MARCH 2 SECURITY MEETING PRODUCES LITTLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000659

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2026
TAGS: PGOV PINS PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: MARCH 2 SECURITY MEETING PRODUCES LITTLE


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Because of the latest spat with the Kurds,
PM Jafari canceled a morning meeting of top political leaders
that had been scheduled to discuss the security situation in
Iraq. After much pushing from post, the meeting was held the
evening of March 2. However, all the participants could
agree on was to schedule a curfew for March 3. The Kurdish
Alliance, Tawafuq, and the Iraqi National Accord (the
National Salvation Front - NSF) have each sent letters to
Shia Islamist Coalition (List 555) leader Abd al-Aziz
al-Hakim demanding that the Shia revoke the nomination of
Prime Minister-nominee Ibrahim Jafari. An attack on Tawafuq
leader Adnan Dulaymi's car left one bodyguard dead and five
others wounded. END SUMMARY

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Baghdad
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2. (C) Tawafuq leader Adnan Dulaymi's son told PolOff that
unknown assailants shot at his father's limousine in the
Ghazaliya area of Baghdad on March 2. One of Dulaymi's
bodyguards was killed and five others wounded. Reportedly,
the elder Dulaymi had just left the vehicle for another in
his package after one of his limousine's tires became flat.
While his staff was changing the tire to his stationary
limousine, it came under fire.


3. (C) Sadr City District Advisory Council (DAC) chair Hassan
Shama told PolFSN in a March 2 phone conversation that an
attack by a suicide bomber killed four people and wounded six
in Sadr City earlier that day. The attack took place near
the Ishbilia Bank. The suicide bomber was riding a bus with
ten other people when he detonated his suicide vest.

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Jafari Annoyed with Talabani
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4. (C) Prime Minister Jafari told Charge March 2 that
President Talabani's outburst in the press after Jafari's
February 28 trip to Turkey was inappropriate. Jafari said
Talabani should learn to keep their disputes out of the
media. Jafari planned to ignore the outburst; any concession
to Talabani just led Talabani to seek more, he commented
bitterly. Jafari immediately agreed with our point that the
expanded security group meeting, planned as follow up to the
PM's February 25 meeting, should not be postponed. The Iraqi
political leaders had to distinguish between a security
crisis on one side, and normal political competition in a
democratic system on the other. The security track should
not suffer due to the political competition, Charge
underlined. Jafari asked for our help in bringing Talabani,
Barzani and SCIRI to the meeting.

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Evening Meeting Produces Curfew, Speeches
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5. (C) Charge and Poloffs worked this during March 2
afternoon and the meeting took place March 2 evening at the
PM's office. Only one Sunni Arab of note attended. In a
three hour session of political speechmaking and mutual
recrimination, the only conclusion was to impose a curfew on
vehicle traffic in Baghdad for part of March 3. All agreed
the country is still on the edge of terrible civil strife;
they could not agree on any kind of action plan.

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Sadr's Plans Unclear
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6. (C) In the midday March 2 meeting, Jafari opined that the
security situation is still very tense; the Shia street is
still angry and Moqtada as-Sadr is active. He noted that
Ayatollah Sistani's position had shifted towards one where he
is less likely to get in front of the Shia community if anger
boils over. (He attributed this to the influence of
Ayatollah Mohammed Said al-Hakim.) In response to our
question, Jafari said he was unaware of what Moqtada
as-Sadr's next plans were. On the spot, he had his chief of
staff, Abdelaziz at-Tamimi, call the Interior Minister to see
if Sadr had advised them of any demonstrations. The Interior
Minister said he had not. Jafari agreed with our point that
Sadr might not inform the Interior Minister of Sadrist
activities and that a close watch on Sadr was vital.
(Comment: No one from the Sadrists attended the March 2
evening meeting. End Comment.)


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Kurds Have Taken the First Step
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7. (C) Later on March 2, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
leader Masud Barzani informed Charge and UK Ambassador Patey
that the Kurdish Alliance, Tawafuq, and the Iraqi National
Accord (the National Salvation Front - NSF) have each sent
letters to Shia Coalition leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim
demanding that the Shia revoke the nomination of Prime
Minister-elect Ibrahim Jafari. Although Iraqi National
Dialogue Front leader Saleh Mutlak is currently out of the
country, Barzani stated that he would also be sending a
separate letter to al-Hakim. Barzani appeared hazy on the
details of the choreography following the receipt of the
letter, but insisted that the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party
should be a part of the NSF to emphasize that the group is
truly interested in national unity.


8. (C) Charge asked Barzani to put aside politics and accept
Jafari,s call to meet on the evening of March 2 to discuss
the worsening security situation in Iraq. Charge again
stressed the importance of separating efforts to contain
sectarian violence from the negotiations to stand up a new
government. Barzani agreed that the Kurds would send Deputy
Prime Minister Shaways and Planning Minister Barham Saleh to
represent the Kurdish Alliance. He irritably added, however,
that while security was a legitimate concern for all Iraqis,
a meeting of the various party leaders would not serve to
address the underlying issues. The key to stabilizing the
security situation, Barzani insisted, is to arrest Moqtada
al-Sadr and neutralize the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). (Barzani
recalled that in 2004, he had recommended to then CPA
Administrator Bremer that al-Sadr should be "dealt with.")
It would be better to confront Sadr and the JAM now, mused
Barzani, before they could consolidate their position and
gain in strength and numbers. Masrur Barzani, Barzani's son,
commented that the Iraqi Police would be incapable of
confronting the JAM in a direct clash.


9. (C) Also on March 2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief of
Staff and newly elected KDP Council of Representatives (CoR)
member Fawzi Hariri told PolOff that Jafari's trip to Turkey
further damaged his relationship with the Kurds. (Note:
Although Jafari did not directly notify the Presidency
Council of his trip, Foreign Minister (and Kurdish official)
Zebari found out in time to insist that Deputy Foreign
Minister (and SCIRI member) Hamid al-Bayati accompany Jafari.
End Note.) Hariri added that Jafari is extremely
shortsighted if he thinks he has the PM nomination wrapped
up. Previously, the Kurds were content to wait for factions
within the Shia Coalition to break away. But after Jafari's
Ankara visit, the Kurds have lost all patience. Hariri said
he hoped that al-Hakim would leave the Coalition, bringing
SCIRI, Fadhila party and perhaps some DAWA moderates with him
to join with the Kurds, Tawafuq and Allawi.
SATTERFIELD