PRT TIKRIT: POWER, CORRUPTION, AND AQIZ IN SALAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004407

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PTER KCOR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: POWER, CORRUPTION, AND AQIZ IN SALAH
AD DIN


Classified By: PRT Leader Stephanie Miley for reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY. The disintegration of the social fabric of
Salah ad Din (SaD),
which started during the Saddam regime, was exacerbated by
its fall and the
subsequent aftermath, has caused political disarray in the
province. With the
diminution in authority of traditional tribal sheikhs and
Saddam-backed sheikhs,
a new group of individuals has acquired influence, the
"Hawahsim sheikhs," or
war-profiteers. Some former Baathists have been able to
integrate into the new
Hawahsim system, while others actively subvert it or remain
in a wait-and-see
mode to see which system will win out. The combination of
politically
discontent pro-Baathists and disarray in the changing
patronage systems has
provided a conducive environment for al Qaeda (AQIZ)
operations and has
generally eroded security. It is essential that those in a
wait-and-see mode
be persuaded to continue refuting violent alternatives; this
will be
accomplished by bringing them into the political fold. To do
that, the
debaathification process must be reformed and SaD residents
must perceive
greater Sunni participation in the national political
decision making process.
Restoration of a strong, professional Iraqi Army, inclusive
of some of the
debaathified officers, could also curb the political and
economic flux in the
province that AQIZ is exploiting. END SUMMARY.

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Three Types of Sheikhs in SaD
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3. (C) Salah ad Din province has three types of sheikhs: the
traditional tribal
sheikhs, the Saddam-created "90's sheikhs," and the recent
opportunistic
Hawahsim sheikhs. Historically, tribal sheikhs in the
province had full
authority over their tribes and passed their authority down
generationally
along heredity lines. After the 1991 Shia uprising, in an
effort to combat the
influence of the tribal sheikhs throughout the country,
Saddam Hussein
systematically established new sheikhs within many tribes by
offering money and
direct access to Saddam to an individual in the tribe who
pledged alliance to
him. These "90's sheikhs," established throughout the
decade, wielded their
influence through a patronage system whereby they obtained
government
appointments and other government benefits through Saddam for
members of their
tribes, thus reducing the authority of the tribal sheikhs.
As the influence of
the 90's sheikhs grew, the Baath Party increased
consolidation of its power.
Many of the 90's sheikhs were locally influential members of
the party.


4. (C) With the fall of the Saddam regime and the institution
of
debaathification regulations, many of the 90's sheikhs were
no longer able to
offer favors, thus diminishing their influence with their
former constituencies.
As the Coalition Forces began reconstruction efforts, many
individuals became
wealthy and acquired land through contracts, connections with
the CF, and other
means. SaD residents generally term these individuals the
"Hawahsim," or "war-
profiting," sheikhs. They have replaced the 90's sheikhs and
have effectively
re-established systems of patronage, increasing their newly
acquired influence
in the province.

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Emerging Social Order in SaD Affects Local Politics
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5. (C) Debaathification regulations and the presence CF
forces have essentially
re-organized the political infrastructure of SaD and brought
the emergence of
three types of political leaders: first, the 90's sheikhs who
parleyed their
influence into the new Hawahsim system; second, the
disenfranchised 90's
sheikhs who now actively support the pro-Baathist insurgent
movement; and third,
the majority of SaD residents and tribal sheikhs who are in a
political wait-
and-see mode.

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The Emergent Hawahsim Sheikhs
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6. (C) The first group, the Hawahsim sheikhs, are leaders in
the current
provincial government and business community. Many of them
openly support the
democratic political process, while they amass wealth and
administer personal
patronage systems through their new positions and
affiliations. Examples of
this include Provincial Council (PC) Chair Sheikh Rasheed
Ossman, who was a
90's sheikh who parleyed his way into the Hawahsim system,
and Deputy Governor
(General) Abdullah Ejbarah, who was a level four Baathist who
now supports the
inclusion of a reformed, democratic Baath Party into the
political process.

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The Ousted 90's and Actively Pro-Baathists Sheikhs
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Some of the Baath loyalist 90's sheikhs support the
pro-Baathist
insurgency and other AIF elements (whom they see as freedom
fighters, not
terrorists). Many of our contacts report that these Baath
loyalists take
direction from Izzat al-Duri - Saddam's former Vice
President, who is believed
responsible for planning and financing many of the anti-CF
attacks in the
province - and actively work to undermine the democratic
political process and
to expel the "occupying forces."

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The Wait-and-See Tribal Sheikhs
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8. (C) The majority of SaD residents fall into a third group
of figures who
appear to be waiting to see if the political process has room
for them (or who
are waiting to see if Saddam will return as is heavily
rumored throughout the
province). This group is composed of many traditional tribal
leaders. They do
not feel as though the provincial government acts in their
best interest. They
view many of the provincial government leaders as
self-interested Hawahsim
sheikhs. However, these ?wait and see-ers? are equally not
convinced that the
pro-Baathist insurgents have a better solution. They
romanticize the Saddam
regime, even long for its return, but do not necessarily
actively support its
re-establishment. They seek reformation of the
debaathification regulations,
re-establishment of a strong, professional army, and greater
Sunni
participation in the national political process.

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Increasing Corruption through the Hawahsim System
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9. (C) While the Hawahsim system is re-defining political and
social influence,
its focus on wealth-based power and patronage systems is
increasing corruption
in the province. Provincial government leaders are largely
perceived to have
amassed wealth through their positions and connections with
the CF. As others
join the ranks of the Hawahsim sheikhs, inside deals and
kickbacks from
reconstruction projects and government contracts are
reportedly becoming more
commonplace. This institutionalized corruption system, as
the foundation of
the Hawahsim sheikhs' influence, defines the provincial
government's operations.

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Conducive Environment for AQIZ, Erosion of Security
-------------- --------------


10. (S) The combination of political discontent among the
actively pro-Baathist
90's sheikhs as well as the political disarray through the
change of patronage
systems has provided a conducive environment for AQIZ
operations and has eroded
security generally. As the CF continues focused operations
in al Anbar and
Baghdad, SaD has become a relatively "safer" operating
platform for AQIZ.
Additionally, AQIZ has exploited the refineries in Bayji for
financing. In
some cases, the pro-Baathists and AQIZ have found a marriage
of convenience
based on their common enemy, the CF. In other more
economics-based cases, SaD
residents, who have lost their livelihoods through
debaathification and the
change to the perceived to be CF-backed Hawahsim system, have
aided (or at
least turned a blind eye to) AQIZ operations. However, a
growing number of
people see AQIZ and foreign fighters as simply damaging Iraq.
Many of the
wait-and-see tribal sheikhs speak out against terrorist
elements (but not pro-
Baathist insurgents).

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Comment
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11. (C) None of the leaders we have met in the province is
ready to see the
Baath Party discarded completely. At the extremes, the
Hawahsim sheikhs want a
reformed version incorporated into the political process, and
the ousted 90's
sheikhs want a return of the Saddam-style Baathists.
However, the majority of
SaD residents are still in a wait-and-see mode until they see
which side will
win out and where they can plug into a benefit system. To
bring them on board
with the political process, the debaathification process must
be reformed and
they must perceive a greater Sunni participation in the
national political
decision making process. In the meantime, corruption is
becoming
institutionalized in the province government.


12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. Most of our interlocutors
fervently advocate for
restoration of a strong, professional Iraqi Army, inclusive
of some of the
debaathified officers. If done properly, such a move could
be part of the
solution by eliminating some of the political and economic
flux that is eroding
security and that AQIZ is exploiting in Salah ad Din. Time
is running out,
however, as the province continues to stagnate economically
and feel
marginalized politically. If there is no positive movement
by the central
government and the National Debaathification Commission in
the next few months,
PRT is concerned that a proportion of the residents and

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sheikhs in the wait-
and-see mode could tire of inaction and cast their lot with
the anti-CF and AIF
forces. END COMMENT.


13. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad
Din, please see our
SIPRNET Reporting Blog:
http://blogs.csp.sgov.gov/blojsom/blog/ salahaddin/.
SCOBEY