SCENESETTER FOR DRL A/S LOWENKRON'S NOVEMBER 27-28

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAKU 001659

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL A/S LOWENKRON FROM AMBASSADOR DERSE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM AJ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DRL A/S LOWENKRON'S NOVEMBER 27-28
VISIT TO AZERBAIJAN

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Azerbaijan is at a pivotal moment in its development,
with billions in energy revenue beginning to flow into
government coffers, increasing fears of tensions with Iran
and Russian resurgence in the region, and senior leaders
taking a careful look at Azerbaijan's internal development
and potential to strengthen its regional role. US interests
are served by Azerbaijan's continued prosperity and
stability, and reform -- both political and economic --
remains key to both. The next two years, leading up to
Azerbaijan's 2008 presidential election, offer a window in
which President Aliyev, benefiting from his support in the
public, can implement steady, gradual reform if he chooses.
We should engage the senior levels of GOAJ leadership now in
a results-oriented, realistic, and discreet dialogue that
underscores democratic reform as an integral part of a
strengthened bilateral relationship and seeks to establish a
joint commitment and program for progress. Your visit will
be the first step in our effort to establish a new,
structured dialogue on democratic reform, and will set the
tone and content as we work with the GOAJ to develop a shared
vision of Azerbaijan's democratic reform goals and how the US
can best support them. We believe this dialogue should be
organized around five key areas in which there is a need for
democratic progress: rule of law, political process, media
freedom, respect for human rights, and an engaged, empowered
citizenry. We should build directly on President Aliyev's
commitment in Washington to continue to work with the US in
support of reform to promote Azerbaijan's development as a
modern, secular, market-oriented democracy.


2. (C) Azerbaijan's democratic progress since the November
2005 parliamentary elections has been halting and
disappointing. In some areas, such as judicial reform and
anti-corruption measures, we have seen limited progress, such
as the creation of a new exam system for judges, stiffer
penalties for criminal corruption offenses, and prosecution
of corruption cases. In other areas, such as parliamentary
and electoral reform, the GOAJ appears to be clinging to an
unacceptable status quo. In still other areas, such as media
freedom and freedom of assembly, we have seen a clear
rollback of previous gains.


3. (C) Azerbaijan's uneven performance stems in large part
from continuing and deeply held misperceptions within the
GOAJ ruling elite of the merits of democratic reform and
related concerns about the potentially destabilizing impact
of reform. Unconvinced that democratic reform is key to
Azerbaijan's long-term prosperity and stability, many within
the governing elite continue to view democratic reform as a
threat first to Azerbaijan's widely prized stability, and
second to their own power and perquisites. Current pressures
on the media and limitations on freedom of assembly (septels)
undoubtedly are seen by some within GOAJ ruling circles as
smart -- and necessary -- domestic political tactics in the
run-up to 2008 presidential elections.


4. (C) Absent a strategic framework for change and an agreed
approach with the GOAJ, we are unlikely to change
significantly this pervasive attitude. We believe that the
incentive of an enhanced relationship with the U.S., coupled
with the confidence that comes from an agreed agenda and
regular, government-to-government dialogue, is our best hope
to address deeply ingrained attitudes and promote change. In
this cable, we outline our assessment of the current
situation in five key areas, as well as our recommendations
for shared reform objectives that could be identified in a
new democracy dialogue. Continued USG support for
strengthening Azerbaijan's democratic institutions through
diplomatic and programmatic efforts is vital in all five
areas.

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RULE OF LAW
--------------


5. (C) The judiciary continues to be corrupt and dominated
by the Executive Branch. High-profile cases such as the
trial of the opposition Yeni Fikir youth activists were
marred by serious procedural problems. In one positive
development, the GOAJ agreed to hold new exams for aspiring
judges, and the process -- held in accordance with

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recommendations from our DOJ Resident Legal Advisor and
ABA/CEELI -- was judged by international observers to be
fair, transparent and corruption-free. This positive
experiment needs to be fully implemented through the
appointment of these new judges, and replicated throughout
the judiciary and the police force to ensure that GOAJ
officials in the legal and law enforcement sector are
well-qualified and not corrupt.


6. (C) More general progress on anti-corruption measures is
lacking, as noted in the June 2006 Group of State Against
Corruption (GRECO) report. While the GOAJ has passed good
laws, it has failed to implement them or to demonstrate the
political will to address this problem. Key next steps
include passage and implementation of legislation to combat
terrorist financing and money laundering, and creation of a
Financial Investigations Unit. Progress in key
anti-corruption areas is likely to remain limited while
senior GOAJ officials continue to pursue their own vested
economic interests, underscoring the importance of continued
USG efforts to push the GOAJ on economic reform. At a
minimum, the GOAJ needs to implement its own conflict of
interest legislation, to ensure that sitting officials are
not making policy decisions that affect their own economic
interests.


7. (C) As part of our democracy dialogue, we should press
the GOAJ to implement its rule of law commitments, as
articulated by the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Further
reform in the judicial process -- including hiring new,
well-qualified judges, restructuring and opening the defense
bar, and retraining current judges, prosecutors and defense
lawyers is essential to that process. A GOAJ program to
reform the police force, now lackig, also is essential,
particularly to ensure tha individuals are protected from
the arbitrary us of state powers. Continued USG technical
assisance programs, particularly those implemented by IL
and DOJ, as well as USAID implementing partner ABA/CEELI, are
critical to our efforts. In retur for continued USG support
to GOAJ reform effort, we should press for broad legal and
structural changes that will allow real reform to take root,
such as the enforcement of anti-corruption laws, the
restructuring of the Prosecutor General's Office, and the
paid retirement of current, Soviet-era judges.

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POLITICAL PROCESS: PARLIAMENT, PARTIES, ELECTIONS
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Since Azerbaijan's November 2005 parliamentary
elections, little has changed in Azerbaijan's political
process and climate. Although the GOAJ acknowledged the
serious irregularities that marred the vote counting and
tabulation process and held rerun elections in ten districts
that were acknowledged by the international community as free
of major irregularities, progress on electoral reform ended
with the May 2006 rerun elections. The GOAJ is in dialogue
with the Venice Commission over proposed changes to the
Electoral Code, but has yet to implement electoral reform
recommendations made by the OSCE/ODIHR. So far, the new
parliament is off to a lackluster start, with little apparent
effort by the leadership to guide the legislative agenda or
make the legislative process more transparent and open.
Certain individuals within parliament are trying to make a
difference, pressing for procedural changes that would enable
independents and the opposition to introduce legislation and
participate more effectively, but their efforts to date have
received no support from the leadership. Other individual
MPs are reaching out to their constituents, slowly building
the relationships and level of responsiveness necessary to
develop a truly representative democracy. The Speaker of
Parliament has agreed to make one personal staff member
available to each MP, an important initiative we will support
through training and technical assistance provided under
USAID's new parliamentary assistance program.


9. (C) With the exception of Musavat, which is playing a
constructive role, the traditional opposition parties
(Popular Front Party, Azerbaijan Democratic Party and
Azerbaijan Liberal Party) have boycotted the political
process since the November 2005 elections were certified, and
have displayed little interest in the hard work of
grass-roots party-building and advocacy needed to build a

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real following. On a positive note, USAID implementing
partners NDI and IRI report the GOAJ and ruling Yeni
Azerbaijan Party are fully supportive of their party-building
activities and grant them both full license to work
throughout Azerbaijan.


10. (C) As part of our democracy dialogue, we should work to
convince the GOAJ that it has the political space necessary
to encourage a robust political process without posing a risk
to Azerbaijan's internal stability. Strengthening Parliament
as an independent branch of government -- particularly by
opening the legislative process to public scrutiny and
debate, and by empowering Parliament to conduct true
oversight of executive branch activities -- could create a
significant opening for public debate. In practical terms,
the GOAJ has little to lose by giving more power to a body
completely dominated by the ruling party.


11. (C) The GOAJ also must continue its work on electoral
reform, institutionalizing and building upon the hard-won
procedural gains of the 2005 elections. Pressing for full
implementation of the OSCE/ODIHR election reforms well before
the 2008 election must be part of our democracy dialogue.
Changing the electoral code to ensure that election
commissions are truly neutral and balanced bodies, one of the
recommendations made by both the OSCE and the Venice
Commission, is key. The real challenge will be to convince
President Aliyev and his key advisors that, in domestic
political terms, he can allow the democratic opening that is
needed.

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MEDIA FREEDOM
--------------


12. (C) The media environment has deteriorated significantly
over the last year, with several attacks on opposition and
independent journalists, a rash of libel suits, threats
against VOA and BBC's ability to broadcast in Azerbaijan as
part of an effort to undermine independent local broadcaster
ANS, and pressure on several opposition newspapers to vacate
their premises. Given that resident Aliyev had ordered a
halt to libel suit on journalists in the wake of the March
2005 muder of journalist Elmar Huseynov, the deterioration
in media freedoms over the last year has been diturbing both
for Azerbaijani journalists and the international community.
Some of the libel suits are linked to ongoing clashes among
Azerbaijan's political heavyweights (Interior Minister Usubov
and Minister of Emergency Situations Heydarov, for example,
both have provided extensive financial backings to newspapers
that they use as vehicles to attack rivals) but the overall
effect has been chilling.


13. (C) As part of our democracy dialogue, we should press
the GOAJ to decriminalize libel as a first priority. We also
should urge President Aliyev to consider working with a
representative group of responsible media to develop a modus
vivendi and if possible, joint efforts to both develop the
climate and legal framework for a free media, and efforts to
develop the media itself as a professional and ethical
institution in Azerbaijan's emerging democracy. As
independent observers, including Reporters without Borders,
have noted, Azerbaijan's media is dominated by mouthpieces
for the government and opposition parties; it is need of
further training and development.


14. (C) As part of our democracy dialogue, we also should
offer additional training to Azerbaijani journalists. Senior
GOAJ officials -- including President Aliyev -- complain
repeatedly that Azerbaijani journalists are neither
professional nor principled. While these complaints do not
excuse the physical and legal attacks that journalists have
suffered in Azerbaijan, they are not unfounded. Journalists
in Azerbaijan need a great deal of training and exposure to
international standards in order to play a more responsible
role in public debate. A renewed and enhanced commitment
from the United States to help professionalize Azerbaijan's
journalists could vastly improve Azerbaijan's media climate,
by giving journalists the tools and political space they need
to do their jobs.

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ENGAGED, EMPOWERED CITIZENRY

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15. (C) 15 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union,
civil society is still very weak in Azerbaijan. While a few
courageous groups -- primarily in the human rights sphere --
continue to speak out, they enjoy little recognition outside
Baku and rely heavily on foreign funding. Civil society's
weakness stems from a continuing, fundamental lack of
understanding among Azerbaijan's citizens of their rights and
responsibilities under a democratic system of governance, as
well as the GOAJ's implicit mistrust of NGOs and subsequent
heavy-handed tactics, and the divided and personality-driven
nature of Azerbaijan's NGO scene. NGOs and political parties
have been stymied in their efforts to hold public rallies
over the last year, with requests denied on little or no
grounds. Since the GOAJ used force to break up an authorized
opposition rally on November 26, 2005, the GOAJ has not
allowed a single opposition rally to take place. NGOs also
continue to face difficulty in the registration process,
particularly human rights and political NGOs.


16. (C) Because an understanding of democracy is the key to
an engaged and empowered citizenry, we should seek a
commitment from the GOAJ to work together on civic education
programs, offering technical assistance -- on a cost-sharing
basis -- that could bring international best practices to
Azerbaijan. As part of our democracy dialogue, we also
should press the GOAJ to ease recent restrictions on freedom
of assembly, to ensure that all groups can exercise their
constitutional right to freely assemble and peacefully
express their views. The GOAJ also fully respect its legal
commitments regarding freedom of association by easing the
NGO registration process. Holding the GOAJ to its Council of
Europe commitment to eliminate the system of appointed local
authorities (ExComs) by 2008 also would greatly improve the
connection between citizens and their local officials, and
create much-needed room for grass-roots activism. As part of
our democracy dialogue, we should continue to provide
technical assistance regarding community development and the
strengthening of local governments.

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HUMAN RIGHTS
--------------


17. (C) Much of the public discussion of Azerbaijan's human
rights record over the last year has been driven by two
high-profile cases: the Yeni Fikir youth group and the group
of 11 former GOAJ officials -- including ex-Ministers Farhad
Aliyev and Ali Insanov -- accused of plotting a coup in the
run-up to Azerbaijan's November 2005 parliamentary elections.
Regardless of the merits of the charges against either
group, the judicial process in both cases has been poor. The
Yeni Fikir trial exhibited a complete absence of due process,
and the televised "confession" of former Finance Minister
Fikret Yusifov and the torture of former police officer
turned opposition leader Natiq Efendiyev have irreparably
damaged the process for Farhad Aliyev and his alleged
co-conspirators. Yet the attention paid to these
high-profile, politically driven cases masks deeper, systemic
problems in Azerbaijan's legal and judicial process.


18. (C) We believe the root cause of Azerbaijan's human
rights problems can be successfully addressed only through a
targeted, structured program to fundamentally reform
Azerbaijan's law enforcement and judicial systems.
Currently, Azerbaijan's police forces, prison officials,
judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys are poorly trained
and paid, lacking in resources, corrupt and, for the most
part, without any incentive to ensure they are meeting
Azerbaijan's international human rights obligations in their
own work. Police officials rarely are investigated or
punished for human rights abuses, and the European Court of
Human Rights presents the only chance for a citizen facing
political charges to obtain a fair hearing. Our best chance
for long-term change in Azerbaijan's human rights performance
will come not only from pushing for due process in pending
cases, but by supporting and pushing consistently and
carefully for long-term change in Azerbaijan's institutions
and processes. Reform of the police, the prisons, the
Prosecutor General's Office, the courts, and the defense bar
-- supported by continued technical assistance from the
international community -- must be a central element of our

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human rights dialogue, even as we continue to raise our
concerns in cases of egregious violations.
DERSE