LACK OF OSCE LEADERSHIP UNDERCUTS DEMOCRATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 001480

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM RU AJ
SUBJECT: LACK OF OSCE LEADERSHIP UNDERCUTS DEMOCRATIC
REFORM EFFORTS IN AZERBAIJAN

REF: TRAUB/POLASCHIK EMAIL OF 9/20/06

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, per 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) With Presidential elections looming in 2008, we
cannot afford to continue with weak OSCE leadership in
Azerbaijan. The OSCE can and should provide coordination and
leadership to the international community's efforts to
promote democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights
in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's OSCE commitments are a key tool
to guide reform. As such, the OSCE is uniquely placed to
speak for the broad range of European countries that have
signed on to the OSCE's principles, and to lead our efforts
to hold the Government of Azerbaijan accountable to its OSCE
commitments. While the GOAJ took some positive steps in the
run-up to the November 2005 parliamentary elections, we have
seen backsliding in recent months in the key areas of media
freedom and freedom of assembly. The international community
needs to make a concerted, unified effort now to press for
full implementation of the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations from
the November 2005 parliamentary elections, and to coordinate
and maximize its efforts to engage the GOAJ and stem the
current deterioration in media freedom and freedom of
assembly. The absence of an effective OSCE presence during a
critical period in Azerbaijan's democratic development -- the
two years preceding the 2008 Presidential elections -- will
impede our efforts to maintain momentum on key reforms.


2. (C) The effectiveness of the OSCE's efforts in Azerbaijan
has been hampered by the weak leadership of current Head of
Mission Ambassador Mauricio Pavesi. Pavesi's political
views, chronic mismanagement of the OSCE office, and frequent
failure to coordinate with and disregard for the views of
OSCE member states have seriously undercut the OSCE's ability
to provide much-needed leadership here on democracy, human
rights and political reform in Azerbaijan (ref). In the last
few months, for example, we learned from OSCE contacts that
Pavesi quashed OSCE members states' strategy for addressing
mounting problems on freedom of assembly and media freedoms.
On the freedom of assembly issue, Pavesi ignored member
states' concerns and those of his staff, and organized a
closed-door roundtable discussion in which working-level OSCE
staff lectured senior GOAJ officials. OSCE members states
have never received a readout from Pavesi on that meeting.


3. (C) On media freedoms -- an area in which member states
have expressed increasing concern over a deteriorating
environment -- Pavesi simply ignored member states' repeated
requests for the OSCE to organize a joint demarche. Pavesi
finally moved ahead on member states' long-standing request
to bring OSCE Representative on Media Freedoms Miklos
Harazsti to Baku but disregarded OSCE member state embassies'
request to brief Harazsti before his official meetings with
President Aliyev and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov. These are
only the latest examples in which Pavesi's management has
hindered the international community's ability to effectively
engage the GOAJ on key democracy and human rights issues,
areas in which the OSCE Mission should be a leading advocate
on behalf of the international community. The UK Mission in
Baku has weighed in strongly with the same view.


4. (C) Our understanding is that Pavesi will leave Baku in
December and a search is underway for his successor. We
further understand that an Italian and a Russian national
currently are being considered to fill the Baku Head of
Mission job. Given Russia's bitter legacy in Azerbaijan,
history in the region, and Russia's own poor record on human
rights and democracy, we are concerned that having a Russian
national in this high profile position could undercut the
OSCE's credibility at a time when it will be essential for
progress on democratization. In the run-up to Azerbaijan's
November 2005 parliamentary elections, for example, Russia
tried to stack the OSCE short-term observer mission with 700
CIS observers. Memories of Russian attempts to influence the
OSCE process are fresh and we are concerned that a Russian
national -- no matter how effective -- inherently will be
viewed as a less than honest broker. We urge that the USG
work to ensure the OSCE selects a highly competent,
non-Russian official for this critical job in Baku.
DERSE