POWERPOINT AND PSYCHO-BABBLE: SECOND-TIER JAFARI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000944

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2026
TAGS: PGOV PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: POWERPOINT AND PSYCHO-BABBLE: SECOND-TIER JAFARI
ADVISERS BRING INUK MANAGEMENT GROUP TO REORGANIZE PM
OFFICE

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S) Summary. In a March 20 meeting with PolCouns
and PolOff, PM advisors (and brothers) Bashar and
Zuhair al-Naher, who aspire to join Jafari's inner
circle, presented a plan they said PM Jafari had
approved to reorganize the PM's office substantially
and creating policy development and follow-up units.
With guidance from the the al-Nahers, the UK managment
consulting firm Capgemini-crafted plan also utilizes
"Deep Democracy" and "Neuro-Linguistic Programming
(NLP)." Some of what is in the plan in terms of
strengthening liaison to the ministries and tracking
policy implementation makes sense, given the
weaknesses in the previous Jafari administration.
Improving the working relationship between PM and his
ministers would also be a marked achievement.
However, elements of the plan that talk about
"motivating" Iraqi political figures and government
employees strikes us as idealistic at very best.
Jafari has a way of keeping his advisors unsure of
their influence, and the Nahers are clearly trying to
increase theirs at the expense of Jafari's Dawa al-
Islamiyya old guard. End Summary.

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Capgemini's Plan
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2. (C) After a seven month absence, PM Advisor Bashar
al-Naher returned from London with his twin brother
Zuhair and a comprehensive plan to reorganize the PM's
office. Bashar admitted that the PM's Office has
lacked vision and organization. For the last six
months, he has worked with several international
consultant firms to craft an specific plan for the
Iraqi Prime Ministry.


3. (SBU) Zuhair al-Naher claimed that the UK
management consulting firm Capgemini has prepared a
structural plan modeled after the UK PM's office.
Central to the plan is establishment of a Strategic
Policy Advisory unit to link broad guidance from the
Prime Minister to actual implementation of policies at
the ministerial level. Zuhair said its function would
resemble something like the USG National Security
Council. (Note: This is not to be confused with the
Political Committee for National Security now under
discussion by the Iraqis. Capgemini's idea is an
office responsive only to the Iraqi PM.)


4. (SBU) This strategic policy unit would consist of
20-25 experts in their field. Al-Naher anticipated
that the experts would be recruited from all over the
world and Iraq, though he considers Iraq lacking
highly skilled technocrats. It would be responsible
for producing an integrated strategic plan for the
government. The strategic policy unit would have sub-
units in direct contact with ministers and government
agencies in the following functional areas:

- Strategic Management Training
- Human Resources and Recruitment
- External and Foreign Relations
- Internal Government Relations
- Strategic Policy
- Political Operations
- Advisory
- Events Visits Scheduling
- Media/Communications
- Executive Follow-up

The staffs of these ten sub-units would work in the
PM's office but would be in direct contact with the
ministers and their top staffs, the Nahar brothers
noted. They would guide ministers to ensure that
policies were better coordinated.


5. (C) PolCouns welcomed the effort to enhance inter-
ministerial coordination but expressed concern about
the amount of time it would take and office space to
set up such a comprehensive structural organization.
Zuhair stated that PM Jafari has given the al-Naher
brothers "unlimited resources" to get this done.
Bashar added that they expect to take over one floor
of the ITG building to accommodate the anticipated
influx of highly skilled expatriate consultants.
Bashar took note of PolCouns' mention of the severe

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shortage of Green Zone housing.

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"Deep Democracy" and "Neuro-
Linguistic Programming"
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6. (S) PolCouns also noted that the PM would have to
engage his ministers directly from time to time; he
could not leave it only to the ten sub-unit chiefs
above since Iraqi protocol meant that a minister did
not take direction from a mere staffer. Basher
explained to PolCouns that the Capgemini plan
incorporates two methodologies: "Deep Democracy" and
"Neuro-Linguistic Programming." These aim at
motivating Iraqi political leaders and government
employees to accept the prime minister's vision about
policy direction. It would also help reconciling
Sunni Arab and Shia differences. PolCouns said
training government staff for their functional jobs
might be a good thing. He expressed much greater
reservations about the utility of consultants coming
to Iraq to provide motivation or resolve deep-seated
cultural divides. The Nahars remained convinced of
the value of "Deep Democracy" and "Neuro-Linguistic
Programming" to help solve Iraq's problems.

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COMMENT
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7. (S) Adding vision and structure to the PM's
office, starting with an expanded staff blessed with
management and strategic direction, would be a
definite improvement. Improving the working
relationship between the PM and his ministers,
aligning their objectives would also be a big plus.
There are plenty of problems with this particular
plan, however. It would take months to set up, and
does not take into account the practicalities of the
Green Zone or lack of office space. Moreover, the al-
Naher brothers are naive about the political blowback
of having so many expat consultants in a strategic
policy unit trying to run the government; we already
see problems with IRMO consultants here. There is
also a negative optic that expat Iraqis carry a second
passport and often appear less committed to staying
in Iraq.


8. (S) The political class might give Jafari a chance
at implementing an idea like this, minus some of its
loopier elements, if/if Jafari could get the rest of
the country to buy into his vision for Iraq. Jafari's
problems gaining 184 votes to start the process of
selecting the cabinet show that he has failed thus far
to successfully articulate such a vision, let alone
get the Iraqi political class, which has its own
problems, to buy into it. In the face of a skeptical
political class, this idea will either face a stormy
reception or other Iraqis will find a way to
marginalize it completely.


9. (S) Jafari has promised to change his advisors and
build an office that is more representative of Iraq.
The Naher brothers, who were around before in ill-
defined roles, found themselves marginalized and
departed for London. Now they are back, and Jafari is
clearly reshuffling his advisers to improve both the
prospects of his becoming Prime Minister and in trying
to govern the country better. The Naher brothers are
hoping we will embrace "deep democracy" and "neuro-
linguistic programming" as a means both of improving
Jafari's office and increasing their own standing in
Jafari's eyes. Even if they have the right diagnosis,
they are writing the wrong prescription. We should
give Jafari credit for recognizing some of the major
problems, but if he ultimately becomes prime minister,
we will have to work to get them to focus on
immediate, practical steps they can take to improve
policy direction from the Prime Ministry and how to
boost interagency coordination within the Iraqi
Government.
KHALILZAD