Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD4654
2006-12-21 16:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ANBAR: A YEAR-END REVIEW

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS ASEC PHUM KDEM PINR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4654/01 3551638
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 211638Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8642
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2// PRIORITY
RUEHAM/USDAO AMMAN JO PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004654 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ASEC PHUM KDEM PINR IZ
SUBJECT: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ANBAR: A YEAR-END REVIEW

Classified By: ANBAR PRT LEADER JIM SORIANO. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004654

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ASEC PHUM KDEM PINR IZ
SUBJECT: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ANBAR: A YEAR-END REVIEW

Classified By: ANBAR PRT LEADER JIM SORIANO. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable.


2. (S) Summary. The security situation in Anbar is typically
described as "deteriorating," and there is little doubt that
the enemy is deeply rooted here and ruthlessly pursues its
goals. However, AQI is on the defensive. The organization
may have been able to intimidate Anbari civilians with
relative ease at the beginning of 2006, but finds that task
more difficult as the year closes. Several key indicators are
pointed in the right direction. Two such developments
include the emergence last September of a group of
Ramadi-based sheikhs who are battling AQI, as well as a
tribal-based police recruitment drive. Neither factor was on
the scene as recently as four months ago; nor did they arise
merely because of the initiative of local leaders. They
happened because of ongoing Coalition and Iraqi security
operations in Ramadi, which are enabling local citizens to
regain control of their city. The anti-insurgent tribal
movement in Ramadi is making a bid to spread its influence to
other cities. Police recruitment is up, compared to the slow
in-take earlier in the year. The two Iraqi army divisions in
the province have been bloodied in battle and are showing
increasing confidence. On the down side, they are 5,000
soldiers below full complement and are hampered by inadequate
logistics. Two further elements are needed in our engagement
with Anbar: encouraging constructive governmental relations
between Baghdad and Ramadi, a necessary condition for
post-war reconstruction and national reconciliation; and the
need for local elections. End Summary

--------------
The Situation
--------------


3. (SBU) The recently published Iraq Study Group Report
contains only four references to Anbar Province, one of which
stated: "In Anbar, the violence is attributable to the Sunni
insurgency and to Al-Qaeda (AQI),and the situation is

deteriorating." Keying on that sentence, a web search on
"Anbar" and "deteriorating" returns 95,000 hits, suggesting
that the press shares the view that the province is slipping
into the hands of the insurgents. But far from slipping
away, the security situation in Anbar presents several
opportunities that could reduce insurgent attacks to a level
that would allow the return to normal economic and political
life.


4. (S) AQI is on the defensive. Coalition Forces (CF) and
Iraqi security forces (ISF) are taking the battle to the
enemy and much of the rise in weekly attacks (see below)
reflects AQI defensive action. AQI never had widespread
public support in Anbar and signs point to growing public
opposition to the insurgency. At the beginning of 2006, AQI
was able to intimidate Anbari civilians with relative ease;
it finds that task more difficult as the year closes.

--------------
The Enemy
--------------


5. (S) AQI is the dominant insurgent group on the scene
today. It has eliminated or co-opted competition from
Baathist insurgents, who are no longer a significant factor.
Ansar Al-Sunna is also active, but accounts for a small
percentage of attacks on CF and the ISF. AQI aims to
debilitate the Iraqi police (IP),keep pressure on the CF,
and intimidate the local population.


6. (S) AQI's murder and intimidation campaign targets the
police, local government officials, contractors working on
Coalition or GOI projects, and prominent citizens. Anbar's
Provincial Council fled to the relative safety of Baghdad
last April amid continuing insurgent threats. Council
members say that security conditions in Ramadi are still too
volatile to contemplate the Council's early return to the
province. The Council is effectively in exile.


7. (S) AQI is deeply involved in economic crime and has
disrupted the normal patterns of commercial and social life
in the province. It is involved in hijacking, highway
extortion, black marketing, and control of gasoline stations,
and is largely self-financed by these activities. Moreover,

BAGHDAD 00004654 002 OF 004


Anbari youths -- even pre-teens -- are commonly detained in
security sweeps. AQI has increasingly resorted to the use of
children as auxiliaries, look outs, and even as attackers.


8. (S) There are few foreign fighters, estimated at 300 to
500, in the province. Foreign fighters, using valid or
forged travel documents, typically enter from Syria through
the Walid border crossing, or in the vicinity of the Al-Qaim
crossing, which opened in mid-December. Few foreign fighters
enter through Jordan. Some assume AQI leadership positions;
others travel to points east to conduct anti-Shia operations.


9. (S) Recidivism is a continuing problem that tends to
replenish insurgent ranks. Security detainees are typically
not prosecuted because Anbar does not have a criminal justice
system. Some detainees are transferred to Baghdad for
arraignment, but many are released without criminal
prosecution after serving the statutory detention period.
The photos of many at-large insurgents show them wearing the
ORANGE prison jumpsuit of a previous detention. Recidivism
makes local citizens less willing to cooperate with CF and
the ISF because they perceive that detained insurgents will
soon be on the street again.

--------------
Security Incidents: Long-term up trend
--------------


10. (S) Insurgent attacks have increased steadily throughout
2006, rising to about 430 incidents recorded weekly by
mid-December from 230 weekly incidents a year ago.
Two-thirds of the attacks take place in Ramadi.


11. (S) The year-long rise in attacks is due to several
factors, including the effectiveness of AQI,s murder and
intimidation campaign, as well as the increased presence of
CF and ISF in the field. There are more Iraqi police, army,
and CF than a year ago, presenting AQI with more targets.
Another factor is AQI's improved its command and control.
The killing last June of AQI chief Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi was
followed by an increase in attacks on CF, suggesting that the
organization will not be neutralized merely by the
elimination of its leadership.

--------------
Tribal Engagement
--------------


12. (S) Perhaps the most significant development on the
battlefield this year was the emergence of a group of
anti-insurgent tribal leaders in the Ramadi area, led by
Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha. The group was formed in
mid-September and is variously referred to in the press as
the "Awakening Council of Anbar" (Sahawa Al-Anbar, SAA) or
the "Salvation Council."


13. (S) SAA is a backlash phenomenon, a tribal reaction to
AQI excesses. Sheikh Sattar himself has lost his father and
a brother to AQI assassins in the past two years. SAA
fighters have taken control of several neighborhoods of east
Ramadi. The movement comprises some 25 tribes and is making a
bid to spread its influence east and west from Ramadi through
the Euphrates Valley. The SAA reportedly has killed 70-80
insurgents since September, while sustaining 35 "martyrs" in
its own ranks.


14. (U) Sattar and his group publicly denounce the notion of
"honorable resistance," which is the moral double-standard in
currency among some Sunni clerics which prohibits an Iraqi
from taking the life of another Iraqi, but is silent on the
taking of a life of a CF soldier. Sattar has publicly
described the Coalition Forces as "friendly forces," openly
cooperates with them, and calls on other tribal leaders to do
the same.


15. (U) Today the SAA is actively recruiting area youth to
serve in the police force, striving, with apparent success,
to raise 4,000 policemen. Police recruitment in the Ramadi
area has surged in recent months. By contrast, few
applicants answered the recruitment drives last summer when
AQI had greater influence in Ramadi.

--------------
The Al-Qaim Model

BAGHDAD 00004654 003 OF 004


--------------


16. (S) MNF-West commanders continue to engage tribal leaders
like Sattar, using them as a sort of "force multiplier" in
the fight against AQI. The anti-insurgent phenomenon now
evident in Ramadi was previewed 16 months ago in the Syrian
border town of Al-Qaim, when the local Abu Mahal tribe
decided to align itself with MNF-West forces to eliminate
AQI. The result of that cooperation was a success: today
Al-Qaim has thriving markets, full schools, a functioning
city government, and even real estate development. A key
element in the formula was the recruitment of Abu Mahal youth
into the local police force, which helps the tribe keep a
close eye on jihadist activity. Today the tribal sheikhs of
Ramadi are trying to imitate that experience.

--------------
Battle for Ramadi
--------------


17. (S) Using Al-Qaim as a model, MNF-West forces launched
major operations in Ramadi in June. They are still underway.
The plan calls for establishing a series of inter-locking
combat outposts (COPs),forward positions set up in urban
areas to deny space to the insurgents. The COPs are set up
sequentially, a new one going up as MNF-West pushes into a
new neighborhood, -- and as soon as ISF are ready to follow
up. From these positions, MNF-West keeps "overwatch" and
patrols actively. Depending on conditions, security duties
are transitioned first to the Iraqi Army (IA) and then to the
local police. In some instances, the IA co-locates with CF
on the same COP, or they set up their own outposts nearby.


18. (S) The operation proceeds in stages: isolate the area
of interest; clear; retain; and transition to ISF. The
process as a whole is visible to the local population, a sign
that the Coalition and ISF are there to stay and are
determined to eliminate the insurgents. Residents who had
earlier fled the area begin to return.


19. (S) Such operations in Ramadi have had tangible results.
The mobilization of Ramadi tribal sheikhs to fight AQI and
the increase in local applicants for the police force did not
happen merely because local leaders took the initiative.
They happened as a result of CF and ISF security operations.
The CF and the ISF shaped the security environment to allow
local citizens to regain control of their lives. Looked at
another way, the tribes of Ramadi would not be standing up to
AQI and the city,s youth would not be applying for police
jobs if they doubted the CF,s staying power.

--------------
Anbar's police and army
--------------


20. (S) Compared to other provinces, Anbar has much catching
up to do on police recruitment, but momentum is evident in
recent months. Some 8,400 policemen are now on the
province's rolls, compared to 1,000 policemen twelve months
ago, and virtually none twenty-four months ago. The police
are deployed in every Anbari city and town, with the
exception of the desert oasis of Rutbah. The province aims
at maxing out its full complement of 11,300 police officers
by spring 2007.


21. (S) Meanwhile, Anbar's two IA divisions, the First and
the Seventh Iraqi Army Divisions, continue to expand their
operations. Both units have been bloodied in battle, are
demonstrating confidence, and are eager to engage the enemy.
Fifteen of the divisions' battalions now control independent
battle spaces. On the downside, however, the two divisions
are about 5,000 troops below full complement. The lack of
manning and logistical support hampers IA operations in the
province.


22. (S) Another drawback is that the police force is largely
Sunni, as recruits are enlisted locally. The two IA
divisions, however, are recruited nationally, and
consequently their ranks are filled with Shia Muslims. There
appears to be little desire by Anbari youth to join the army,
which they perceive as a basically a Shia organization.
Although many Shia army recruits in Anbar show loyalty to
cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr, to date they have not displayed any
sectarian antagonism on the battlefield.

BAGHDAD 00004654 004 OF 004



--------------
The Road Ahead
--------------


23. (S) No one has any illusions as to the difficulties ahead
in the Battle for Anbar. The enemy is deeply rooted,
adaptable, and ruthless. But Anbar's situation is far from
"deteriorating." Key indicators are pointed in the right
direction. One challenge that is ever-present is getting
GOI-Anbar governmental relations right. A combination of GOI
neglect, administrative snafu, and Anbar's estrangement from
the national political process has long hindered the flow of
financing and other support from Baghdad to the province.
The country's Sunni-Shia divide introduces an element of
mutual suspicion in the relations between the Center and
Ramadi. Consequently, the absence of GOI fiscal and policy
support for the province has been a contributing factor for
the insurgency. Building constructive Center-provincial ties
is essential for turning the battle in our favor, as well as
for post-war reconstruction and for national reconciliation.
MNF-West and the PRT have roles to play in this regard.


24. (S) One element missing in our counter-insurgency
strategy is provincial and municipal elections. Anbar's
Provincial Council was elected in the January 2005 poll.
Anbaris boycotted; only 3,700 votes were cast province-wide
in a population of 1.2 million residents. Today the
Council's claim to legitimacy rests on the shaky foundation
of a scant voter turn-out in a boycotted poll. Elsewhere in
the province, some municipal councils have dispersed because
of insurgent pressure. Those that continue to meet are the
legacies of the CPA days. Both the provincial and municipal
councils are today self-perpetuating: they fill vacancies
without the expression of a public ballot.


25. (S) Anbaris recognize that they made a mistake
boycotting the January 2005 poll. Electoral refreshment is
needed. Holding local elections has tactical advantages in a
counter-insurgency strategy. Evidence suggests that
contested areas with functioning local governments tend to be
more stable than those without them (Al-Qaim v. Ramadi,
e.g.). But ultimately, such elections would allow the
Anbaris themselves to search for their own political
accommodations and have a voice in the future course of their
province.
KHALILZAD