THE CHANGING ROLE OF ISLAMIC RELIGIOSITY IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 001367

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM KISL IR AJ
SUBJECT: THE CHANGING ROLE OF ISLAMIC RELIGIOSITY IN
AZERBAIJAN

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary. Fifteen years after independence, Islamic
religiosity, while far from widespread, is on the rise in
Azerbaijan. This slow but steady growth of religious
observance stems from two factors: a natural rediscovery of
Azerbaijan's Muslim religious heritage, and active
proselytizing by Turkish, Iranian and Arab groups. With GOAJ
support, Turkish Sunni Islam, deemed more amenable to state
interests, has developed a network of schools and mosques
around Azerbaijan, but is not seen as a thriving religious
tradition. By contrast, the Salafist Sunni community, while
still small, has grown steadily in recent years, with Baku's
leading Sunni mosque reportedly drawing several thousand to
services. Azerbaijan remains an overwhelmingly Shia country,
but Iran's influence on Shia believers is countered by tight
GOAJ control over official Shia institutions, primarily
through the Caucasus Muslim Board and the State Committee for
Work with Religious Associations. Iran's influence is most
active in the small but growing network of unsanctioned,
underground mosques around the country, most publicly visible
in Baku's Juma Mosque community and its high-profile Imam,
Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, who is widely believed to receive
financial support from Iran. Over the longer term, the role
of Islam in Azerbaijan as a political and social force, will
depend in large measure on how the Government states and
delivers on its promise of building an equitable, democratic,
free market society. Septels will examine the role of
political Islam in Azerbaijan and the potential implications
for U.S. interests. End Summary.

RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE ON THE RISE
--------------


2. (C) Fifteen years after Azerbaijan's independence from the
Soviet Union, religious experts and scholars agree that
Islamic religiosity, while far from widespread, is on the
rise in Azerbaijan. Hard numbers are difficult to come by,
but anecdotal evidence, including interviews with contacts
and first-hand observations support this assessment. Young
people are fasting during Ramadan in increasing numbers and
women wearing headscarves are increasingly visible in the
streets of Baku. Two factors have contributed to this slow
but steady increase in religious observance. The first is the
end of atheistic Soviet rule in this historically Muslim
culture. While the GOAJ is steadfastly oriented toward the
West, the revitalization of Azerbaijan's national identity
has necessarily meant a rediscovery of its faith. The second
driver of Islam's growth has been the directed efforts of
foreign actors, specifically Turkey, Iran and the Arab states
to actively proselytize their versions of Islam.

EARLY ON TURKISH ISLAM RECEIVES GOAJ SUPPORT
--------------


3. (C) In the 1990s President Heydar Aliyev promoted the
growth of Turkish Sunni Islam in historically Shiite
Azerbaijan because he found it more amenable to the state's
interests. According to Azerbaijani religious scholar Nariman
Gasimoglu, Aliyev viewed Turkish Sunni Islam as a means of
arresting the growing 1990s influence of Iranian Shiite
conservatism. With the assent of the Azerbaijani Government,
starting in the early 1990s the Turkish Directorate of
Religious Affairs built mosques throughout Azerbaijan and
launched a network of schools as well as a theology faculty
at Baku State University. Turkey's Youth Development Fund
also opened madrassas in northern Azerbaijan with GOAJ
support.


4. (C) In the 1990s, Turkey's Fatulleh Gulen movement opened
several schools under the rubric of Cag Ogretim Isletmeleri,
a private Turkish company reportedly connected to (the
influential) Minister of Emergency situations Kemaladdin
Heydarov. With GOAJ endorsement, the Gulen movement founded
between 15 and 20 private high schools as well as the well
known Qafqaz university. Religious scholars tell us that the
GOAJ views Turkish Islam's influence in Azerbaijan as a
counterweight to Sunni Salafism and conservative Shiite
Islam. Although statistics are difficult to find, the
consensus view of religious scholars is that Turkish Sunni
Islamic community is stable, open, and not growing much when
compared with the Salafist and Shiite communities.


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SALAFIST ISLAM MAKING INROADS
--------------


5. (C) One of Azerbaijan's most well respected young Sunni
leaders, Yashar Gurbanov, highlighted the small but growing
Salafist community in Baku and the regions. Gurbanov's own
background is a telling lesson in the community's expansion.
Born in the northern Azerbaijani town of Zagatala, Gurbanov
attended Azerbaijan Economic University. After graduating in
2001, Gurbanov joined a small number of his classmates who
decided to further their religious studies. Gurbanov said he
became interested in Islamic theology largely because of the
influx of Turkish and then Arabic and Iranian missionaries
who rushed into the country after independence. Gurbanov
enrolled in the Islamic University of Medina, at the behest
of the Sunni Imam of a Zagatala mosque well known to Gurbanov
and his peers. In Medina, Gurbanov said he developed a strong
grasp of Islamic history and theology and the life of the
Prophet Mohammed which he brought back to Azerbaijan.


6. (C) Today, Gurbanov, a high-profile academic, teaches
religious philosophy at Azerbaijan International University
and delivers regular lectures at Baku's leading Sunni Mosque,
Abu Bakr. Gurbanov blames the GOAJ for labeling all Salafis
as "terrorist Wahabbists" hell-bent on overthrowing the
state. He rejects the notion that Salafists are Wahabbists
calling this a "common misconception" by the ill-informed.
Salafism, Gurbanov contends, is a peaceful, puritanical form
of orthodox Sunni Islam and should not be associated with
Wahabbism, a later aggressive form of Sunni Islam or with Al
Qaeda "hypocrisy" which "violates the sanctity of Islam." An
articulate spokesman for his community, Gurbanov added that
it was especially important for Salafism in Azerbaijan to be
apolitical given society and government's sensitivity toward
Islamic radicalism. He added that because true Salafism is
non-violent and inward-looking, piety manifests itself in
increased religious observance, forms of dress and, for men,
having a beard. This in turn contributes to the social
perception that Salafists are different, Wahabbists, and
therefore more threatening. Gurbanov himself has hosted many
television specials on religion, which he said brought him to
the attention of the head of the Caucasus Muslim Board Sheikh
Pashazade, whom he praised.

BAKU'S ABU BAKR MOSQUE
--------------


7. (C) Gurbanov's comments square with the observations of
most scholars we talked to about the central role of the Abu
Bakr mosque community to Sunni Islam in Azerbaijan. Abu Bakr
is perhaps the most visible sign of the growth of the Sunni
community. Salafist supporters, detractors and GOAJ officials
tell us that attendance at Friday prayers regularly reaches
5000 - 7000 participants. During 2005 religious holidays,
over 10,000 people are reported to have attended Abu Bakr's
services resulting in the closure of several blocks around
the mosque in central Baku. (Even if these figures are
exaggerated, the Abu Bakr community would still be the
largest in Baku.) Abu Bakr was built in 1997 by the
Azerbaijani branch of a Kuwaiti charity. The mosque is run by
Imam Gamet Suleymanov, a young, confident preacher educated,
like Gurbanov, in Saudi Arabia in Islamic theology and law.
Suleymanov, who has at times been heavily criticized by the
authorities, told the press in a recent interview, "I am not
a Wahabbite" and went on to explain that the large number of
attendees at his sermons indicated a rediscovery of
faithfulness and nothing more.


8. (C) Local experts report that the Abu Bakr community is
comprised of two basic groups, an educated secular-appearing
elite, and the working class. The educated elites who attend
Abu Bakr do so for the spiritual guidance of an educated,
Sunni leader, Gamet Suleymanov. According to one expert,
these persons are often professionals, they do not grow
beards and dress according to conventional dress codes but
they have found the simplicity and piety of Suleymanov's
message appealing in a society overwhelmed by corruption. The
second group, the working poor, a large majority of the
Azerbaijani population presently disenfranchised from the
country's oil wealth, find the Salafist message to be one of
hopefulness. Yet the message remains reportedly apolitical,
according to sources who have heard his lectures, as
Suleymanov reportedly stays away from overt criticism of the

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Azerbaijani political leadership and the West. However,
scholars and human rights activists who follow Islam tell us
that criticism of the U.S. and the Aliyev regime is growing
in other, less public Sunni and Shiite quarters.


9. (C) Beyond Baku's growing Sunni community, Sunni
communities are strong in northern Azerbaijan along the
Dagestani border. Gurbanov told us that the north central
city of Zagatala (his hometown) is today a center of Sunni
Islam. Travelling in the regions, Poloff observed that there
are active Sunni Salafist communities in Azerbaijan's
northeastern towns, such Khachmaz, Khudet and Gusar. The GOAJ
periodically shuts down Sunni mosques and madrassas in this
region, declaring them unregistered Wahabbist entities.
Noting the increase in the size of the Sunni community,
Gurbanov claimed that Azerbaijan was nearing a 50-50
Shia-Sunni split, not the 65 - 35 Shia-Sunni ratio that GOAJ
officials report.

IRANIAN IMPACT ON SHIAS UNCLEAR
--------------


10. (C) According to conventional wisdom, Iran strongly
influences the development of Shiite Islam in Azerbaijan.
However, on closer inspection, Iran's role in Azerbaijan's
religious life is less clear cut. A Shiite majority country,
most Azerbaijanis who attend religious services do so at
state-controlled mosques falling under the jurisdiction of
Sheikh Allahshukur Pashazade. Pashazade, the head of the
Caucasus Muslim Board and Azerbaijan's leading cleric, is
also a long-standing GOAJ loyalist going back to the Soviet
period, and the consensus view of experts is that he has been
successfully bought off. (There are widespread allegations of
kickback schemes within the Sheikh's apparatus.) GOAJ
officials also tell us that they write the sermons for many
of Pashazade's mosques, ensuring that these Imams preach a
pro-government line.


11. (S/NF) Iranian influence is believed to be strongest in
the network of unofficial mosques and Shiite religious
communities that are outside of Pashazade's control. We do
not know how many "underground" mosques exist or the size of
these communities, but locals tell us that there is a small
(in contrast with Abu Bakr) but growing network of Shiite
communities, most frequented by younger Azerbaijanis. They
also are believed to receive funding and support from a range
of Iranian Government and charitable organizations. Most
prominent among these is the Juma mosque community led by
Imam Ilgar Ibrahimoglu. The GOAJ evicted Ibrahimoglu's
community from its Baku mosque in 2004 ostensibly because of
its lack of legal registration. Ibrahimoglu, a charismatic
leader who studied in Iran for several years, is known for
his anti-corruption, anti-government rhetoric that draws a
community of several hundred worshippers.


12. (C) Ibrahimoglu, however, plays a dual role in civil
society because he is an outspoken human rights and democracy
advocate - making him something of an anomaly in the ease
with which he moves between conservative Shiite religiosity
and Western democracy rhetoric. Ibrahimoglu openly campaigned
on behalf of opposition party political candidates in
Azerbaijan's 2005 parliamentary elections drawing the GOAJ's
attention and ire. (Shortly after the parliamentary
elections, the GOAJ announced that Parliament would seek to
amend the Law on Religious Freedoms to prohibit political
activities by religious leaders.) Credible human rights
activists who know Ibrahimoglu well also quietly tell us that
he receives financial support from Iranian sources. Scholars
claim that Ibrahimoglu only emerged as a high profile leader
of the unofficial Shiite community when the Iranian Cultural
Attach in Baku, Haji Nijat (son-in-law of the chairman of
Iran's supreme council) stepped aside from his leadership
role in the community.


13. (C) Iranian influence is also widely felt in the village
of Nardaran, 25 kilometers north of Baku. Nardaran is home to
an independent-minded, pro-Iranian Shiite community generally
viewed as out of step with mainstream society. Construction
of Nardaran's principal mosque is believed to have been
financed by an Iranian charity. The Nardaran community was
also among the only to protest the publication of the Danish
caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed earlier this year, and
more recently the Israeli-Hizbullah conflict in Lebanon,

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burning Israeli and American flags.


14. (C) Religious scholars also report that Iranian religious
proselytizing is quite active in southern Azerbaijan, where
experts tell us Iranian charities sponsor unofficial
communities and religious festivals. GOAJ officials by
contrast claim that they have successfully arrested Iranian
influence in the south by expelling mullahs, and closing
Iranian-sponsored madrassas over the past five years. The
Government may be having some success at curbing Iran's
religious influence. The leading Shiite official Imam in the
southern city of Lenkoran states that his goal was to protect
the community from Iranian religious incroachment. As proof
of his success, the Imam, a young charismatic community
leader appointed by Sheikh Pashazade, points to a large
madrassah he operates where students study a modified liberal
arts curriculum alongside Shiite theology courses. Later on,
visiting the Imam's three primary mosques in Lenkoran, it was
apparent that this young, pro-government cleric was very
popular with the community, drawing warm welcomes from the
public on the street.

THE STATE COMMITTEE: AZERBAIJAN'S DIYANET
--------------


15. (C) In addition to the state control licensed through
Sheikh Ul-Islam Pashazade, the GOAJ created the State
Committee for Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA) in
2001, along the lines of Turkey's Directorate for Religious
Affairs. The Committee's first chairman, Rafiq Aliyev, used
his authority to regulate the registration, licensing and
operations of any religious group operating in the country.
Aliyev, who often clashed with the Sheikh over his efforts to
micromanage the Sheikh's officially sanctioned Shiite
community, was dismissed in June 2006. Aliyev's successor, a
long-standing presidential aide, Hidayat Orujov, quickly
started a public rapprochement with the Sheikh. Orujov also
publicly reaffirmed the GOAJ line on radicalism telling
reporters August 28 that the mission of the State Committee
was to prevent the spread of religious extremism and stop
groups from "destabilizing Azerbaijan."

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) Religion clearly is taking on an increasingly
important role in Azerbaijan. The political impact of
religious observance in Azerbaijan is less clear. Public
expectations of Ilham Aliyev's ability to deliver on his
promise of a Westernized, equitable, democratic, free market
society are very high. Over the long term, the role of Islam
as a political and social force will depend in large measure
on the Government's ability to deliver on these promises. The
GOAJ is acutely aware of religion's potential in society; the
real question is whether the GOAJ can balance legitimate
religious freedom issues with what it perceives as a growing
security threat.
DERSE