INDEPENDENT IRAQI SHI'A MP DISCUSSES FEDERALISM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003610

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT IRAQI SHI'A MP DISCUSSES FEDERALISM,
SHI'A COALITION, AND JAM WITH CHARGE

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Independent Council of Representatives
(CoR) Shia coalition (UIC) member Qassim Daoud told the
Charge on September 23 that the role of the central
government needed to be strengthened and that region
formation should be delayed until the appropriate capacities
are in place. He argued against a broad-scale military
operation to curb militias, making clear at the same time his
opinion that the best way to deal with the Sadrists was to
eliminate Muqtada Al-Sadr. Daoud offered some details on his
efforts to form a secular or centrist party within the UIC,
but said that the timeline for launching the party had been
delayed. END SUMMARY.

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Federalism and the Center
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2. (C) Turning initially to the related issues of federalism
and constitutional review, Daoud told the Charge that the
role of the central government needed to be strengthened.
While stating that he agreed with federalism in principle,
Daoud argued that it should not be implemented until the
necessary governance institutions are developed and said he
had proposed an amendment to the draft law on regions that
would mandate a "capacity building" period of three to five
years after a request to form a region before it could be
brought to the voters in a referendum. Daoud characterized
the Shia Coalition's SCIRI and Badr as "pro-federalism in an
extreme way" but noted that SCIRI's Coalition partners Dawa
and Fahila, as well as Prime Minister Maliki, had concerns
about federalism. The Sadrists, he continued, "are difficult
to work with" on the issue of federalism. Daoud added that
several areas of ambiguity in the constitution had to be
resolved in order to strengthen the central government, using
the issue of division of oil revenues as an example.

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Dealing with JAM and Muqtada Al-Sadr
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3. (C) Asked by the Charge what solution he envisioned to
the challenges posed by militias, Daoud stated that major
military operations against militias would "complicate the
security situation even in what we call the secure south."
Daoud agreed with the Charge that multinational and Iraqi
forces needed to combat those militia cells involved in death
squad activities and other crimes. Turning to Muqtada
Al-Sadr and the Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM),Daoud claimed that
"Muqtada does not control the JAM." He characterized the JAM
as divided into at least three groups: "criminals and
Baathists," led by a man known as Abu al-Dira; "an extreme
element," close to Iran and led by Qays al-Khuz'ali; and
"low-class people who believe Muqtada has holy bones in his
body." Daoud claimed that al-Dira's group operated the death
squads, killing mostly Sunnis but on occasion Shi'a as well;
several of his Shi'a bodyguards had recently been captured
and tortured by al-Dira's group, Daoud said. He described
the Sadrist movement as "a shallow, fragile, one-man movement
without an ideology." Noting again his belief that a major
military operation against the JAM would lead to greater
instability, Daoud argued that the best way to deal with the
Sadrist movement was to "eliminate Muqtada from Iraq" (i.e.,
kill him).

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A Party for Secular Shi'a?
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4. (C) The Charge then asked Daoud about the status of a new
political party Daoud had previously mentioned intending to
form. Noting that secular Shi'a were not represented in the
UIC, Daoud characterized his plan as "forming a party of the
center," though not calling it a "secular" party. He said
that Ayatollah SISTANI agreed with this plan because "he sees
that the competent people are all secularists." Daoud noted
that he had planned to launch the new party in September, but
that he had not been able to hold the necessary meetings
before Ramadan. He said that in the coming months he planned
to invite 300 to 400 prominent people from the provinces to
several meetings "to help them feel that they are part of the
process" of forming the new party.

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Comment
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5. (C) Daoud has several times mentioned his intention to
form a secular party within the Shi'a coalition. While his
vision for this party is consistent, the timeline keeps
slipping. He did not mention how he planned to finance the
party, nor was his strategy for soliciting support from
provincial figures convincing.
KHALILZAD