GOVERNMENT FORMATION UPDATE: HIZBALLAH LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000463

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2026
TAGS: PGOV PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMATION UPDATE: HIZBALLAH LEADER
SAYS SADRISTS WILL SEEK TO BLOCK ALLAWI'S INCLUSION IN
GOVERNMENT; MUTLAK DREAMS HE'LL BE KINGMAKER

Classified By: POL COUNS Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b)


1. (C) Summary: Iraqi politicos are still adjusting to
the victory of incumbent Prime Minister Jafari being named
again by the Shia Islamist Coalition to be its prime
minister nominee. A key element of the Shia Coalition, the
SCIRI party, is worried about the rising influence of the
rival Sadrist group within the government. One story
making the rounds is that the Sadr-affiliated Mahdi militia
intimidated some of the Shia Coalition independents to vote
for Jafari. Meanwhile, outspoken Sunni Arab politician
Saleh Mutlak predicted SCIRI in its discomfort would
eventually break ranks with the Shia Coalition. The
question political figures will ask over the next couple of
days is whether the Shia List 555 Coalition will, in fact,
hold together despite SCIRI and Coalition partner Fadhila's
unhappiness with Jafari and Sadr. End Summary.


2. (C) In a February 14 meeting with poloffs, Hizballah of
Iraq movement leader Hassan Radi Khadim al-Sari predicted
that unity government formation would be difficult and may
face delays, especially when the Sadrists refuse to
consider Ayad Allawi's participation. He insisted,
however, that dialogue will overcome any difficulties and
that Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim will play an influential role in
this process.


3. (C) Sari, who is SCIRI-aligned, expressed surprise that
the Shia independents did not vote as a bloc on February 12
for Adil Abd al-Madhi. According to al-Sari, the
independents met before the vote and determined that the
majority of members planned to support Abd al-Madhi. As a
result, they agreed to vote as a bloc for the SCIRI
nominee. During the February 12 vote, Al-Sari described
that each voting member was called one-by-one to the stage,
wrote the name of his/her choice on a ballot and dropped it
into a ballot box. Despite his surprise at the outcome, Al-
Sari considered the vote fair and the ballot secret.


4. (C) SCIRI senior official Shaykh Humam al-Hamudi was
clearly unenthusiastic about Jafari in his late February 14
conversation with PolCouns. He and colleague Akram al-
Hakim complained about Mahdi Army intimidation of
independent voters, especially women; they blamed Abd al-
Mahdi's loss to Jafari partially on this. They were wary
of the Sadrists gaining more influence in the next
government. (They asserted that the Sadrists are seeking
three ministries in the next government: Transport, Trade
and Labor. The latter, they noted caustically, controls
social security payments and is a plum for corrupt picking.
On February 14, Defense Minister Dulime told polmiloff that
the Sadrists would make a grab for the Interior Ministry.)
Despite their discomfort with Sadr, these SCIRI officials
also are not rushing to break ranks with the rest of the
Shia List 555 bloc. Hamudi said that he and Hakim would
travel to Najaf on February 15 to consult with Sistani.
Hamudi made clear he would not mind if the Kurd-Sunni Arab-
Allawi bloc stopped Jafari, but he gave no indication that
they would publicly encourage that bloc to do so.


5. (C) Separately, Dialog Front leader Salih Mutlak told
Poloff February 14 that his bloc's 11 parliamentary
deputies' votes could prove decisive in the event that the
Jafari government formation bid fails. Mutlak said he
planned to meet Muqtada Sadr in a few days to discuss the
options. Because of its unhappiness about Jafari, SCIRI
will, in his view, join the Kurd-Allawi-Sunni Arab
coalition and abandon plans for the quick establishment of
a federal region in the South. There are serious splits on
this issue within SCIRI, said Mutlak, and Hakim will not
prevail. He noted the likely PM candidates for the
coalition would be Allawi (who would be rejected by Sadr)
and Nadim al-Jabiri (who would be rejected because of his
inexperience and Ba'thist past). He hinted that with his
11 seats, he would like to emerge as the consensus
candidate for the PM role. Mutlak claimed he is also
leaving open throwing his support to Ja'fari in exchange
for two sovereign ministry posts (e.g., Interior and Oil).
He claimed to be playing it coy with Kurds, who have twice
invited him to sign on to the Erbil agreement, which he has
not yet done. His advice to the USG was to keep Iraqi
political parties struggling for awhile and then step in
and impose a government with a strong leader at the helm
(presumably Mutlaq). "We need a dictator" he said. The US
should either fix what is wrong with Iraq or "leave us
alone."


6. (C) Comment: Mutlak is mercurial and at times -- such as
his prime ministerial aspirations -- provides sorely

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needed comic relief. Not surprisingly, several members of
Mutlak's Dialog group have told Poloff that they have
signed separate deals with the rival Sunni Tawaffuq
coalition. IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi made a similar
assertion to Poloff February 13 (septel). Mutlak is a
factor in Iraqi politics, however, because he is frequently
on Arabic television and people watch. Meanwhile, Sari's
assertion that the Sadrists may delay government formation
in an attempt to exclude Allawi is both familiar and more
realistic. As the outcome of the February 12 Shia List 555
nomination vote continues to sink in, new rumors are
circulating as to what more the Sadrists may demand of
Jafari in exchange for their decisive support. Ppolitical
figures and observers will be asking whether or not the
Shia List 555 Coalition will hold together or whether
elements of that Coalition will signal support, direct or
indirect, for the rival Kurd-Allawi-Sunni Arab bloc.
End Comment.



KHALILZAD