POLITICAL LEADERS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO STEM VIOLENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002957

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KFRD IZ
SUBJECT: POLITICAL LEADERS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO STEM VIOLENCE

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In late July in discussions with the
Ambassador, leading Iraqi political figures began signaling
their deep concern over the deteriorating security situation
in Baghdad and began to consult across political fault lines
and propose practical steps on what to do. The Prime
Minister's High Commission for National Reconciliation and
Dialogue convened on July 22, and other formal and ad hoc
groupings are also scheduled to focus on the violence.
Although there is a nascent SCIRI-IIP-Kurdish coalition, Shia
and Sunni still have divergent narratives to account for the
security problems. However, they both criticize MNF-I. The
Shia in particular focus heavily on the "Baathists and
Takfiris" as the source of Iraq's violence, suggesting that
the militia phenomenon is only a natural reaction to the
terrorism. The Shia Coalition has raised questions about the
U.S. approach, suggesting that attention on the militias is
misplaced, and expresses growing fear that their democratic
victory will be stolen from them. Sunni leaders focus on
problems with the Ministry of Interior forces and Shia
extremists.

--------------
Talabani as Honest Broker
--------------


2. (C) President Talabani shares U.S. concerns about
deteriorating security, particularly in Baghdad. He is
engaged in outreach across Iraq's partisan and sectarian
frontlines to promote practical measures to stem the
violence. He is trying to encourage moderate Sunni clerics
to play a larger role, and is promoting an unofficial
coalition among Kurds, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and SCIRI to
promote reconciliation. Talabani also has reported his
efforts to support Prime Minister Maliki's reconciliation
proposals and his willingness to make the opening remarks at
the High Commission for National Dialogue and Reconciliation
(HCNDR) which was held on July 22. (Since then the HCNDR has
met several more times, is writing its own rules, and
undertaking arrangements for larger events, such as an
upcoming large meeting for tribal leaders.) He is also
searching for ways to bring Moqtada, or his senior leaders,
into direct dialogue with the US. At his suggestion, Deputy
Prime Minister Barham Salih hosted a small dinner on July 18
with the Ambassador with President Talabani, IIP leader and
Vice President Tariq Al Hashemi, and SCIRI leader and Vice
President Adel Abdel Mahdi.

--------------
SCIRI and IIP: Seeking Answers
--------------


3. (C) At dinner on the 18th, Tariq al Hashemi reported that
he had had a good meeting recently with SCIRI leader Abdul
Aziz Al-Hakim to search for ways to cooperate on controlling
the violence. Although clearly both leaders are looking for
ways out of the current cycle of violence, they have not yet
agreed on what to do, namely because they are looking in
different direction. Al Hashemi made clear that the Ministry
of Interior forces constitute the crux of the problem in
Baghdad. He cited several cases in which even his concerted
efforts failed to provoke MOI into responding to serious,
ongoing violent incidents. In exasperated tones, he said it
was easier to get President Bush on the phone than the Iraqi
Interior Minister. During the Mahmoudiya massacre, he tried
unsuccessfully for four hours to speak to MOI Bolani, but he
was always "in meetings."


4. (C) Adel Abdel Mahdi did not dispute Al Hashemi's version,
and stressed more practical measures. He said he believed
the political leadership of all parties needed to do more to
provide political cover for taking strong measures against
militias and terrorists. He also argued for organizing
neighborhood watch committees.

--------------
Shia Views
--------------


5. (C) On July 21, the Ambassador received three Shia
political figures from the Shia Coalition: Sheikh Jamal al
Din Al Sagheer (SCIRI),Dr. Haider Abbadi (Dawa),and Hadi Al
Amri (Badr). He expressed his concern about deteriorating
security in Baghdad and saw a need to get Iraq's political
leadership working together. Shaykh Jamal said he thought
there were a lot of areas where they should talk to the US to
seek agreement, and many detailed discussions should occur.
He thought that more meetings would be needed. He said that
he believed when the US and the Shia worked together, they
were very strong, but a feeling among the marja'iya and the
street was developing that the US was changing its views of
the Shia. He said he did not agree or disagree with this

BAGHDAD 00002957 002 OF 002


view, but found it dangerous. The Shia fear that tens of
thousands died in their "jihad" for democracy and they fear
its loss.


6. (C) Haider Abbadi defined the "real problem" as Baathist
and Takfiri-inspired terrorism, which has unfortunately been
adopted by some of the Sunni who believe "their" government
was stolen from them. Sadly, this has now placed Shia and
Sunni "at war" with each other. The Shia cannot be protected
from the VBIEDs, and the Sunni leadership has not tried to
reassure the Shia publicly. The Shia feel let down and
without protection, and now that there is so much talk about
disarming Shia civilians--it creates misunderstanding. Shia
and Sunni forces need to be balanced. (NOTE: Baghdad is 70%
Shia. END NOTE.) Tawafuq (Sunni bloc) proposed that the
Sunni control Karkh, and the Shia control Rasafa (west and
east sides of the Tigris),which Abbadi rejected. Baghdad
must remain united. He said that the Shia Alliance wants to
disarm the militias, but cannot do so until the level of
violence declines. He felt that MNF-I was not taking
responsibility for the situation. Acknowledging that the CF
could not take sides between the groups, he argued that more
could be done to control the entry and exit points to the
city.


7. (C) Hadi Al Amri recalled the feeling of tension among the
Shia after the Karbala explosion, when people questioned the
marja'iya's advice to be patient and many feared
uncontrollable violence from the Shia. Now, he insisted, the
situation was worse--he believed that many extreme acts of
violence were occurring because the CF were passing control
to the ISF. Were the Iraqi forces ready or not? He cited
many areas of Baghdad that were virtual seas of terrorists,
but the MNF-I was conducting raids to disarm civilians. He
agreed that civilians should not be armed but that they
needed them for protection until the ISF are ready. Iraqi
Shia were "in the same trench with you" against the
terrorists. He too claimed that terrorism in Iraq was caused
by ex-forces of Saddam Hussein and the Takfiris, but that
three months ago the problem suddenly became the militias.
The terrorists were also killing Kurds and Christians, but
the Shia were bearing the brunt of the violence. He realized
that the Shia reactions were creating sectarian battlelines
which must be stopped.


8. (C) Al Amri proposed some practical steps. (1) Reinforce
the government and rebuild the armed forces. (2) Do not stop
the campaign against terrorists--there must be political
reconciliation, but force must also be used; he referred to
recent meetings between the Shia and Sunni Coalitions. (3)
He recommended "popular committees" to be formed in every
community: Shia in predominantly Shia communities; Sunnis in
Sunni communities, and mixed committees where the populations
are evenly divided. These committees could work with ISF and
MNF-I to assure that they remained under the control of the
government. (4) Rebuild in safe areas of Iraq, not just in
Kurdistan. Many communities were secure, such as in Karbala,
Muthanna, Najaf, and Samarra. They need encouragement in the
form of investment.


9. (C) Sheikh Jamal al Din offered the closing observation,
warning that the problem could grow. He was seeing the
growth in anti-American feeling among the Shia, which could
have negative affects on international and regional issues.
He cited Lebanon as a problem, and noted that there could be
local reactions to U.S. forces. Dr. Haider stressed the
importance of addressing the economic problems of Iraqis,
particularly in the safe areas. He said unemployment in Sadr
City contributed to terrorist actions.
KHALILZAD