IRAQ,S EFFECTIVE SECURITY RESPONSE TO THE GOLDEN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000646

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: IZ KCRM MOPS NATO PARM PGOV PINR PREL UK
SUBJECT: IRAQ,S EFFECTIVE SECURITY RESPONSE TO THE GOLDEN
MOSQUE BOMBING

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 (
C) and (D).


1. (S//REL MNFI) SUMMARY: The GOI's national security
apparatus and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),supported by
the U.S. and UK embassies and MNF-I, performed well in most
areas of Iraq that experienced sectarian violence following
the February 22 bombing in Samarra. The GOI's tactics were
mostly successful in maintaining order, but some, such as the
ban on public display of weapons, have yet to be enforced.
Sunni Arabs are still highly skeptical of Ministry of
Interior (MOI) police forces and have urged a stronger
Coalition Force (CF) or Iraqi Army (IA) presence in some
neighborhoods. Militias took advantage of the situation to
flaunt their presence in the streets, without significant
challenge from legitimate security forces. Reports from
Basrah in particular indicated that the ISF were
conspicuously absent, relative to Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaish al
Mahdi (JAM) militia, for the first two days after the Samarra
attack. A confrontation with JAM could develop if ISF and CF
enforce the weapons ban. END SUMMARY.

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GOI LEADERSHIP
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2. (U) After the February 22 bombing of the Golden Mosque in
Samarra, widespread violence did not break out in large part
due to effective actions by the GOI, calls for calm from
leaders across Iraq, and the performance of the ISF. PM
Jafari's initial calls for unity and for Iraqis to block
those aiming to spark sectarian violence, which were
supported and at times overshadowed by similar public
announcements by senior religious leaders, reassured the
country and limited sectarian violence.


3. (S//REL MNFI) The GOI's security measures included curfews
and a security plan led by the ISF. In some instances, ISF
heeded Sunni Arab sensitivity to a heavy MOI presence and
substituted IA or CF for the police. Judicious use of
extended nighttime curfews (February 23-27),no-notice
daytime curfews (February 24-26),and control of vehicle
access to Baghdad facilitated the maintenance of order.
According to some reports, ISF was slow to enforce the curfew
on the first two days but by February 25 had imposed stricter
enforcement. We also received accounts of militias flouting
the curfew in some areas, without challenge. Jafari proposed
a ban on public display of weapons by non-security forces,
but this measure has yet to be enforced.

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ISF PERFORMANCE
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4. (U) IA and IP performance contributed substantially to
keeping demonstrations peaceful and contained. Overall, ISF
adhered to their mission rather than a sectarian agenda.
According to MNF-I, ISF-implemented crowd controls proved
largely effective and demonstrated real improvements in ISF
planning, coordinating, and executing security missions. IP
and IA coordinated in a timely and effective manner, moving
to key locations to control demonstrations without themselves
inciting violence. IP handled a number of real and fake IEDs
around demonstrations and religious sites.


5. (S//REL MNFI) Despite capable performance in independent
and joint operations, ISF performance required CF support to
be fully effective. In general, ISF first responders
established an inner cordon around an area to control
violence, and CF set up an outer cordon to contain the
situation.


6. (S//REL MNFI) Although the IA performed well, the IP had
mixed results, according to MNF-I division commanders. This
is due partly to the army having more training and experience
than the police and because some IP units are populated by
militia members. Overall, major subordinate command (MSC)
division commanders evaluated IP performance outside of
Baghdad as much better than units inside Baghdad. In
addition, according to Sunni interlocutors, Baghdad's Sunni
Arab residents tend to distrust the IP and do not feel
protected unless U.S. soldiers, or at least the IA, are in
the area. Thus, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B)
surged more U.S. troops into the Sunni parts of the city to
maintain order. Outside of Baghdad, public support for

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police remains largely positive.


7. (S//REL MNFI) Reports from Basrah were conflicting.
MND-SE commanders evaluated ISF performance as largely
positive and reported that the population saw the ISF clearly
in the lead, demonstrating capabilities to maintain order in
a sensitive situation. REO Basrah, however, noted a
conspicuous absence of IP or IA in the first few days of the
crisis; they apparently had abandoned the streets to Sadr
militias who were out in force.

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COMMENT
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8. (S//REL MNFI) COMMENT: The ISF acquitted themselves
admirably during this crisis. Following their successful,
albeit passive, performances in securing the referendum and
elections, this was their first encounter with widespread
public disorder and violence. The ISF rose to the occasion
and -- without over-reacting or using heavy-handed tactics --
eased tensions, promoted general stability, and supported the
politicians' efforts to show unity. The daytime curfew on
Friday (February 24) was risky but effective, and the
political leadership is now fully aware of the importance of
accurate reporting of events and of squelching rumors and
exaggeration.


9. (S//REL MNFI) COMMENT CONT'D: Nonetheless, the ISF still
needed a huge push and material assistance from the U.S. and
UK missions and from MNF-I. The ban of public display of
weapons has yet to be implemented. To the upside, they also
did not unnecessarily instigate further instability through
confrontation with the militias. Such a confrontation with
JAM or other militias may yet occur, however, if ISF and CF
begin to enforce the ban on the public display of weapons.
END COMMENT.
KHALILZAD