Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD300
2006-02-02 12:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

(U) QUSHTEPE OFFICIALS COMMENT ON AL TASH

Tags:  PREF PTER PINR PINS PREL IZ IR JO UNHCR PRM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9935
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0300/01 0331219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021219Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2442
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000300 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AMMAN FOR REFCOORD CLAIRE KANESHIRO
CAIRO FOR REFCOORD GERRY CHEYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016
TAGS: PREF PTER PINR PINS PREL IZ IR JO UNHCR PRM
SUBJECT: (U) QUSHTEPE OFFICIALS COMMENT ON AL TASH
RELOCATION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 277

B. 05 STATE 180059

C. 05 BAGHDAD 3918

D. 05 KIRKUK 188

E. 05 AMMAN 6270

F. 05 AMMAN 297

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000300

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AMMAN FOR REFCOORD CLAIRE KANESHIRO
CAIRO FOR REFCOORD GERRY CHEYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016
TAGS: PREF PTER PINR PINS PREL IZ IR JO UNHCR PRM
SUBJECT: (U) QUSHTEPE OFFICIALS COMMENT ON AL TASH
RELOCATION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 277

B. 05 STATE 180059

C. 05 BAGHDAD 3918

D. 05 KIRKUK 188

E. 05 AMMAN 6270

F. 05 AMMAN 297

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 25, RefCoord accompanied
UNHCR to Kawa to monitor and evaluate the PRM-funded,
UNHCR-implemented relocation of Iranian Kurds formerly
resident in the Al Tash refugee camp near Ramadi in Al
Anbar governorate. Ref A covered assistance work at the
camp. En route to the site, RefCoord and UNHCR called on
the Mayor of Qushtepe and the Qushtepe Chief of Police,
whose mandates extend to Kawa, to explore the local
government perspective on the Kawa project. Although the
local government officials made vague allegations about
links between former Al Tash residents and insurgents,
they indicated that Erbil remained committed to accepting
up to 2,000 Al Tash Kurds and would take in the remaining
Al Tash populations barring specific information that
could be linked to individuals. END SUMMARY.

--------------
(SBU) BACKGROUND ON AL TASH RELOCATION
--------------


2. (SBU) The Al Tash Refugee Camp for Iranian Kurds in Al
Anbar is no longer viable. Security concerns have
undermined provision of adequate humanitarian assistance
and protection. The Government of Jordan has been
anxious to see the camp moved out of Al Anbar to northern
Iraq. Hundreds of refugees from Al Tash have already
flooded into Jordan; the GOJ is concerned about future
flows (refs E and F). Ninety-seven percent of the Al
Tash Kurds wanted to go to Sulaymaniyah, to join several
thousand former Al Tash residents who had previously been
relocated. The Department and UNHCR sought and won
agreement from KRG-Erbil (KRG-E) to relocate 2000 Al Tash
Kurds to Erbil. The KRG-E offered an acceptable site

above the green line at Kawa (refs C and D).


3. (SBU) As of January 25, almost all of the Al Tash
Kurds have relocated. 1273 have traveled to Kawa with
UNCHR assistance; the remainder has spontaneously
migrated to Sulaymaniyah without objection from KRG-S.
UNHCR does not have a firm figure for Iranian Kurds left
in Al Tash camp proper, but estimates approximately 150.
Another 189 Al Tash Kurds remain on the Jordanian border
hoping that they will be admitted to Jordan and referred
for third country resettlement. UNHCR is seeking better
information about how many individuals remain at each
location, who they are, whether they are UNHCR recognized
refugees, and why they have not yet accepted relocation
to Kawa.

-------------- --------------
(SBU) VIEWS OF QUSHTEPE MAYOR AND CHIEF OF POLICE
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Before visiting the Kawa relocation site to
monitor assistance levels (SEPTEL),RefCoord and UNHCR
met with the Qushtepe Mayor and Chief of Police (COP) to
explore the local government's view of the project. Both
indicated they had security concerns about the Kurds
remaining in Al Tash. The COP asserted that all people
who live two or three years in Ramadi have some
involvement with terrorist groups. He said the 50
families remaining in Al Tash don't want to move North
because they are involved in terrorist activities. The
COP claimed to have information that terrorist attacks
had been planned in the camp. (Note: MNF-I is following-
up.)


5. (C) The Mayor was uneasy about travel back and forth
between Ramadi and the Kawa site. He noted that a number
of the refugees at the Kawa site had legitimate business
to settle in Ramadi. However, he expressed concern that
traveling to and from Ramadi might "create an opportunity
that the terrorists can exploit." The refugees at the
Kawa site are allowed to travel to Ramadi, conditional on
a police investigation including interviews with the
police before and after the trip. Visitors to the Kawa
site from Ramadi and Iran are required to register with

BAGHDAD 00000300 002 OF 002


the Qushtepe authorities.


6. (C) UNHCR asked whether the refugees at the Kawa site
posed a security problem. The Mayor said that in dealing
with security issues, it is prudent to always suspect and
investigate. However, he noted that the refugees at the
Kawa site were allowed into Erbil without an
investigation. The COP confirmed that in principle the
local government has no problem with the remainder of the
Al Tash Kurds coming North. He said that if he had any
solid evidence of anything, they would not be allowed,
but he did not have any such evidence. The COP said that
they had specific information implicating one refugee
leader in an alleged bomb preparation incident in
December, and they would arrest him if he came north.
UNHCR asked if the Mayor and COP knew of Iranian
government activity in Kawa; they said no.


7. (SBU) The Mayor said that ID cards from Ramadi are
being accepted in Erbil. Students are attending local
schools and universities. One refugee is working as a
shuttle bus driver. Some refugees have shops in
neighboring villages. The Mayor indicated he wanted the
refugee population at the Kawa site to be locally
integrated. He said 205 families would be given ID cards
indicating they were refugees in Qushtepe. Per the COP,
these ID cards would serve as residence permits, and
would be valid for six months "so if they are resettled
in third countries we will know who has left." As to the
time frame, the Mayor said "we are working on it" and
expressed a desire for the IDs to be issued as quickly as
possible.


8. (SBU) According to the Mayor, the refugees are free to
work anywhere. The COP said a contractor regularly hires
day laborers from the Kawa site. Per the COP, the
refugees can get driver's licenses through the same
process as the local people.


9. (SBU) According to the Mayor, all of the refugees at
the Kawa site will get new Ministry of Trade ration cards
in 2006, but the cards will be issued in Ramadi.
Transferring the cards from Al Anbar to Erbil will take
some time. The Mayor remarked that ration cards are a
general problem throughout Iraq.


10. (SBU) UNHCR informed the Mayor about its hopes to
persuade the 189 Al Tash Kurds on the Jordanian border to
move to Kawa. UNHCR is trying to organize a delegation
of local officials and refugee representatives to tell
the 189 at the border about the Kawa site. The Mayor
indicated he would be willing to join the delegation, if
the Ministry of the Interior and the Erbil Governor
agree. The Mayor reiterated that the KRG-E is committed
to accepting 2,000 Al Tash refugees. So far only 1273
have moved to Kawa; KRG-E remains willing to take an
additional 727.

--------------
(U) Comment
--------------


11. (C) UNHCR's relocation of the Al Tash refugees to
northern Iraq is thus far a success. The refugees, now
out of harm's way, are beginning the process of locally
integrating; the reported access to education and work
are positive signs. The reports of bad apples remaining
at Al Tash and a limited number of refugees traveling
between Al Tash and Kawa are bear monitoring. The local
authorities' security concerns about Al Tash Kurds (paras
4 and 5) seem to conflict with continued KRG-E
willingness to accept relocation of more of them to Kawa.
The Mayor and COP's motives to espouse these
contradictory positions were not clear, but may be laying
the groundwork to justify limiting the refugees' freedom
of movement. Although the officials claimed there were
no such limits per se, and promised to help resolve
existing problems, they could use security concerns as an
excuse later for not following through.

KHALILZAD