Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD662
2006-03-03 15:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

COLLABORATION AND CONFRONTATION BETWEEN MOI AND

Tags:  IZ KCRM MOPS NATO PARM PGOV PINR PREL UK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7236
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0662/01 0621555
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031555Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3030
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000662 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: IZ KCRM MOPS NATO PARM PGOV PINR PREL UK
SUBJECT: COLLABORATION AND CONFRONTATION BETWEEN MOI AND
MOD FORCES

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DAVID SATTERFIELD, REASONS 1.4 (C) AND
(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000662

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: IZ KCRM MOPS NATO PARM PGOV PINR PREL UK
SUBJECT: COLLABORATION AND CONFRONTATION BETWEEN MOI AND
MOD FORCES

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DAVID SATTERFIELD, REASONS 1.4 (C) AND
(D).


1. (C/REL MNFI) SUMMARY: Recent high-profile encounters
between the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of
Defense (MoD) highlight the friction that exists between the
two security ministries. Although there also has been
cooperation in some areas, there have been several incidents
in which their respective forces have targeted each other.
MNF-I has stepped in to help work out these differences and
form better collaborative relationships. END SUMMARY.

--------------
MOD/MOI CONFRONTATION
--------------


2. (C/REL MNFI) Several high profile encounters -- some
confrontational, some collaborative -- between Iraqi Army
(IA, part of the MoD) and Iraqi Police (IP, part of the MoI)
forces have occurred over the past few weeks. The latest
incident occurred the night of February 26 when the MoI's
Fourth Public Order Division (POD) launched a raid against
elements of the IA's 16th Strategic Infrastructure Battalion
(SIB) near the Daura Oil Refinery in Baghdad. The MoI claims
to have had credible information that 16th SIB has members
actively involved in insurgent activity, including VBIED
production, IED production and training, foreign fighter
housing and training, IED emplacement within the Daura
facility, and mortar attacks. (COMMENT: This SIB has not yet
been vetted or prepared for IA training and is one of the
original tribal forces hired by the Ministry of Oil. It is
credible that individuals in 16th SIB may have been
responsible for attacks and have insurgent connections. The
6th IA Division has assumed operational control over this
unit now. END COMMENT.) The POD forces raided several houses
and detained 31 individuals, some of whom were SIB soldiers.
The POD had obtained pre-raid approval from MND-Baghdad but

failed to mention that the targets were connected to a SIB.
Moreover, MoI did not inform MoD about the impending raid or
the information it had acquired about the SIB. Complicating
the matter, Iraqi TV reporting the incident characterized the
SIB suspects as criminals who work for MoD. On February 28,
Minster of Defense Duleime ended the weekly MoD/MoI/MNF-I
meeting early, challenging the MoI representative over this
incident and storming out. (NOTE: Minister of Interior Jabr
was not present at this meeting. END NOTE.)

--------------
A NEW MOI/MOD AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION
--------------


3. (C/REL MNFI) The evening of February 28, MNF-I CG Casey
met with Ministers Duleime and Jabr over dinner to work out
an agreement to improve coordination and operations between
the two ministries. MoD completed and MoI has concurred on
what MNSTC-I considers a good agreement. The essence of the
accord is that, whenever possible, the MoI and MoD will
inform each other in advance (or immediately afterward in the
case of sudden developments) regarding planned operations
against personnel in each other's ministry or forces. In
addition, the ministries will agree to conduct joint
operations when one ministry needs to conduct an activity in
the other ministry's geographic sector, especially in
Baghdad. Casey highlighted the need to rebuild trust between
the ministries and that just having a written agreement is
insufficient.


4. (C/REL MNFI) MNF-I will organize joint investigations of
the February 26 incident and perhaps one other incident,
which involves allegations that MoI commandos targeted BG
Najh Hashim, a Sunni brigadier on the MoD staff. Hashim
reportedly claimed that MoI commandos had raided his
apartment and assaulted him. MNF-I will ask the two
ministries to assign personnel to the investigations.

-------------- ---
RECENT EXAMPLES OF EFFECTIVE MOI/MOD COOPERATION
-------------- ---


5. (C/REL MNFI) Two significant IA/IP encounters occurred
during the past several weeks that demonstrated effective
MoI/MoD collaboration. The first incident involved IA
personnel manning a checkpoint in northeast Baghdad who
detained 22 members of the MoI Highway Patrol on January 20.
Four of the highway patrolmen allegedly informed the

BAGHDAD 00000662 002 OF 002


soldiers at the checkpoint that they were escorting a Sunni
Arab to a Shi'a mosque where he was to be interrogated and
(in an incredibly frank admission on the part of the
policemen) killed. The soldiers detained all of the
patrolmen (and the Sunni Arab victim),eventually releasing
the victim and remanding the four patrolmen to Abu Ghraib.
The remaining 18 patrolmen are in the custody of the MoI's
Major Crimes Unit for further questioning.


6. (C/REL MNFI) In the second incident, on February 20, a
unit of the IA 6th division (6-IA),on a routine presence
patrol, confronted a suspicious IP patrol. When approached
by the soldiers, several policemen dropped their weapons and
tried to flee but the IA detained all 18 IP officers. Upon
initial questioning by 6-IA, the detained IPs revealed that
they were from al-Kut and claimed to be on a legitimate
out-of-sector patrol. Contacted by phone, MoI could not
verify the IP's claim and recommended that the IA confiscate
their vehicles (3 Nissan trucks) and weapons (18 AK-47s plus
ammo and side arms) and detain the IPs for further tactical
questioning. Both MoI and 6-IA suspected that the IPs
matched the profile of an IP-disguised "death squad" that
operates throughout the 6-IA's area of responsibility (i.e.,
greater Baghdad). In addition to murders, the death squad is
accused of kidnappings, which it allegedly uses to finance
further criminal and insurgent activity. The 18 policemen
reportedly implicated their former chief in al-Kut, BG Hanin,
who recently was Chief of Police in Baghdad's Karkh district.
MoI also arrested Hanin within the past few days.


7. (C/REL MNFI) COMMENT: Squabbles between the IP and IA are
not new, especially when IP and IA run into each other's
sectors in Baghdad. According to MNSTC-I's assessment,
company-grade (captain and below) officers from the two
services generally work well together; friction tends to
arise at the field-grade (colonel and above) level. However,
effective army/police collaboration across the board is
vital, especially when loyalties of police units are suspect.
The cross-sectarian credibility of the IP must be
reestablished in the eyes of all Iraqis, and improved
inter-service collaboration between the MoD and MoI is likely
to bring additional transparency and accountability to the
system. The January 20 and February 20 incidents are good
examples of how such coordination can bring "bad cops" and
"bad soldiers" to justice. END COMMENT.
SATTERFIELD