Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD628
2006-02-27 19:54:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE DISCUSSES 24-POINT
how-toVZCZCXRO0497 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHGB #0628/01 0581954 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 271954Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2964 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000628
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2016
TAGS: IZ KCRM MOPS KJUS PINR PREL PGOV UK
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE DISCUSSES 24-POINT
PLAN FOR STABILITY
REF: BAGHDAD 609
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (C) and (D).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000628
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2016
TAGS: IZ KCRM MOPS KJUS PINR PREL PGOV UK
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE DISCUSSES 24-POINT
PLAN FOR STABILITY
REF: BAGHDAD 609
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (C) and (D).
1. (S//REL MNFI) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari
called a Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS)
meeting on February 26 with the Ambassador, UK Ambassador
Patey, senior MNF-I officers, and top Iraqi national security
staff to continue addressing the February 22 bombing of the
Golden Mosque in Samarra. Discussion focused on the
specifics and implementation of a GOI-compiled 24-point
agenda (see para 12) as a political blueprint to ease
tensions and restore stability. The agenda was based on the
previous night's political advisory group meeting (reftel).
Among the key deliverables are: a committee to review the
status of those detained since February 22; an agreement to
inspect and repair damaged mosques and to return those
occupied since February 22 to their original administrators;
a government offer to protect the holiest shrines as
required; a determination of which victims of the sectarian
strife are eligible for benefits as martyrs; and deployment
of armored vehicles around cities to maintain stability.
Embassy also pressed for enforcement of the GOI-prescribed
weapons ban, but Jafari asked for more time to publicize the
ban nation-wide. END SUMMARY.
2. (S//REL MNFI) Jafari convened the MCNS on February 26 to
review the 24-point agenda proposed during the previous
night's meeting of a broad-based political advisory group
that had comprised political party and other leaders.
Present at the MCNS meeting were the Ambassador, UK
Ambassador Patey, MNF-I CG Casey, MNF-I DCG Houghton, Pol-Mil
Counselor Litt, Minister of Defense Dulaime, Minister of
Interior Jabr, Minister of National Security al-Anzi, and
National Security Advisor Rubaie. See para 12 for a complete
list of the 24 points; a review of the highlights appears
below. (COMMENT: As with all MCNS meetings, the Sunni Arab
political perspective was mostly absent given the heavily
Shia political configuration of the national security
apparatus. END COMMENT.)
--------------
ADVISORY GROUP'S SUCCESS
--------------
3. (S//REL MNFI) Ambassador praised the political advisory
group meeting. Jafari said its success is attributable to
the breadth of participation and points of view expressed; to
its results and recommendations; and to the positive impact
the image of the meeting had on the populace. He thanked
Ambassadors Khalilzad and Patey for generating the idea to
hold such a meeting. Nevertheless, Jafari said, success will
only come with implementing its recommendations.
--------------
POINT 2: REASSURING THE IRAQIS
--------------
4. (S//REL MNFI) The MCNS members concurred that the
political parties, especially the two principal Sunni groups,
have launched an important effort in their positive public
statements and that these must continue.
--------------
POINT 3: RELEASING DETAINEES
--------------
5. (S//REL MNFI) Much debate occurred about releasing
detainees. After discussing the formation of a committee to
determine releasability of detainees (e.g., whom the
committee should comprise, whether there should be an
amnesty/unconditional release, which group of detainees are
to be considered),the MCNS reached consensus to augment the
current Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB) (composed of
nine members, the majority of whom are Iraqis) by two new
members: representatives of the Sunni Tawaffuq group and
Mithal al Alussi's party. Jafari imposed three conditions on
this board's members, especially the political party members:
information revealed during the board's deliberations must
not be made public; the inevitable internal disagreements and
disputes of the board must not be discussed with the media;
and each party is obliged to contribute information relevant
to a given detainee not already available in the files to
which they might be privy. This expanded CRRB would only
review the files of the approximately 100 people detained
BAGHDAD 00000628 002 OF 003
since February 22. The board would identify the detainees as
falling into two categories: those to be released (either
having been detained unlawfully or detained legally but
without prosecutable evidence or posing a security threat)
and those to be maintained under detention (those who are
prosecutable and those who pose a security threat but are not
necessarily prosecutable). The Ambassador suggested the
government might consider extending the mandate of this board
if the model proves successful. In that case, another
category would apply -- those whom Iraq might agree to
release under one set of circumstances, but not under others.
These people could be part of an amnesty program. All
agreed that unconditional amnesty is premature. (COMMENT:
The modalities of the new board's deliberations will have to
be worked out to ensure compliance with Iraqi law and UNSCR
1647. END COMMENT)
--------------
POINT 4: DAMAGED AND OCCUPIED MOSQUES
--------------
6. (S//REL MNFI) Jafari announced the formation of a
committee comprising representatives of the Sunni and Shia
foundations (waqf) and the Council of Ministers that will
inspect mosques that were damaged or destroyed during the
recent violence. Mosques that were damaged during the
current violence would be repaired or rebuilt. Those seized
unlawfully as a result of the crisis would be returned, but
those mosques whose ownership has been under dispute since
before the crisis would be dealt with separately. Dulaime
reported the case of one mosque (Masjid an-Nida') seized by
the government and in which the Iraqi Security Force (ISF)
found Saddamist propaganda, evidence of a military
operations room, and a medical clinic used to treat
insurgents.
--------------
SHIA EVICTIONS
--------------
7. (S//REL MNFI) A discussion ensued about the imminent
problem of dozens of Shia families evicted from their homes
in predominantly Sunni neighborhoods (especially Abu Ghraib,
Daura, and Shu'la) who are seeking to enter the International
Zone for refuge. Jafari and Dulaime stressed the importance
of returning these people to their homes and halting these
evictions immediately, lest Shia neighborhoods begin to
retaliate against Sunni families. MOI explained that many of
these families were not driven away at gunpoint but rather
received credibly threatening letters demanding that they
leave. Since other families ignoring such threats had been
killed, he added, these victims needed no additional warning.
--------------
POINT 5: DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
--------------
8. (S//REL MNFI) Jafari reiterated the importance of
deploying forces into "hot" or sensitive areas without delay
and announcing such deployments publicly. Casey, Dulaime,
and Jabr stated that beginning February 27 mechanized/armored
vehicles would be deployed visibly around the cities,
especially in mixed Shia/Sunni areas. Casey also asked for,
and received, confirmation that the vehicle ban in Baghdad
would be lifted February 27. Finally, Casey emphasized the
importance of enforcing the government's weapons ban
immediately, although some violence should be expected as a
result, especially from the Jaysh al Mahdi. Jafari urged
that first the ban first be publicized broadly over the
course of a few days. MOI Jabr added that he has begun a
campaign to ask political party leaders to inform their
organizations about the ban. Jafari tried to argue for an
interim weapons buy-back program before enforcement of the
ban, but Casey persuaded him that a buy-back program is
premature. (COMMENT: The weapons ban was not part of the
24-point plan but was prescribed earlier by the GOI. END
COMMENT.)
--------------
POINT 20: PROTECTING HOLY SHRINES
--------------
9. (S//REL MNFI) Jafari warned that destruction of another
major religious site could plunge Iraq into civil war. As a
result, Jabr said he will meet with the religious leadership
BAGHDAD 00000628 003 OF 003
of all sides regarding the requirements to protect their
holiest shrines, especially if they have evidence of threats.
In the longer term, Jafari suggested creating a security
force with a mandate to protect holy sites. UK Ambassador
Patey observed that such a government offer of security would
shift some responsibility to the shoulders of the religious
foundations to determine for themselves what assistance they
require.
--------------
POINT 21: HONORING MARTYRS
--------------
10. (S//REL MNFI) The issue of determining "martyrdom" as a
result of the violence is important for the government to
provide benefits to families of victims. Jafari said the
same committee working the mosque inspections also could
decide whether the deceased is a terrorist/foreign fighter
and thus ineligible, or is an innocent party and thus a
martyr eligible for assistance. The PM acknowledged that
there would be many difficult cases to decide.
--------------
POINT 22: RECONSTRUCTION DONATIONS
--------------
11. (S//REL MNFI) Jafari observed that sharia law actually
complicates the procedures for collecting donations for
reconstruction of damage or other loss. Donations offered
for a particular fund, he explained, may be spent only on
that project and may not be diverted to another cause or
project for any reason. Jafari expressed Iraq's profound
appreciation for President Bush's and HMG's offers to
contribute to rebuilding the Samarra mosque. The Shia
religious leadership prefers to reconstruct the mosque
themselves, he said, but the US/UK offers (and those of other
nations and organizations) might be used for reconstruction
around the mosque.
--------------
24-Point Plan
--------------
12. (U) The following is Embassy's unofficial translation of
the 24 points raised during the political advisory group
meeting on February 25, collated by the PM and distributed at
the February 26 MCNS meeting:
1. Political initiative is the solution
2. Public announcement reassuring all Iraqis
3. Releasing detainees
4. Return of occupied mosques
5. Consideration of proper deployment of Iraqi Army and
Iraqi Police in Shia and Sunni areas
6. Application of martial law
7. Condemning terrorism
8. Detentions under law and approved by a judge
9. Addressing extremist imams in mosques
10. Form investigative committee
11. Avoiding exaggeration of facts
12. National Honor Charter
13. Joint review of detainee folders by MOI and MOD
14. Consult with neighboring nations
15. Regularly conduct outreach meetings
16. Follow the rule of law
17. Increase number of judges
18. Apply anti-terrorist laws
19. Use of curfews
20. Protect holy shrines
21. Consider the dead as martyrs
22. Donation-collection committee
23. Conclusion statement
24. Execute the Cabinet plan
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2016
TAGS: IZ KCRM MOPS KJUS PINR PREL PGOV UK
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE DISCUSSES 24-POINT
PLAN FOR STABILITY
REF: BAGHDAD 609
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (C) and (D).
1. (S//REL MNFI) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari
called a Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS)
meeting on February 26 with the Ambassador, UK Ambassador
Patey, senior MNF-I officers, and top Iraqi national security
staff to continue addressing the February 22 bombing of the
Golden Mosque in Samarra. Discussion focused on the
specifics and implementation of a GOI-compiled 24-point
agenda (see para 12) as a political blueprint to ease
tensions and restore stability. The agenda was based on the
previous night's political advisory group meeting (reftel).
Among the key deliverables are: a committee to review the
status of those detained since February 22; an agreement to
inspect and repair damaged mosques and to return those
occupied since February 22 to their original administrators;
a government offer to protect the holiest shrines as
required; a determination of which victims of the sectarian
strife are eligible for benefits as martyrs; and deployment
of armored vehicles around cities to maintain stability.
Embassy also pressed for enforcement of the GOI-prescribed
weapons ban, but Jafari asked for more time to publicize the
ban nation-wide. END SUMMARY.
2. (S//REL MNFI) Jafari convened the MCNS on February 26 to
review the 24-point agenda proposed during the previous
night's meeting of a broad-based political advisory group
that had comprised political party and other leaders.
Present at the MCNS meeting were the Ambassador, UK
Ambassador Patey, MNF-I CG Casey, MNF-I DCG Houghton, Pol-Mil
Counselor Litt, Minister of Defense Dulaime, Minister of
Interior Jabr, Minister of National Security al-Anzi, and
National Security Advisor Rubaie. See para 12 for a complete
list of the 24 points; a review of the highlights appears
below. (COMMENT: As with all MCNS meetings, the Sunni Arab
political perspective was mostly absent given the heavily
Shia political configuration of the national security
apparatus. END COMMENT.)
--------------
ADVISORY GROUP'S SUCCESS
--------------
3. (S//REL MNFI) Ambassador praised the political advisory
group meeting. Jafari said its success is attributable to
the breadth of participation and points of view expressed; to
its results and recommendations; and to the positive impact
the image of the meeting had on the populace. He thanked
Ambassadors Khalilzad and Patey for generating the idea to
hold such a meeting. Nevertheless, Jafari said, success will
only come with implementing its recommendations.
--------------
POINT 2: REASSURING THE IRAQIS
--------------
4. (S//REL MNFI) The MCNS members concurred that the
political parties, especially the two principal Sunni groups,
have launched an important effort in their positive public
statements and that these must continue.
--------------
POINT 3: RELEASING DETAINEES
--------------
5. (S//REL MNFI) Much debate occurred about releasing
detainees. After discussing the formation of a committee to
determine releasability of detainees (e.g., whom the
committee should comprise, whether there should be an
amnesty/unconditional release, which group of detainees are
to be considered),the MCNS reached consensus to augment the
current Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB) (composed of
nine members, the majority of whom are Iraqis) by two new
members: representatives of the Sunni Tawaffuq group and
Mithal al Alussi's party. Jafari imposed three conditions on
this board's members, especially the political party members:
information revealed during the board's deliberations must
not be made public; the inevitable internal disagreements and
disputes of the board must not be discussed with the media;
and each party is obliged to contribute information relevant
to a given detainee not already available in the files to
which they might be privy. This expanded CRRB would only
review the files of the approximately 100 people detained
BAGHDAD 00000628 002 OF 003
since February 22. The board would identify the detainees as
falling into two categories: those to be released (either
having been detained unlawfully or detained legally but
without prosecutable evidence or posing a security threat)
and those to be maintained under detention (those who are
prosecutable and those who pose a security threat but are not
necessarily prosecutable). The Ambassador suggested the
government might consider extending the mandate of this board
if the model proves successful. In that case, another
category would apply -- those whom Iraq might agree to
release under one set of circumstances, but not under others.
These people could be part of an amnesty program. All
agreed that unconditional amnesty is premature. (COMMENT:
The modalities of the new board's deliberations will have to
be worked out to ensure compliance with Iraqi law and UNSCR
1647. END COMMENT)
--------------
POINT 4: DAMAGED AND OCCUPIED MOSQUES
--------------
6. (S//REL MNFI) Jafari announced the formation of a
committee comprising representatives of the Sunni and Shia
foundations (waqf) and the Council of Ministers that will
inspect mosques that were damaged or destroyed during the
recent violence. Mosques that were damaged during the
current violence would be repaired or rebuilt. Those seized
unlawfully as a result of the crisis would be returned, but
those mosques whose ownership has been under dispute since
before the crisis would be dealt with separately. Dulaime
reported the case of one mosque (Masjid an-Nida') seized by
the government and in which the Iraqi Security Force (ISF)
found Saddamist propaganda, evidence of a military
operations room, and a medical clinic used to treat
insurgents.
--------------
SHIA EVICTIONS
--------------
7. (S//REL MNFI) A discussion ensued about the imminent
problem of dozens of Shia families evicted from their homes
in predominantly Sunni neighborhoods (especially Abu Ghraib,
Daura, and Shu'la) who are seeking to enter the International
Zone for refuge. Jafari and Dulaime stressed the importance
of returning these people to their homes and halting these
evictions immediately, lest Shia neighborhoods begin to
retaliate against Sunni families. MOI explained that many of
these families were not driven away at gunpoint but rather
received credibly threatening letters demanding that they
leave. Since other families ignoring such threats had been
killed, he added, these victims needed no additional warning.
--------------
POINT 5: DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
--------------
8. (S//REL MNFI) Jafari reiterated the importance of
deploying forces into "hot" or sensitive areas without delay
and announcing such deployments publicly. Casey, Dulaime,
and Jabr stated that beginning February 27 mechanized/armored
vehicles would be deployed visibly around the cities,
especially in mixed Shia/Sunni areas. Casey also asked for,
and received, confirmation that the vehicle ban in Baghdad
would be lifted February 27. Finally, Casey emphasized the
importance of enforcing the government's weapons ban
immediately, although some violence should be expected as a
result, especially from the Jaysh al Mahdi. Jafari urged
that first the ban first be publicized broadly over the
course of a few days. MOI Jabr added that he has begun a
campaign to ask political party leaders to inform their
organizations about the ban. Jafari tried to argue for an
interim weapons buy-back program before enforcement of the
ban, but Casey persuaded him that a buy-back program is
premature. (COMMENT: The weapons ban was not part of the
24-point plan but was prescribed earlier by the GOI. END
COMMENT.)
--------------
POINT 20: PROTECTING HOLY SHRINES
--------------
9. (S//REL MNFI) Jafari warned that destruction of another
major religious site could plunge Iraq into civil war. As a
result, Jabr said he will meet with the religious leadership
BAGHDAD 00000628 003 OF 003
of all sides regarding the requirements to protect their
holiest shrines, especially if they have evidence of threats.
In the longer term, Jafari suggested creating a security
force with a mandate to protect holy sites. UK Ambassador
Patey observed that such a government offer of security would
shift some responsibility to the shoulders of the religious
foundations to determine for themselves what assistance they
require.
--------------
POINT 21: HONORING MARTYRS
--------------
10. (S//REL MNFI) The issue of determining "martyrdom" as a
result of the violence is important for the government to
provide benefits to families of victims. Jafari said the
same committee working the mosque inspections also could
decide whether the deceased is a terrorist/foreign fighter
and thus ineligible, or is an innocent party and thus a
martyr eligible for assistance. The PM acknowledged that
there would be many difficult cases to decide.
--------------
POINT 22: RECONSTRUCTION DONATIONS
--------------
11. (S//REL MNFI) Jafari observed that sharia law actually
complicates the procedures for collecting donations for
reconstruction of damage or other loss. Donations offered
for a particular fund, he explained, may be spent only on
that project and may not be diverted to another cause or
project for any reason. Jafari expressed Iraq's profound
appreciation for President Bush's and HMG's offers to
contribute to rebuilding the Samarra mosque. The Shia
religious leadership prefers to reconstruct the mosque
themselves, he said, but the US/UK offers (and those of other
nations and organizations) might be used for reconstruction
around the mosque.
--------------
24-Point Plan
--------------
12. (U) The following is Embassy's unofficial translation of
the 24 points raised during the political advisory group
meeting on February 25, collated by the PM and distributed at
the February 26 MCNS meeting:
1. Political initiative is the solution
2. Public announcement reassuring all Iraqis
3. Releasing detainees
4. Return of occupied mosques
5. Consideration of proper deployment of Iraqi Army and
Iraqi Police in Shia and Sunni areas
6. Application of martial law
7. Condemning terrorism
8. Detentions under law and approved by a judge
9. Addressing extremist imams in mosques
10. Form investigative committee
11. Avoiding exaggeration of facts
12. National Honor Charter
13. Joint review of detainee folders by MOI and MOD
14. Consult with neighboring nations
15. Regularly conduct outreach meetings
16. Follow the rule of law
17. Increase number of judges
18. Apply anti-terrorist laws
19. Use of curfews
20. Protect holy shrines
21. Consider the dead as martyrs
22. Donation-collection committee
23. Conclusion statement
24. Execute the Cabinet plan
KHALILZAD