cooperation with Azerbaijan.


8. (C) In our view, technical assistance to help strengthen
Azerbaijan's border controls could be one area for possible
expanded Israel-Azerbaijani security assistance. The USG
provides assistance through a range of DTRA, DOE, EXBS, INL
and EUCOM-funded programs, but Azerbaijan's border control
needs are immense. Border control assistance -- particularly
if conducted under the rubric of an internationally organized
effort such as the OSCE's new border security initiative,
could be both effective and politically sustainable. We will
mull this idea in-house and report the embassy's consolidated
views septel.
DERSE