Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAKU163
2006-02-03 14:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZERBAIJAN MUM ON P5+2 STATEMENT ON IRAN, LIKELY

Tags:  PARM PREL KNNP AORC EU IR AJ 
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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0008
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0105
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000163 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP AORC EU IR AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN MUM ON P5+2 STATEMENT ON IRAN, LIKELY
TO REMAIN SILENT

REF: A. STATE 16171


B. 05 BAKU 1959

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RENO L. HARNISH III PER 1.4 (B,D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000163

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP AORC EU IR AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN MUM ON P5+2 STATEMENT ON IRAN, LIKELY
TO REMAIN SILENT

REF: A. STATE 16171


B. 05 BAKU 1959

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RENO L. HARNISH III PER 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) Pol/Econ Counselor delivered ref a demarche on Iran's
nuclear programs to MFA Americas Desk Director Ilgar
Mukhtarov on February 2. Mukhtarov had no substantive
comment and, in response to emboff's query, said the GOAJ had
not issued a public statement on the P5 2's agreement that
the IAEA should report Iran to the UN Security Council.
Following the meeting, Americas Desk Officer Elchin Bashirli
confided that he believed the GOAJ would never issue public
statements on this or any other issue related to Iran's
nuclear programs, as the GOAJ had too much to lose --
including real security threats and access to the isolated
exclave of Nakhchivan -- to risk making public statements
critical of Iran.


2. (C) Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov
separately confirmed on February 1 that the GOAJ would not
issue public statements on Iran's nuclear programs. While
the GOAJ has serious concerns about Iran's pursuit of nuclear
capabilities and subsequent ability to threaten Azerbaijan's
security, Mammadov said the GOAJ believes it would harm,
rather than advance, its security interests by criticizing
Iran publicly. For these reasons, Mammadov said, President
Aliyev in particular will never/never comment on Iran's
nuclear programs. Moreover, the GOAJ as a policy only
comments publicly on Iran's nuclear programs when absolutely
necessary, as when Mammadov personally corrected statements
made -- without instructions -- by Azerbaijan's Ambassador to
Tehran that indicated the GOAJ supported Iran's nuclear
weapons program. (Following the Ambassador's statement,
Mammadov made a statement to IRNA expressing Azerbaijan's
hope that Iran would find an understanding with the UN
Security Council members that would lead to a peaceful
resolution of the situation.) Mammadov also noted that the
Ambassador had been punished for his statement.


3. (C) When forced to comment on Iran's nuclear programs,
the GOAJ generally walks a fine line that recognizes the
right of nations to develop nuclear energy while calling on
all nations to respect international agreements. As Deputy
Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov explained Azerbaijan's
position on Iran to emboffs on January 25, Azerbaijan
believes that all nations have the right to use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes under international agreements
and each state should conduct nuclear energy programs within
this international framework. He quickly added, however,
that Azerbaijan does not desire or support the idea of a
nuclear weapons program in Iran. Khalafov noted that Iran is
a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore has
international responsibilities. He emphasized that
Azerbaijan supports stability and security in the region and
would continue to support international efforts in this
regard, including the activities of the European Union. He
stressed that any non-implementation of international
agreements by any state could lead to misunderstanding and
undesirable consequences and that resolution of any
disagreements must be resolved through dialogue and
diplomacy. In keeping with the concerns outlined by
Mammadov, however, this flat rejection of a nuclear weapons
program for Iran never makes it into GOAJ public statements.


4. (C) Comment: Azerbaijan is in a difficult position
vis-a-vis Iran, with serious concerns about the threat its
much larger neighbor poses to Azerbaijan's security, and with
an equally serious need to maintain good, working relations
with Iran on a host of border and trade issues (ref b).
Azerbaijan clearly would like to see Iran's nuclear weapons
question resolved but it is reluctant to play any role in the
public or private pressuring of Iran to heed the
international community's warnings. Absent any security
assurances from the United States regarding possible
provocations from Iran, the GOAJ is unlikely to change its
quietly neutral stance on Iran's nuclear programs.
HARNISH