AMB URGES SUNNI POLITICAL LEADERS TO DENOUNCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000074

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2016
TAGS: PNAT PTER PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: AMB URGES SUNNI POLITICAL LEADERS TO DENOUNCE
VIOLENCE, HELP END THE INSURGENCY

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Khalilzad met on January 5 with
key leaders from the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and on January
6 with the Iraqi National Dialogue Council (INDC) to review
their concerns about the December 15 parliamentary elections
and to solicit their views on the formation of a national
unity government. He also expressed deep concern about the
increase in violence and asked that the leaders issue
statements calling for calm. The leaders all expounded
unrealistic expectations that the ongoing international
review of the elections would result in specific changes to
the outcome. However, none of them threatened to boycott the
new parliament or negotiations over a unity government if the
election results remain unchanged. Instead, they said they
are talking to the Kurds about the shape of that government.
They are developing lists of potential candidates and are
engaged in discussions about potential power-sharing
arrangements in a national unity government. The leaders
were far less forthcoming regarding statements condemning the
recent upsurge in violence, claiming that the violence was a
response to GOI repression and killings of their political
operatives after the election as well as to provocative
statements by some Shia leaders linking all Sunni Arabs with
the insurgency. The Ambassador told the Sunni leaders that
they are not credible political partners if they defend the
insurgency, which, with the formation of a widely
representative government, could no longer be justified and
would have to be termed terrorism. END SUMMARY.

Key Issues - Election, Government Formation, Violence
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad met on January 5 with Tariq
Hashimi and Ayad Samarrai, key leaders in the Iraqi Islamic
Party (IIP). On January 6, he met with the Iraqi National
Dialogue Council (INDC) chairman Sheykh Khalif Al-Ayan,
accompanied by Mahmood Mashadani and Abd Nasir Al-Janabi.
The IIP and the INDC are two of the three parties in the
Al-Tawaffuq Front, the Sunni Arab coalition that, according
to preliminary results, won 43 seats in the December 15
elections.


3. (C) The Ambassador told the leaders that the International
Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE) is conducting a review of
election complaints and IECI audits and will issue its
preliminary findings before January 18. The US will support
the recommendations in the report, but it is unreasonable to
expect that the election will be rerun, the Ambassador told
the Sunni Arab leaders.


4. (C) The USG is encouraging a national unity government,
said Ambassador Khalilzad. He noted that the Kurd, Sunni,
and secular parties together have more votes than the Shia
Alliance and that, if they joined together, they could
negotiate with the Shia on an equal footing to form the new
government. The USG has no specific names to propose for any
positions but proposed ministers should be competent and the
key security agencies (Defense, Interior and Intelligence)
led by people who are non-sectarian, with no ties to
militias, and who enjoy broad political support. Otherwise,
the USG would have difficulty in cooperating with the
ministries.


5. (C) The Ambassador expressed deep concern about the
upsurge in violence and asked the leaders to issue statements
for an immediate suspension of violence during the government
formation process. He noted that statements by some groups
unhappy with the provisional election results suggested
support for the insurgency. This is a mistake that makes the
formation of a unity government more difficult, he noted.
Parties cannot have one foot in the insurgency and another in
the government. He also cautioned that political parties
should not defend as legitimate violence against a government
that is the outgrowth of a representative process; such
violence must be condemned as terrorism.

Unrealistic Expectations for Electoral Review
--------------


6. (C) IIP leader Tariq Hashimi asserted that the Sunni Arab
complaints about the election are very important and that
their supporters expect concrete remedies; otherwise there
will be "trouble". The Tawaffuq Front is being condemned as
being too soft by some parties, especially former INDC
spokesman Saleh Mutleq (whose competing Sunni Arab Iraqi
Unified Front slate won 11 seats). Tawaffuq hard-liner Abd
Nasir Al-Janabi was more direct, demanding that his bloc be
awarded 12 extra seats to compensate for alleged unfair seat
allocation in the new Council of Representatives (CR). He
claimed that Sunni Arabs represent 35-40% of Iraq's
population, the same as the Shia Arabs. The Ambassador
replied that there is nothing the USG could do about the 12
seats -- any revision in seat allocation will be decided by
the next CR (perhaps aided by the census planned for 2007).
The allocation of the 45 compensatory seats is distributed
according to the electoral law and cannot be simply awarded.

Sunnis Developing Candidate Lists
--------------


7. (C) Both Hashimi and another Tawaffuq Front leader, Khalif
Al-Ayan, confirmed that the Tawaffuq is developing a list of
candidates for senior government positions and will provide
Embassy with the list when internal consensus is reached.
Hashimi stated that the Sunni Arabs need to see fundamental
changes in the makeup of the government - they will balk at
the same names in top positions. He argued that a Sunni Arab
in a top symbolic position, like the President, would be an
important sign that things have changed. PolCouns urged the
Sunni Arab leaders to weigh carefully their options. They
need to consider whether it is more useful to gain the
Presidency when, under the new constitution, a Deputy
President has nearly as much authority and the Sunni Arabs
might secure more ministerial jobs by accepting a Deputy
President position. Hashimi and al-Janabi understood the
logic but appeared unconvinced.

Increase in Violence
--------------


8. (C) Both groups of party leaders were markedly cool to the
Ambassador's call for public statements to end the violence.
Hashimi was especially harsh in rejecting the call to condemn
the recent kidnapping of MOI Jabr's sister saying, "We have
no sympathy for Jabr and view him bitterly." Expressing
sympathy for the victim, he noted that the kidnapping
occurred near the IIP office and that IIP bodyguards shot at
the kidnappers in an unsuccessful attempt to intervene.
Hashimi said that violence is a two-sided problem and that
the recent upsurge in insurgent activity is a response to
government violence against Sunni Arabs after the election.
Tawaffuq Front official Mahmoud Mashadani asserted the
violence was in response to the SCIRI leader Hakim's and
Da'wa leader Jawad Al-Maliki's recent harsh statements
linking all Sunnis with the insurgency. Ayan claimed that
the GOI is assassinating Sunni Arab election observers and
confiscating homes and fields in Anbar, with families being
"thrown into the wilderness". He asserted that 58 Tawaffuq
observers were detained by the IP the day after the election
and that 38 of them were killed. He claimed that the GOI,
along with Iran, supports Zarqawi, whose terrorism primarily
affects Sunni Arabs. Mashadani charged that the GOI is
increasing terrorism against Arab Sunnis and the USG is not
intervening.


9. (C) Ambassador pushed back, stating that Zarqawi wants to
provoke a civil war and that the USG will not cease
operations against him. Shia leaders publicly complain that
the USG is restraining the GOI from responding to terror and
that that is the reason there is an increase in violence.
The Ambassador emphasized that the Sunni Arab political
parties must come out firmly against violence or their
credibility as a government partner will suffer. In
response, Mashadani said that the political leaders can reach
the "resistance" and the Ba'athists to affect their behavior.
Al-Janabi asked that the USG be patient with the Sunni Arab
political groups.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) COMMENT: Hashimi underlined the importance of the
international monitoring group looking seriously into fraud
allegations and making changes to the results as necessary.
That said, in neither meeting with these Tawaffuq Front
leaders did anyone mention boycotting the new parliament or
abstaining from negotiations about a unity government.
Internally they must decide what they want - symbolic
leadership in a Presidency or real power through control of
key ministries. They are clearly focused on problems
relating to the security ministries as a matter of immediate
concern. The key for the next weeks will be to convince them
that, without a definitive public break from the insurgency,
their ability to convince the Kurds and Shia to accept them
as serious partners in government will be limited, even with
our support. END COMMENT.
KHALILZAD