Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD626
2006-02-27 19:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
how-toVZCZCXRO0467 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHGB #0626 0581927 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271927Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2961 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000626
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: RELATIVE CALM PREVAILS
REF: BAGHDAD 609
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000626
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: RELATIVE CALM PREVAILS
REF: BAGHDAD 609
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The overall security situation in Baghdad is
relatively calm and reports of sectarian violence once again
decreased overnight. The ban on vehicular movement in
Baghdad was lifted at 0600 hrs on February 27, and our
contacts appeared to be largely consumed with personal
errands for much of the day. The Deputy Mayor of Baghdad
reported a February 27 missile attack on a girls' school
resulting in casualties. Although the violence has tapered,
sectarian and ethnic tensions are still high. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) MNF-I noted two reports of attacks on Shia mosques
overnight. According to the Basrah police, shortly before
midnight on February 26, an improvised explosive device (IED)
exploded inside the Imam Ali Mosque in Basrah. The National
Police reported that a Shia shrine in the Madean District of
Baghdad was hit by three mortar rounds an hour later. Two of
the rounds hit the dome of the Selman Al Muhemdi shrine; the
third struck the outside of the shrine.
3. (C) Deputy Mayor of Baghdad Hussein Al-Bahraini told
PolOff that on February 27 a missile was fired into a girls'
school in the Al-Salaam district of Al-Monsour, reportedly
killing seven teachers and several students. Hussein and
officials in the district are attempting to confirm
casualties and damage to the school. No group has taken
responsibility for the attack.
4. (C) Fadhila parliamentarian Mohammed Ismail al-Kusai told
PolFSN in a February 27 phone conversation that the challenge
Iraq is currently facing is sectarian, not political. He
added that the Fadhila Party will work to preserve the unity
of the Shia coalition in order to present a united front and
to keep the "Ba'athists" at bay.
5. (C) Ala'a Mekki of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) told us
February 27 that Sunni Arabs were watching the Shia militia
carefully, especially Jaysh al-Mahdi. He was unsure whether
the militia would stand down, although he had only one report
of an attack on a Sunni area (which we later learned was an
approved MoI operation). Mekki expressed some discomfort
with the Sadrists. The talks on February 23 and 24 had been
difficult, he observed, as Sadrist negotiators Abdel Hadi
ad-Darraji and Hazem al-Araji had been "almost violent."
6. (C) In a telephone conversation on February 27, Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) senior member Masrur Barzani expressed
the Kurds' frustration with the slow pace of government
formation negotiations and blamed both Shia and Sunni Arabs
for the delay. "It seems as though only the US Government
and the Kurds are interested in helping Iraq progress toward
democracy and self-sufficiency," complained Barzani. Barzani
then reported that the KDP is avoiding large gatherings in
the Green Zone after a mortar landed in its compound
yesterday. While no one was hurt, the Barzanis are
uncomfortably aware that their late-night conferences are
attracting attention.
7. (C) Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubai'e
told PolCouns February 27 that he would brief Sistani's
office on February 28 about events. He perceived that
Sistani's mention in his February 22 fetwa about the faithful
protecting holy sites themselves was "not helpful." Rubai'e
opined that Shia patience with terror attacks is still very
thin; one major terror attack could alter the scene
immediately, he thought.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: RELATIVE CALM PREVAILS
REF: BAGHDAD 609
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The overall security situation in Baghdad is
relatively calm and reports of sectarian violence once again
decreased overnight. The ban on vehicular movement in
Baghdad was lifted at 0600 hrs on February 27, and our
contacts appeared to be largely consumed with personal
errands for much of the day. The Deputy Mayor of Baghdad
reported a February 27 missile attack on a girls' school
resulting in casualties. Although the violence has tapered,
sectarian and ethnic tensions are still high. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) MNF-I noted two reports of attacks on Shia mosques
overnight. According to the Basrah police, shortly before
midnight on February 26, an improvised explosive device (IED)
exploded inside the Imam Ali Mosque in Basrah. The National
Police reported that a Shia shrine in the Madean District of
Baghdad was hit by three mortar rounds an hour later. Two of
the rounds hit the dome of the Selman Al Muhemdi shrine; the
third struck the outside of the shrine.
3. (C) Deputy Mayor of Baghdad Hussein Al-Bahraini told
PolOff that on February 27 a missile was fired into a girls'
school in the Al-Salaam district of Al-Monsour, reportedly
killing seven teachers and several students. Hussein and
officials in the district are attempting to confirm
casualties and damage to the school. No group has taken
responsibility for the attack.
4. (C) Fadhila parliamentarian Mohammed Ismail al-Kusai told
PolFSN in a February 27 phone conversation that the challenge
Iraq is currently facing is sectarian, not political. He
added that the Fadhila Party will work to preserve the unity
of the Shia coalition in order to present a united front and
to keep the "Ba'athists" at bay.
5. (C) Ala'a Mekki of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) told us
February 27 that Sunni Arabs were watching the Shia militia
carefully, especially Jaysh al-Mahdi. He was unsure whether
the militia would stand down, although he had only one report
of an attack on a Sunni area (which we later learned was an
approved MoI operation). Mekki expressed some discomfort
with the Sadrists. The talks on February 23 and 24 had been
difficult, he observed, as Sadrist negotiators Abdel Hadi
ad-Darraji and Hazem al-Araji had been "almost violent."
6. (C) In a telephone conversation on February 27, Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) senior member Masrur Barzani expressed
the Kurds' frustration with the slow pace of government
formation negotiations and blamed both Shia and Sunni Arabs
for the delay. "It seems as though only the US Government
and the Kurds are interested in helping Iraq progress toward
democracy and self-sufficiency," complained Barzani. Barzani
then reported that the KDP is avoiding large gatherings in
the Green Zone after a mortar landed in its compound
yesterday. While no one was hurt, the Barzanis are
uncomfortably aware that their late-night conferences are
attracting attention.
7. (C) Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubai'e
told PolCouns February 27 that he would brief Sistani's
office on February 28 about events. He perceived that
Sistani's mention in his February 22 fetwa about the faithful
protecting holy sites themselves was "not helpful." Rubai'e
opined that Shia patience with terror attacks is still very
thin; one major terror attack could alter the scene
immediately, he thought.
KHALILZAD