CHARGE AND INTERIOR MINISTER DISCUSS KIDNAPPINGS,

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 004292

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINS PNAT MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: CHARGE AND INTERIOR MINISTER DISCUSS KIDNAPPINGS,
SITE 4


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: Charge D'Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard met
with Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani November 17 to discuss
Site 4, recent kidnappings and the warrant against Harith
al-Dhari. Charge emphasized to Bolani the importance of
ensuring that all Site 4 warrants are executed. Bolani said
his committees have completed their investigations and he is
encouraging those implicated to turn themselves in to the
courts. Bolani said that he expected that the officers would
appear voluntarily, but also noted that large scale arrests
were unlikely. Bolani said that MOI Major General Mahdi has
received administrative punishment for poor performance in
his management of Site 4 and that additional punishment is up
to the court. He noted that because of this incident, Mahdi
has lost his powerful position within MOI and hinted that
this would allow further action. Bolani believes that the
recent kidnapping of dozens of Ministry of Higher Education
employees was sophisticated and Iranian supported. He also
pled
ged to do whatever he could to ensure that the American
citizens abducted near Basrah in the 16th were returned
safely. Bolani said that the Harith al-Dhari warrant is not
political, but based on evidence including al-Dhari's
possible involvement in the abduction and murder of British
citizen Margaret Hassan in 2004. End Summary.


2. (C) On November 17, CDA and MOI Bolani met to discuss
progress on the execution of the arrest warrants of
fifty-seven MOI officers implicated in the abuse of prisoners
at Site 4. Charge emphasized the importance on bringing into
custody the indicted officers, especially in regard to MOI
Major General Mahdi. Bolani stopped short of promising
arrests, explaining that he had ordered the commanders of all
the indicted officers to ensure that they appear before the
court. It is the court's job to prosecute. CDA offered
assistance in coordinating actions between MOI and the
Ministry of Justice should it be required. Bolani assured
CDA that he will continue to make difficult decisions to
uphold the law, fight corruption, sectarianism, and uphold
human rights. In this, Bolani emphasized, he has Prime
Minister Maliki's support.


3. (C) Bolani was very calculated in his responses to the
Charge's repeated requests for clarification on General
Mahdi's status. While Bolani first said that he is
encouraging all those involved to voluntarily turn themselves
in, he never mentioned Mahdi's name in conjunction with any
existing judicial proceeding. He said that his committees
recommended administrative punishment against Mahdi, and that
is what will happen. Asked again whether this meant that
Mahdi would also be allowed to face the courts, Bolani
sidestepped, saying "The case is open. If new evidence comes
in, I will have to look at it. It is up to the judiciary."
The Charge cautioned Bolani that he could expect continued
USG pressure for action against Mahdi. The Charge noted that
for rule of law to take hold, leaders must be accountable;
the public will not believe in the system if the junior
officers are punished harshly while the senior officers, like
Mahdi, are spared. Bolani joked in reply that "perhaps they
all will receive light punishment," but noted that Mahdi was
a very strong, polarizing character, but now has lost some of
that power and has been reduced to a more humble status.
(Comment. In his remarks Bolani seemed to obliquely appeal
for patience, citing an Arab proverb that "good health comes
gradually" and noted that under his leadership MOI is
reversing its poor human rights record and is now actually
sending people to court and that he "was the one moving on
these things." He implied that additional action against
Mahdi may be better accomplished when he is even weaker. End
Comment.)


4. Bolani spoke about the Ministry of Higher Education
kidnappings. He said that the incident was an attempt to
embarrass the MoI and the GoI (and the coalition). He
believed that the planning, intelligence, and funding came
from Iran. The kidnappers used English, and gained access to
the site by claiming that they were there in advance of a
visit by Ambassador Khalilzad. Bolani said that all but a
few of those abducted had been released, but that it was
impossible to know exactly how many employees were kidnapped
due to poor record keeping. The Minister lamented that he
was not able to get support from U.S. SpecOps forces when he
requested. The Charge said he would inquire with MNF why
that request was denied.


5. (S/NF) Regarding the al-Dhari warrant, Bolani assured the

CDA that it was not politically driven but the result of
evidence linking him to terrorism and possible even
involvement in the 2004 abduction and murder of UK citizen
and C.A.R.E. director Margaret Hassan. Bolani emphasized to
the CDA that he is not non-political and is handling cases as
they come to him. (Comment: Although key facts are still
unclear, this incident will increase friction between Iraq's
Sunni and Shiite political leaders. It will also increase
popular Sunni mistrust for the GOI, particularly in the wake
of the November 14 mass kidnapping at the Ministry of Higher
Education. End Comment).


6. (S) The Charge concluded the meeting with a request that
Bolani do all he could to affect the safe and speedy release
of the four American and one Austrian citizen abducted when
their convoy was attacked outside Basrah on November 16. The
Charge noted that the incident took place in a PIC'ed
province. Bolani said that he would do what he could and
mentioned that he had already offered a reward for their
release.
SPECKHARD