Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD3724
2006-10-07 15:57:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PESHMERGA TRANSFORMATION TALKS

Tags:  PGOV PTER PREL MOPS PINS PNAT IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #3724/01 2801557
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 071557Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7275
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003724 

SIPDIS

S/REL MNF-I


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL MOPS PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: PESHMERGA TRANSFORMATION TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),an
d (d).

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003724

SIPDIS

S/REL MNF-I


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL MOPS PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: PESHMERGA TRANSFORMATION TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),an
d (d).


1. (S/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: On September 26, the Government of
Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) held the
second in a planned series of meetings to transform the
Peshmerga into a unified regional force consistent with
Iraq's constitution and federal law. Neither side presented
a clear position on the proposed KRG regional force's name;
organization; composition; size; or duties. Talks resume
October 10, but negotiations are unlikely to progress unless
both sides articulate their respective visions. If this
transition is not properly structured and transparently
executed, it could pose an unhelpful precedent with respect
to local and regional militia forces formed along party and
ethno-sectarian affiliation as Iraq's legislature works to
structure federalism legislation. (NOTE: National Security
Advisor Rubaie has since told us the GOI has developed a
position on a few key issues. We assume these points will be
used in the next round of discussions. END NOTE.) END SUMMARY.

--------------
KRG effort to consolidate Peshmerga
--------------


2. (S/REL MNF-I) Service in the Peshmerga has been the path
to power in PUK and KDP party structures, and the name
carries strong nationalist and party connotations. In
January 2006, President Barzani committed to merging the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's (PUK) Peshmerga with the
Kurdish Democratic Party's (KDP) Peshmerga into one
apolitical force. Coalition and Iraqi officials working
together as the Joint Committee on the Transfer of Security
Responsibility have assessed the three Kurdish provinces of
Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah as "green" -- ready to
transfer from MNF-I to domestic control since June 2006.
Embassy stressed in June 2006 that, prior to transfer, the
KRG and GoI should consolidate the Peshmerga as a regional
security force in accordance with the constitution, Iraqi

law, and Iraqi Armed Forces policy.


3. (S/REL MNF-I) On September 26, 2006, KRG and federal
government officials discussed transformation of the
Peshmerga into a regional force. Dilshad Miran, Head of the
KRG Representation office in Baghdad, was the Kurdish
spokesman. The GOI delegation, led by Minister of State for
Council of Representative Affairs Dr. Safa al-Safi, included
representatives from the Ministries of Interior and Defense,
and the offices of the National Security Advisor and Prime
Minister. MNF-I, Polmiloff, and UK Pol-Mil Counselor also
participated.

--------------
Force Name
--------------


4. (S/REL MNF-I) The KRG reported that the Peshmerga will be
consolidated into a single force -- independent of party
affiliation, under a unified Ministry and reporting to the
KRG president -- by December 2006. The KRG representatives
said the Kurdish regional force will maintain its current
name, Peshmerga, arguing the name is integral to Kurdish
identity and the Kurdish people's long struggle. The GOI
rejected the name, arguing that the national constitution and
law stipulate it should be named the "Regional Guard Force of
Kurdistan." The matter was left unresolved.

--------------
Structure, Roles and Responsibilities
--------------


5. (S/REL MNF-I) The KRG did not propose a structure for the
future regional force, but stated that the force would look
as it does today. The GOI requested the KRG bring a copy of
their organizational chart to the next discussion but made no
proposals of their own. The KRG said the role of the
regional force would remain as it is defined in the draft
regional constitution. When pushed for specificity, the KRG
stated their duties include "defending democracy fighting
terrorism...supporting border control...(and) supporting the
federal forces in times of natural disasters and against
external threats..." (NOTE: The nature of 'external' threats
was not elaborated. END NOTE.)


6. (S/REL MNF-I) The GOI argued the description is vague and
overlaps Iraqi Security Forces' duties. For example, the GOI
stated that border control is the exclusive role of Iraqi
federal forces, not a function of regional forces. The KRG
agreed but offered to provide 3000 regional guard troops to
support border enforcement. The GOI asked the KRG to define
the force responsibilities at the next meeting.

--------------
Regional Versus National Constitutions
--------------


7. (S/REL MNF-I) The KRG repeatedly cited KRG's regional laws
and draft constitution as the basis for regional force
authority. The GOI representatives were unfamiliar with KRG
law and claimed the supremacy of the national constitution
and federal laws on security matters. (NOTE: Article 110,
subsection two of the Iraqi Constitution states that the
federal government has exclusive authority on formulating and
executing national security policy including establishing and
managing armed forces. Article 121, subsection five states
that regional governments are responsible for the
establishment and organization of the internal security
forces. END NOTE.) The KRG agreed to provide copies of
relevant regional laws and the current draft KRG
constitution.

--------------
Force Size
--------------


8. (S/REL MNF-I) The KRG said the regional force will total
120,000 with an additional 70,000 reservists - a total force
of 190,000. The GOI questioned how the KRG derived this
number without a clear organizational structure or defined
roles and responsibilities. In private meetings with Emboffs
and MNF-I, GOI representatives have proposed a much smaller
Kurdish regional security force of 18,000.


9. (S/REL MNF-I) KRG representatives were unsure how many
Pershmerga have retired since its 2003 official retirement of
32,000. Nor was the KRG able to define how many would be
eligible for the planned Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration Program (DDR). The Kurds asserted that the
federal government should pay pensions to both the current
and future retired force members. Salaries and pensions to
Peshmerga constitute a major mechanism for the PUK and KDP to
transfer funds to a large body of armed party supporters.


10. (S/REL MNF-I) We will continue to facilitate and monitor
developments, as these negotiations will likely serve as a
model for other regions aspiring to greater autonomy. This
will have significant implications for both DDR and
federalism.
KHALILZAD