SCIRI CHAIRMAN HAKIM DISCUSSES MISTAKES, MILITIAS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004096

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: SCIRI CHAIRMAN HAKIM DISCUSSES MISTAKES, MILITIAS,
AND SECURITY


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an October 17 meeting with National
Security Advisor to the Vice President John Hannah and the
Charge, Abdulaziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),said that Iraq had
realized significant achievements in the short time since its
liberation but lamented missed opportunities and the current
security situation. He stressed the need to clarify security
responsibilities and authorities between the multinational
forces (MNF-I) and the Iraqi government, pointing to recent
violence in Balad as an example of a breakdown in
coordination. Al-Hakim said that the problem of militias
needed a rapid solution and called for the implementation of
CPA Order 91. Hannah noted that U.S. officials were looking
forward to al-Hakim's upcoming visit to the United States,
and al-Hakim expressed his hope to visit Washington as soon
as possible after the U.S. elections. END SUMMARY.

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Achievements and Missed Opportunities
--------------


2. (C) Looking back over the three and a half years since the
U.S. invasion, al-Hakim noted that Iraq had made some
significant achievements in a short period of time,
particularly the transition from dictatorship to a democratic
government based on elections and a constitution. Despite
the current security problems, al-Hakim said, "the government
is strong and we are not afraid it will fail." However, he
continued, the US had made mistakes by not fully
understanding the reality of Iraq and the hatred and fear
engendered by Saddam Hussein and the Baathists. He
criticized the lack of a good post-invasion plan, pointing
out the political and security vacuum created by a gap
between liberation and transfer of sovereignty, and by
America's lack of trust that Iraqi partners who had fought
Saddam's regime for years could help secure the country. The
Iraqi opposition, he claimed, had warned the US in a March
2003 meeting in Ankara that it was not possible for a foreign
army to control Iraq's internal security.
"We needed Iraqi forces to control the Iraqi streets, like in
Kurdistan," al-Hakim argued, noting that using Iraqi forces
would have required forming a national unity government on
the day the regime fell to avoid such a vacuum.

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Security: Seeking Clear Definition of Roles
--------------


3. (C) Al-Hakim also expressed his belief that the lack of
clearly defined responsibilities and authorities between
MNF-I and the Iraqi government was hindering progress in the
security sector. "Who is responsible where?" he asked. "Is
it the Prime Minister? MOD? MOI? MNF-I? A committee?"
Al-Hakim cited recent violence in Balad as an example of this
lack of clarity. The Policy Council for National Security,
he said, told the Prime Minister that he needed to protect
Balad residents. According to al-Hakim, the Prime Minister
responded that he had given orders for troops to move to
Balad, but that MNF-I had not allowed the movement. "To
people it seems that MNF-I wants their slaughter," al-Hakim
said. "We must tell people we have responsibility for
security if we can provide it, or tell them that we cannot
provide it and that they should leave or find their own
protection." Noting that MNF-I was the backbone of security
in Iraq at present, Al-Hakim agreed with the Charge on the
importance of coming to an understanding on security
responsibilities as part of renewing UN Security Council
Resolution 1546. However, he said that it would be difficult
to get parliamentary approval without major changes to the
current arrangement.

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Militias and Sectarianism
--------------


4. (C) Hannah noted to al-Hakim his concern about the impact
sectarian militias were having on Iraq's security. Al-Hakim
agreed that militias were a major problem that needed rapid
resolution. Differentiating between those formed before
Saddam fell, like Badr, and those formed after, like Jaysh
al-Mahdi, al-Hakim said that CPA Order 91 laid out a plan to
demobilize and reintegrate the first category of militia, but
that the US was "impeding its implementation." He noted that
the Facility Protection Service constituted a major militia
problem, with up to 140,000 armed and equipped members
accountable only to their individual ministries. He also

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lamented the sectarian basis of the ministries themselves:
"The ministries controlled by Kurds hire Kurds, the same with
the Sadrists and Dawa, etc. These are state institutions,
not party institutions. There should not be a quota system."
When pressed by Hannah directly on whether al-Hakim welcomes
the day when former Badr members in the army of police are
loyal to the Prime Minister's orders, even when they run
contrary to the wishes of Abdulaziz al-Hakim, al-Hakim
answered without hesitation: "Yes. People who have joined
the state must be obedient to the state, not to Abdulaziz
al-Hakim." Al-Hakim insisted that since returning to Iraq,
Badr had committed to transforming itself from a military
organization to a political one. He alleged that the six
governorates currently led by SCIRI/Badr members made their
own decisions as institutions of the Iraqi state, not based
on the direction of SCIRI/Badr organizations. Al-Hakim
further insisted that those former Badr members now serving
in the Iraqi Security Forces were first and foremost loyal to
the state, not Badr.


5. (C) When asked by Hannah to describe the main enemy in
Iraq, Al-Hakim stressed that the real threat to Iraq comes
from the Baathists, Saddamists, and Taqfiris who seek the
failure of the new forces in Iraq and the failure of the US.
These forces will accept nothing less than full control of
Iraq. He described how since the day of liberation they have
attacked the new Iraqi government, the Coalition, the UN, and
the Shi'a. He stressed that for a long time Shi'a leaders
were able to control the Shi'a street, but that persistent
vulnerability to sectarian attacks against the Shi'a -
particularly after the Samarra bombing - made it impossible
to stop the inevitable retaliatory attacks. Al-Hakim noted
again that the primary enemy includes the Saddamists and
Takfiris, who openly oppose the constitution, the elections,
and the government of Iraq.


6. (C) Hannah told al-Hakim that the US relied on Iraqi
leaders like him to make difficult decisions and asked him to
convey U.S. appreciation and regards to Grand Ayatollah
SISTANI for his courage and leadership. He praised SISTANI
for his restraint and wisdom, noting that he is greatly
respected and appreciated by the President, Vice President,
and senior U.S. officials. Al-Hakim expressed his thanks,
saying "we hope to achieve what has been given to us in
responsibility."


7. (U) This cable was cleared by OVPNSA John Hannah.
KHALILZAD