Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD498
2006-02-16 21:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

ZEBARI SAYS JAFARI DOES NOT HAVE LOCK ON

Tags:  PGOV PNAT KDEM 
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VZCZCXRO0190
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0498/01 0472119
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 162119Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2747
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000498 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM
SUBJECT: ZEBARI SAYS JAFARI DOES NOT HAVE LOCK ON
PREMIERSHIP; HAKIM VISITS NAJAF, BUT MARJAIYA POSITION
UNCLEAR

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000498

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM
SUBJECT: ZEBARI SAYS JAFARI DOES NOT HAVE LOCK ON
PREMIERSHIP; HAKIM VISITS NAJAF, BUT MARJAIYA POSITION
UNCLEAR

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY FM Zebari told PolCouns February 16 that
Jafari does not have a lock on the premiership, although
Zebari doubted SCIRI and Fadhila would leave the Shia
Coalition as that would be contrary to the wishes of
Grand Ayatollah Sistani. SCIRI Chief of Staff Haitham
al-Husseini, told PolOff February 16 that Abd al-Aziz al-
Hakim has not yet made a decision on SCIRI's next move.
Hussein said that, whatever decision Hakim makes, it
would have the backing of the Marjaiya. He did not
indicate whether Grand Ayatollah Sistani had given Hakim
any indication of support for a break with Jafari during
Hakim's February 15-16 visit to Najaf. We now see at
least three tracks of talks underway. One is between the
Sunni Arabs and the Kurds; another is between the Shia
and the Kurds; a third is between the Kurds and the
Allawi-Sunni Arab group. There are also talks between
SCIRI and Fadhilah and the Sunni Arabs, although we do
not know if those have touched on program or identified
minister candidates. In other February 16 conversations,
PolOffs heard that Jafari has convened meetings with
Sunnis and Kurds concerning government formation. A
second track of talks, meanwhile, is underway between the
Kurdish Alliance, Allawi and Tawafuq. Shia "independent"
Shatha al-Mousawi told PolOff that Allawi should be
excluded from the government of national unity. Kurdish
political leader Arif Taifour told PolOff that the Kirkuk
issue must be satisfactorily addressed in the new
government's program and that the Kurdistan Alliance
would seek to keep the positions of President, Deputy
Prime Minister, Deputy Speaker (which Taifour held in the
TNA) and Foreign Minister. END SUMMARY

--------------
Zebari: Jafari Prospects Uncertain
--------------


2. (C) In a February 16 meeting, Foreign Minister Zebari
told PolCouns that Ibrahim Jafari does not yet have a
lock on the premiership. Zebari reported that on February
15 Adil Abd al-Madhi had sought his advice on whether or
not the Kurds would join with SCIRI, Fadhila, Tawafuq and

Allawi to block Jafari's PM nomination. Zebari said he
told Abd al-Madhi that the Kurds might join, but only
after SCIRI and Fadhila break with the Shia Coalition.
The Kurds would not move ahead of SCIRI, Zebari
cautioned; they do not want to appear to be forcing a
confrontation with the Shia Islamist Coalition. Zebari
was confident that no move would be made until SCIRI
leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim returned from his February
15-16 trip to Najaf. Zebari said he doubted that the
Najaf clerical establishment led by Ayatollah Sistani
would want to break up the Shia Islamist Coalition by
letting SCIRI and Fashilah break ranks. SCIRI and
Fadhilah would not quit the Coalition against Najaf's
wishes, Zebari believed.


3. (C) Zebari reported that the Kurds have already met
four times with the Shia Coalition separately to discuss
government programs and ministerial selection rules. He
said that they will meet next week to finalize these
plans. Zebari described the upcoming government
negotiations between parties as confusing. He said to
expect more than a four-way negotiation, because it was
still unclear which Sunni Arabs would be representing
which groups. For example, the Iraqi Islamic Party might
launch quiet, separate negotiations on its own. He said
that when the Kurds met with the Tawafuq negotiating team
on February 14, Allawi supporters Rasim al-Awadi and
Adnan al-Janabi were present. According to Zebari, Sunni
Arab negotiators Abdel Nasser al-Janabi and Mahmud
Mashadani told both the Kurds and the Allawi delegates
that the Sunni Arabs would "coordinate" with the Allawi
team but that they were not an integrated team.


4. (C) Zebari said that the Sadrist member of the Shia
negotiating team, Qusay as-Suheil, still is arguing
against the inclusion of the Allawi list in the unity
government. Qusay has argued that the parliament will
need an opposition and the Allawi group could be it. The
Kurds are responding that the Shia, Sunni Arabs and Kurds
should conclude a government program amongst themselves
and then present it to the Allawi team if they would like
to sign on and join the unity government as well. Zebari
noted that it would be much easier for the Kurds, who
want to get Allawi in the unity government and are
arguing with the Sadrists, if the Sunni Arabs and the

BAGHDAD 00000498 002 OF 003


Allawi group would unify into a single bloc.

--------------
Najaf's Position Unclear
--------------


5. (C) SCIRI Chief of Staff Haitham al-Husseini, told
PolOff February 16 that Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has not yet
made a decision on SCIRI's next move. Husseini said
that, whatever decision Hakim makes, it would have the
backing of the Marjaiya. He did not indicate whether
Grand Ayatollah Sistani had given Hakim any indication of
support for a break with Jafari during Hakim's February
15-16 visit to Najaf. He told PolCouns late February 16
that Sistani had promised to back al-Hakim. (Comment:
we sense that it may, in fact, be the reverse. Hakim may
take no decision that would not have the backing of
Najaf. End Comment.)

--------------
Sunnis Talk with Jafari
--------------


6. (C) Salih Mutlak told PolOff February 16 that he had
met with Jafari the preceding day. Mutalk said the PM
had sought his advice on how to achieve a united Iraq,
but had not offered him a job. Mutlak said that Ja'fari
is confident that he can form a government. Sheykh
Fahran Sadeed, a Sunni leader from Salah al-Din who ran
in Mutlak's coalition, also was summoned to Jafari for a
similar discussion. Sadeed told PolOff February 16 that
Jafari has a better than 50-50 chance of forming the
government. Mutlak, Sadeed and Allawi ally Saad Janabi
individually also told PolOff February 16 that they would
meet with Jabiri in the coming days. Tariq al-Hashimi
told PolOff on February 16 that talks among the Kurds,
Allawi and Tawafuq on a joint negotiating position are
going well.

--------------
Shia Independent Considers Allawi a Red-line
--------------


7. (C) In a February 16 meeting, a self-declared Shia
Coalition independent Shatha Mosa Sadiq al-Mousawi
expressed her disdain for Ayad Allawi, insisting that he
be excluded from the new unity government. "Dr. Allawi
only represents himself and has no connection with the
Iraqi people," asserted Mousawi. She said several of her
Independent colleagues side with the Sadrists who believe
that Allawi will bring Ba'athists back into government.
She added that Allawi abandoned many of the people who
had campaigned for him. (She mentioned Saad Saleh Jabr
and Rend Rahim.) Mousawi said that Allawi coalition
member Hamid Moussa of the Iraqi Communist Party was
duped into doing most of Allawi's campaign work - a
thankless task.


8. (C) Mousawi told PolOff that there should be no
National Security Council created that would undermine
the authority of the Council of Representatives. She
predicted that Nadim al-Jabiri's bid to leave the Shia
Coalition is untenable because Najaf would not allow it.
She said she resented the Embassy's Sunni outreach
efforts and our insistence on including Allawi. She
warned that many Iraqis perceive an Embassy change in
policy that is a slap in the Shia face. PolOff stressed
the importance to the U.S. of having a unity government
that represents Iraqis and is made up of competent
national leaders.

-------------- --------------
ARIF TAIFOUR: KIRKUK IS A RED-LINE FOR KURDISH ALLIANCE
-------------- --------------


9. (C) In a February 16 meeting with PolOff, Deputy TNA
Speaker Arif Taifour identified the issue of Kirkuk as a
red-line for the Kurdish Alliance. They will not
negotiate with any party if this is not part of the
government program. He said the Kurdish Alliance is
negotiating independently with the different parties and
not as part of larger bloc. (Comment: Zebari confirmed
this. End Comment.) He estimated that it would take 45
days to form the government and said the Kurdish Alliance
negotiating team will remain in Baghdad until the talks
are complete. He stated that specific names for
government positions have not yet been discussed in the
negotiations, but that the Kurdish Alliance would like to
keep the positions of President, Deputy Prime Minister,

BAGHDAD 00000498 003 OF 003


Deputy Speaker, and Foreign Minister. He said the Kurds
do not differentiate between Shia and Sunni Arabs and
therefore consider themselves to be the second largest
group in Iraq. They feel entitled, therefore, to either
the Presidency or Prime Ministership.


10. (C) Taifour told PolOff that he had heard a report
that the U.S. wanted a Sunni Arab to be President of Iraq
in lieu of Jalal Talabani. He said he hoped this was not
true. PolOff responded that the choice of government
leaders would be Iraq's, not the USG's. Taifour said the
Kurdish Alliance is in favor of the national security
council idea. When asked whether the Kurdish Alliance
will push for more executive powers for the Presidency,
he answered that this will largely depend on the outcome
of the negotiations on the national security council. If
the council has executive powers, then the Kurdish
Alliance may not push for increased presidential
executive powers.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Unlike the two-way discussions between the Shia
and Kurds in the spring of 2005, this time the government
formation talks are much more complicated. We have
identified at least three active tracks: (a) a Shia List
555 discussions with the Kurds that is making some
progress on a program; (b) a Sunni Arab/Allawi dialog
with the Kurds to create a list larger than the List 555
list - this one is waiting to see whether SCIRI and
Fadhilah jump out of the List 555; (c) Sunni
Arab/Allawi/Kurd group talking to SCIRI and Fadhilah
about a possible grand coalition. We have also heard of
discussions between Shia Islamists to engage with Sunni
Arab Islamists, but so far the Sunni Arab Islamists seem
not too interested in a separate deal with their Shia
brothers.


KHALILZAD