Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD497
2006-02-16 20:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

(U) KURDISH POLITICIAN MAHMUD OTHMAN: KIRKUK IS

Tags:  PGOV PNAT IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0130
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0497/01 0472008
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 162008Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2745
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000497 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: (U) KURDISH POLITICIAN MAHMUD OTHMAN: KIRKUK IS
THE LITMUS TEST

REF: BAGHDAD 443

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S.
Ford for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000497

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: (U) KURDISH POLITICIAN MAHMUD OTHMAN: KIRKUK IS
THE LITMUS TEST

REF: BAGHDAD 443

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S.
Ford for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: Kurdish government formation
negotiating team member Dr. Mahmud Othman told
PolOffs on February 15 that he stood by his comments
in Al Dustour newspaper calling on Prime Minister-
elect Ja'afari to commit publicly to resolving the
Kirkuk issue. On Ja'afari nomination, Othman
suggested that while the KDP was not as unhappy with
the nomination as Talabani, both Kurdish parties
were emphasizing that Ja'afari only had one month to
form a government, or he'll lose his position. "In
that scenario, it's not certain that the Shia
Coalition would get another chance to choose the
candidate," he asserted. When asked for an
alternate choice, Othman replied that Allawi is
obviously the next choice. By taking this issue
public before the negotiations for government
positions are really underway, the Kurds are
reminding the Shia and Sunni Arabs parties that they
are an essential party to the eventual government
formation deal. They also aim to ensure that the
Kurds get some kind of resolution on a key redline
issue for their constituents while the Kurds still
hold great influence over the negotiating process.
End Summary.

--------------
(U) Need Progress on Kirkuk
--------------


2. (U) Kurdish government formation negotiating team
member Dr. Mahmud Othman told PolOffs on February 15
that he stood by his comments in Al Dustour
newspaper calling on Prime Minister-elect Ja'afari
to commit publicly to resolving the Kirkuk issue in
accordance with the TAL's Article 58 and the new
Constitution. There is a commission in Kirkuk that
is creating a plan and a proposed budget. The Kurds
will need to work out a formula with other political
leaders to ensure Ja'afari will abide by his
promises, he added. This time, the Kurds will want
guarantees.


3. (C) When pressed on how exactly the Kurds would
enforce this agreement when a similar plan in
January 2005 had failed, however, Othman had no
response. He merely repeated that this time, the
Kurds were serious. Othman then reported that

senior Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Dr.
Fuad Masum was currently working on a Government
Plan that would include a specific timetable on
Kirkuk.

--------------
(U) Negotiations Progressing Slowly
--------------


4. (C) The Kurds were busily meeting with all
political parties everyday, said Othman. The
Kurdish negotiating team had met with some Sunni
leaders and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's list
on February 14. The problem is that no one would
reach out to the others. The Shia and Sunni Arabs
are squabbling. In addition, the Sadrists are
blackballing Allawi's participation. The Kurds are
the only ones speaking to all sides, and "we can get
nowhere like this," averred Othman.


5. (C) Othman recommended some Sunni Arab leaders
for consideration for key positions in the new
government. Adnan al-Dulaymi, for example, was
better than any of the others, he said. Other good
choices were Tariq al-Hashimi, Ayad Samarrai, Saleh
Mutlak, and Sa'adun al-Dulaymi. Mahmud al-
Mashadani, on the other hand, had acted badly when
he recently visited Kurdistan. Othman reported
that, although Mashadani is a medical doctor like
himself and therefore educated, he refused to work
with any Christians because they are "kafir," or
"infidels." Othman recounted that one day after the
meeting, everyone went in to lunch. As they sat
down for the meal, he leaned over and said loudly to
Mashadani, "You can't partake of this lunch - it was
prepared and organized by the KRG-Erbil Deputy Prime
Minister - a Christian. Surely you wouldn't eat a
meal prepared by a kafir?" Othman said with
satisfaction that Mashadani had had the grace to

BAGHDAD 00000497 002 OF 002


look ashamed, and that during the Kurdish meeting
with the Sunni Arabs on February 14 Mashadani had
been more reasonable.


6. (C) On Ja'afari nomination, Othman suggested that
the Prime Minister position is not yet fixed. While
the KDP was not as unhappy with the nomination as
Talabani, both Kurdish parties were emphasizing that
Ja'afari only had one month to form a government,
otherwise he'd lose his position. "In that
scenario, it's not certain that the Shia Coalition
would get another chance to choose the candidate,"
he stated. When asked for an alternate choice,
Othman replied that Allawi is obviously the next
choice.


7. (C) As for the Kurds, there are still some
internal divisions there. The PUK Politburo flew
down to Baghdad February 11-13 for discussions with
Masud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
The KDP, in return for supporting Talabani as
President, wanted to hold both the Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister positions. This would
effectively bar senior PUK Politburo member and
current Planning Minister Barham Saleh from holding
a key ministry portfolio in the new government.
(COMMENT: This is not only reflective of the KDP's
increasing discomfort with the PUK's higher national
government profile, but what appears to be a
personal dislike of Saleh by senior KDP officials
like Masrur Barzani. See reftel. END COMMENT.)
This intra-Kurd division was unfortunate, said
Othman, because the KDP and PUK programs looked
essentially alike - this was just a clash of
personalities, rather than real differences, said
Othman sadly.

--------------
(U) Iraq is Moving Backwards
--------------


8. (C) Othman railed against the stricter social
rules governing women now in Iraq. Iraq is entering
a period of "social terrorism." Othman said he for
one was not willing to accept political freedom at
the expense of social freedom. In addition to
federalism, democracy, and human rights, freedom and
liberty for both men and women are crucial. In
Najaf and Karbala, for example, women were not
allowed to wear brightly colored clothes; only black
or other dark colors were allowed. Many
intellectuals, technocrats, and other secular people
were fleeing Iraq, said Othman. A look at any of
the universities and organizations showed
significant "braindrain." The decreasing
educational opportunities, in addition to the
stricter clothing regulations, are driving many
females away from education, warned Othman.

--------------
(U) Comment
--------------


9. (C) While many Iraqi political groups have
acknowledged that the Constitutionally mandated
agreement on Kirkuk should be implemented, the issue
is so politically sensitive that it has consistently
been pushed off. The Constitution does state,
however, that a referendum should be held no later
than December 31, 2007 on the future status of
Kirkuk. Before that referendum is held, a number of
things should be completed: normalization of Kirkuk,
including Iraq Property Claims Commission hearings
on property confiscated during the Saddam Hussein
years and resolving conflicting claims by the
Arabization Arabs, and an accurate census. By
taking this issue public before the negotiations for
government positions are really underway, the Kurds
are reminding the Shia and Sunni Arabs parties that
the Kurds are a force to reckon with in the
negotiations on ministry positions. Raising Kirkuk
publicly like Othman did also helps the Kurds
pressure for some kind of resolution on a key
redline for their constituents while they still hold
great influence over the negotiations.


KHALILZAD