NEA PDAS JEFFREY DISCUSSES IRAN WITH DEPUTY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001530

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM PINR KNNP MASS MCAP MNUC PARM IR AJ
SUBJECT: NEA PDAS JEFFREY DISCUSSES IRAN WITH DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTERS KHALAFOV AND PASHAYEV

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Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, for reasons 1.4 (b & d)


1. (S) Summary: In a 12 October call on Deputy Foreign
Minister Khalafov, NEA PDAS Jeffrey, accompanied by the
Ambassador, discussed Iran and sought support for a unified
international front in response to Iranian nuclear ambitions.
DFM Khalafov, responsible for Azerbaijan's Iran policy and
serving as Azerbaijan's principle negotiator on Caspian
delimitation issues, was also joined by DFM Pashayev,
Azerbaijan's former ambassador to Washington. Khalafov
outlined Azerbaijan's complex relations with its neighbor and
posited that Azerbaijan could potentially serve as a gateway
to Central Asia (possibly lessening Iran's growing influence
in Central Asia in the process). He also suggested that
sanctions against Iran would likely not be effective because
China, Russia, and Europe would not support them. Despite
the GOAJ's recent decision to suspend the rebroadcasting of
foreign broadcasting, DFM Pashayev suggested that expanded
VOA programming into Iran might be worth considering. End
Summary.

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Iran's Relations with Azerbaijan and the Region
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2. (C) Visiting NEA PDAS Jeffrey and Ambassador Derse paid a
call October 12 on Deputy Foreign Ministers Khalafov and
Pashayev. Khalafov, who is responsible for Azerbaijan's
bilateral relationship and formal MFA to MFA dialogue with
Iran, as well as Azerbaijan's Caspian delimitation policies,
characterized relations with Iran as complicated, but added
that Azerbaijan had enjoyed successes in various areas.
According to Khalafov, Azerbaijan's strategy is to have
normal relations with all neighbors, and that its
relationship with Iran was complicated not only in the
international complex, but in a regional context as well.
While Azerbaijan and Iran share a common religious, cultural
and historical tradition, Khalafov noted that Iran "supports
Armenia against Azerbaijan." Khalafov stressed the pragmatic
importance of good bilateral relations due to Iran's "30
million ethnic Azeris" and continued support to the
Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. Khalafov attributed
Nakhchivan's stability to Iran, and highlighted energy,
transportation, and trade as the main areas in which the two
countries cooperate.


3. (C) Khalafov said that Iran is trying to increase
pressure on Azerbaijan internally by using the "religious
factor." However, Khalafov said that economic and political
reforms in Azerbaijan were reducing Iran's influence. He
also pointed out that many Azerbaijanis have a "positive
attitude" toward Iran for religious and other reasons, and
that the GOAJ hopes that increased ties with Europe will
lessen this influence. Khalafov suggested that Azerbaijan
serves as the "main entrance" to Central Asia and that
Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries share close religious
and ethnic ties. He said that this relationship could serve
as a model for Central Asia and reduce Iran's influence there
(also suggesting that these links would be helpful in
Dagestan and Georgia, as well). Khalafov further claimed
that economic factors were prominent in Iran's relations with
Central Asia, that Russia and Iran's relations were growing
stronger there.


4. (C) Speaking to Iranian domestic issues, Khalafov
asserted that under Ahmadinejad, the regime exerts total
control over domestic politics and that the regime would stay
in control. He suggested that due to Iran's strength and
high economic potential, economic sanctions would not affect
Iran; China, Russia, and Europe, he argued would not support
economic sanctions. He added that "we do not want to see
increasing pressure" exercised over Iran, as it would
adversely affect the region. Khalafov suggested that if
there were no unity among the major powers' Iran policies,
then there would be no success in their respective dialogues
with Iran.

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PDAS Jeffrey Outlines U.S. Intentions
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5. (S) PDAS Jeffrey explained that he understood
Azerbaijan's position and that the USG wanted neighboring
countries to have normal, balanced relations with Iran.
However, Jeffrey asked if this were possible with the current

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regime in Iran. PDAS Jeffrey explained the U.S. was focusing
on the nuclear issue first as it was "the most serious
problem in the Middle East," and that the U.S. considers Iran
to be a key factor in all the region's problems. Jeffrey
said that the U.S. and its partners have offered Iran
compromises in exchange for stopping its uranium enrichment,
but that due to Iranian truculence the time for discussions
on the nuclear issue was over. Since Iran has told the
international community "no" numerous times on stopping
enrichment, Jeffrey said, we believe that it is intent on
developing nuclear weapons. Given recent developments with
the DPRK, Jeffrey said the world cannot afford another
unstable country with nuclear weapons. Speaking to the
contention many countries have made that Iran would not be
likely to use nuclear weapons, PDAS Jeffrey responded by
drawing on the U.S. Cold War experience with the Soviet
Union. Jeffrey said that the U.S. had drawn the conclusion
that nuclear weapons in the hands of a rogue state, even if
it does not use them, magnifies its options to influence
others and limits the ability to counter or contain such
influence. Jeffrey suggested that Iran could use nuclear
weapons to pressure U.S. allies, in order to increase
pressure on the U.S. in turn. Jeffrey said that the U.S.
cannot tolerate this possibility in an Iran led by
Ahmadinejad, and that the U.S. would use all means necessary
to block Iran.


6. (S) PDAS Jeffrey said that the U.S. focus was on the
diplomatic track and on the UN Security Council, stating that
the U.S. wishes to see the UNSC approve a sanctions regime
(along the lines of Article 7/41). In order to ensure UNSC
passage of such a sanctions regime, Jeffrey said that the
U.S. needed the support of partners and friends to pressure
countries like China, adding that anything Azerbaijan could
do in this regard would be much appreciated. Speaking to the
nature of the sanctions the U.S. sought, Jeffrey said that
the U.S. wished to start out with small targeted steps,
focusing on nuclear weapon and missile programs. If these do
not work, sanctions would also move to other areas such as
weapons sales and firms that support the Iranian weapons
program. Jeffrey stated that the U.S. hoped to avoid
sanctions like those imposed against Iraq, i.e. sanctions
which hurt the domestic population and neighbors, adding that
the U.S. would initially try not to impose such sanctions.
Jeffrey said that after it becomes clear Russia will support
sanctions due to its concern about the Iranian nuclear
threat, he thought China would also go along with UNSC
sanctions. Jeffrey suggested that Iran might well continue
with its program after sanctions were imposed, but he
believed that sanctions would slow down these programs,
giving more time for political action. Also, focusing on the
Iranian missile program would limit Iranian power projection.
Jeffrey said that the U.S. felt that this way forward was
the most effective one.


7. (S) Turning his attention to Iran's treatment of its
minorities, PDAS Jeffrey said that the U.S. was seeking a
change in the Ahmadinejad regime's behavior, not changing the
regime itself. He went on the say that the U.S. supports
Iran's territorial integrity and does not support separatist
movements, but that the U.S. did support better treatment of
minorities - in the form of greater political, cultural,
linguistic rights, and participation in the political sphere.
Doing so, said Jeffrey, would moderate the regime by putting
it into the hands of all. Jeffrey explained that the U.S.
would be working to craft educational exchanges,
broadcasting, and media outreach to these groups, without
threatening Azerbaijan's relationship with Iran. Jeffrey
explained that the U.S. realized that Azerbaijan was
vulnerable to Iranian actions and, therefore, the U.S. wanted
to consult and cooperate, hear Azerbaijan's views, and come
up with joint approaches.

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Khalafov's Views of the Ahmadinejad Regime and Prospects for
Sanctions
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8. (S) Khalafov suggested that a number of recent events
demonstrate an increase in "spiritual behavior in Iran." He
pointed to the recent events in Lebanon and heightening
tensions within the international community over Iran's
nuclear program, suggesting that these events contributed to
the formation of a unified position within Iran toward its
nuclear program. He stated that a change in policy and not

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in the regime, and preserving territorial integrity, were
important to Iranians. He said that Iran was not ready to
develop a strategy towards its minorities and viewed it as an
issue of "Iranian survival." Khalafov stated that he was
pleased that the U.S. was consulting with Azerbaijan since
Azerbaijan is a neighbor of Iran and ally of the U.S. He
said that Azerbaijan was not supporting Iran's nuclear
weapons program, saying that it was not in Azerbaijan's
national interest or that of its neighbors. Khalafov further
suggested that the competition of major powers for influence
gives Iran "space to play." He said that sanctions were
important as were the steps within them. Khalafov asserted
that Iran has a high threat potential and to achieve success
in pressuring Iran, the U.S. must pressure Iran's political,
economic, and military spheres. Khalafov said that
Azerbaijan told Iran that nuclear weapons were not good for
Iran or the region, and that "we will continue discussions
with your embassy" on the issue.

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Final Thoughts
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9. (S) PDAS Jeffrey affirmed that while the U.S. would not
mind seeing the regime go, the U.S. is not working toward
this end. He went on to say that diplomatic action at the UN
and with key friends and allies would only be as effective as
the least cooperative friend/ally. He again stated that if
the U.S. could not achieve its aims through the UN and
sanctions, the U.S. would find other ways to make a nuclear
program in Iran less likely. Khalafov said that this was
"clear," and Pashayev, returning to Jeffrey's Cold War
comparison, suggested that Iran was much weaker than the
Soviet Union, and that the U.S. was right to pursue the
diplomatic way "as long as tolerable." Jeffrey said he would
keep in mind that Azerbaijan had special expertise on Iran
and would be affected by any USG actions. In reaction to
Pashayev's suggestion that VOA broadcast a Jazz Hour directed
at Iran, Ambassador Derse said that the U.S. had been told
that the GOAJ had recently declared illegal the
rebroadcasting of foreign broadcasts. PDAS Jeffrey added
that the U.S. was expanding its direct programming to Iran
and that Azeri broadcasts can already be picked up in Iran
and are effective. Ambassador Derse then asked Khalafov if
he led the bilateral Azerbaijan-Iran dialogue, with Khalafov
answering that subsequent to a decision by President Aliyev,
"Azerbaijan moved to more diverse discussion between the
Iranian and Azerbaijani MFAs, led by Foreign Minister
Mammadyarov and supported by him." (Comment: Foreign Minister
Mammadyarov had earlier told us that a bilateral
Azerbaijan-Iran economic dialogue recently had been broadened
and put under the respective MFA's at Iran's request. End
Comment.) Pashayev then suggested, in jest, that Khalafov
would solve the delimitation issue before the nuclear issue
was solved. PDAS Jeffrey ended the meeting by suggesting
that a clear, tough message to Iran was key.


10. (U) PDAS Jeffrey did not have the opportunity to review
this message.
DERSE