Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD3281
2006-09-06 02:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
UN AMBASSADOR QAZI ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMPACT
how-toVZCZCXRO1833 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #3281 2490236 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 060236Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6691 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0519 RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003281
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM PREL ECON IZ
SUBJECT: UN AMBASSADOR QAZI ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMPACT
WITH IRAQ AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
REF: BAGHDAD 3052
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003281
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM PREL ECON IZ
SUBJECT: UN AMBASSADOR QAZI ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMPACT
WITH IRAQ AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
REF: BAGHDAD 3052
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (C) In an August 30 meeting with Charge, UN Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi
welcomed the UAE's decision to host the Iraq Compact
Preparatory Committee meeting in Abu Dhabi on September 10.
Qazi stressed that the Compact's political/security language
should lay out the GOI's intentions, including on national
reconciliation, but should not be made conditional on
international assistance and should allay some Prep Groups
members' concerns that the Compact's exclusive focus is on
economic issues. Charge agreed that progress on the
political/security front should go hand-in-hand with economic
reforms. Qazi said he strongly supported efforts to invite
Turkey as a Prep Group member.
2. (C) On national reconciliation, Qazi stated that there has
been a solid beginning with respect to the "Baghdad Peace
Initiative," but good intentions have to become concrete
actions. Despite UNAMI conferences with various Iraqi
political organizations and politicians, Iraqi agreements to
form "peace committees" in Baghdad have not been acted upon.
Qazi had heard positive reports on the Baghdad Security Plan
and that the Iraqi people are happy to have some relief, but
added that it must be supported by political results to have
a lasting effect. In the wake of an August 7 IED attack on a
UNAMI convoy, Qazi said that security concerns from UN
headquarters in New York are hindering UNAMI efforts in Iraq
and, in particular, impeding UNAMI's attempts to promote the
Baghdad Peace Accord. (COMMENT: UNAMI officials have not
traveled into the Red Zone since Deputy SRSG Schulenburg's
convoy was the apparent target of an IED while traveling
through the Adhamiyah District of North Baghdad on August 7.
END COMMENT)
3. (C) Qazi expressed concern that the August 28 clash
between Shia militia and ISF units in Diwaniyah would
strengthen Moqtada al-Sadr's perception that MNF-I was not
serious about a dialogue or engagement. Qazi cautioned that
the Mahdi Army may seek to increase its activity and
influence, working as a Hezbollah-style resistance and social
movement. Following-up on a conversation with the Charge on
August 18 (Reftel),Qazi said he was concerned Sadr believed
that MNF-I was targeting him. The Charge reaffirmed that our
objective is to stop violent and criminal behavior and that
we were not targeting Sadr or Sadrists as an organization.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM PREL ECON IZ
SUBJECT: UN AMBASSADOR QAZI ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMPACT
WITH IRAQ AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
REF: BAGHDAD 3052
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (C) In an August 30 meeting with Charge, UN Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi
welcomed the UAE's decision to host the Iraq Compact
Preparatory Committee meeting in Abu Dhabi on September 10.
Qazi stressed that the Compact's political/security language
should lay out the GOI's intentions, including on national
reconciliation, but should not be made conditional on
international assistance and should allay some Prep Groups
members' concerns that the Compact's exclusive focus is on
economic issues. Charge agreed that progress on the
political/security front should go hand-in-hand with economic
reforms. Qazi said he strongly supported efforts to invite
Turkey as a Prep Group member.
2. (C) On national reconciliation, Qazi stated that there has
been a solid beginning with respect to the "Baghdad Peace
Initiative," but good intentions have to become concrete
actions. Despite UNAMI conferences with various Iraqi
political organizations and politicians, Iraqi agreements to
form "peace committees" in Baghdad have not been acted upon.
Qazi had heard positive reports on the Baghdad Security Plan
and that the Iraqi people are happy to have some relief, but
added that it must be supported by political results to have
a lasting effect. In the wake of an August 7 IED attack on a
UNAMI convoy, Qazi said that security concerns from UN
headquarters in New York are hindering UNAMI efforts in Iraq
and, in particular, impeding UNAMI's attempts to promote the
Baghdad Peace Accord. (COMMENT: UNAMI officials have not
traveled into the Red Zone since Deputy SRSG Schulenburg's
convoy was the apparent target of an IED while traveling
through the Adhamiyah District of North Baghdad on August 7.
END COMMENT)
3. (C) Qazi expressed concern that the August 28 clash
between Shia militia and ISF units in Diwaniyah would
strengthen Moqtada al-Sadr's perception that MNF-I was not
serious about a dialogue or engagement. Qazi cautioned that
the Mahdi Army may seek to increase its activity and
influence, working as a Hezbollah-style resistance and social
movement. Following-up on a conversation with the Charge on
August 18 (Reftel),Qazi said he was concerned Sadr believed
that MNF-I was targeting him. The Charge reaffirmed that our
objective is to stop violent and criminal behavior and that
we were not targeting Sadr or Sadrists as an organization.
KHALILZAD