Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD2677
2006-07-26 19:07:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQI MINDEF ON IA DEVELOPMENT

Tags:  IZ MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PREL PTER 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2076
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DE RUEHGB #2677/01 2071907
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 261907Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5934
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002677 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016
TAGS: IZ MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PREL PTER
SUBJECT: IRAQI MINDEF ON IA DEVELOPMENT

REF: BAGHDAD 2464

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Margaret Scobey for Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002677

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016
TAGS: IZ MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PREL PTER
SUBJECT: IRAQI MINDEF ON IA DEVELOPMENT

REF: BAGHDAD 2464

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Margaret Scobey for Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with Iraqi
Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir al-Mufraji July 21 to
discuss Baghdad security. Al-Mufraji said the situation
reflected personal struggles among politicians who are behind
the militias killing innocent Iraqis. He pledged to "nip in
the bud" any infiltration of religious-affiliated militias
into the MOD. Al-Mufraji twice denied that he felt political
pressure to "avoid doing the right thing". He felt that
improving coordination across the MNF-I and Iraqi Army (IA)
parallel chains of command to accelerate response times to
incidents is more effective than merely increasing the size
of the Iraqi army, as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has
proposed. He felt that al-Maliki, who has no military
background, needs a military officer as deputy commander in
chief of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to help him make
decisions rapidly. Al-Mufraji will source two additional
Iraqi brigades from existing trained troops because it takes
one to two years to fully
train new recruits. He claimed that only one senior MOD
officer - whose sister is active in the "Party of Return"
movement to restore Saddam Hussein to power - is being
removed under de-Ba'athification, while other officers are
being removed for well-known acts of bribery and corruption.
END SUMMARY

The Ambassador's Question
--------------


2. (S//REL GBR AUS) On July 21, the Ambassador, accompanied
by Pol-Mil Counselor (notetaker),called on Minister of
Defense Abd al-Qadir al-Mufraji to discuss the MOD's views on
the Baghdad Security Plan and other issues in advance of
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's official visit to the United
States, July 25-27. The Ambassador posed three questions
that will likely be asked of the Prime Minister by the U.S.
Congress and the press during the visit.

What more is needed to improve the security situation? The
impression is that Baghdad is out of control and that the new
government of national unity is unable to deliver on its
pledge of improvement. If this continues, individual Iraqis
may take security into their own hands, which would worsen
the situation.

Clean Up Iraqi Politics Behind the Sunni and Shia Militias
-------------- --------------


3. (S//REL GBR AUS) On Baghdad security, al-Mufraji pointed
out that "Baghdad is not Iraq," although Baghdad is special.
In cooperation with Coalition Forces (CF),the IA had
destroyed much of the "evil jihadist movement", and would
soon defeat organized criminal groups. The security
situation reflected personal struggles among the politicians
behind the Sunni and Shia militias. "We need to clean up
Iraqi politics ourselves," he said. In Baghdad, the IA's
target is terrorists, not political groups. During the ban
on cars during Friday prayers, politicians routinely send
their militias into the streets, and the MOD does not know
how to handle it. The Ministry of Interior had been
infiltrated by armed, religious political groups, and with
the Coalition's help, al-Mufraji said he wants to prevent any
similar situation from developing in MOD. As Minister of
Defense and a soldier, al-Mufraji asserted he would carry out
his mission, but the politicians would need to revise their
politics.

Does MOD Have the Right Force Structure?
--------------


4. (S//REL GBR AUS) Building on al-Mufraji's point, the
Ambassador noted that he meets daily with the leadership,
trying to understand what motivates Iraqi politicians to
behave irresponsibly and how to motivate them to improve.
But dialogue itself was insufficient, in his estimation.
Judicious use of force is often also needed. The Ambassador
asked if the MOD has the right force structure, the right
strategy, and the right concept of operations to bring
progress.


5. (S//REL GBR AUS) Referring to the example raised by
Minister of State Foreign Affairs al-Esawi at the July 9
Ministerial Council for National Security (reftel),
al-Mufraji said that citizens in western Iraq, near Ramadi
and Fallujah, want to help MNF-I and the IA kill al-Qaeda in

BAGHDAD 00002677 002 OF 002


Iraq (AQI) terrorists. They had been asking for help for two
weeks, without any response from MNF-I. This area is not a
priority for MFC-I and the IA. Al-Mufraji advised that we
need to create a good command and control (C2) system to
facilitate a quick and strong reaction to these opportunities.


6. (S//REL GBR AUS) Responding to the Ambassador's
observation that some in the US think that the MOD does not
have a "political go signal" to move against the militias,
al-Mufraji denied that he lacks political backing. Rather,
he said that a more pressing problem was the delay introduced
by the need to coordinate IA movements with MNF-I plans to
avoid friendly fire incidents. The Ambassador, noting the
parallel Iraqi and American chains of command, asked if there
was a dual key system, in which the IA could not move unless
MNF-I Commanding General Casey agreed. Al-Mufraji said that
coordination was good, but time was lost through a
back-and-forth process. A new path of operations would
reduce response time, particularly in Baghdad.


7. (S//REL GBR AUS) The Ambassador asked if MOD has the right
force structure, assuming that the C2 coordination process
could be accelerated. Al-Mufraji replied that MOD and MNF-I
were studying this question scientifically. One structural
problem he noted is balancing the short-term need to improve
Baghdad security and the long-term ramifications. If today
the IA increased by 50 battalions and succeeded in improving
the security situation, tomorrow we would face the problem of
demobilization. Al-Mufraji agreed Baghdad needs two more
brigades, but he would prefer to source them from existing
structures. The IA could not the wait to train an effective
brigade from raw recruits. Al-Mufraji informed the
Ambassador that he would soon start to implement one element
of Phase II of the Baghdad Security Plan - dividing Baghdad
into two separate military commands, separated by the Tigris
River. Phase II would hopefully stop armed groups and
militias. Accelerating the coordination process would
obviate the need
for more troops.


8. (S//REL GBR AUS) Al-Mufraji explained that the Government
of Iraq (GOI) needed to improve its own C2 system. The Prime
Minister is the IA's Commander in Chief (CINC). But he is a
civilian, and for balance he needs a military officer as
Deputy CINC to help him make decisions rapidly. Even the
National Security Advisor, Dr. Mowafaq Rubaie, is a civilian,
and the members of the informal National Security Advisory
Group are all civilians. Al-Mufraji stressed the need for
more military officers who speak clearly and succinctly, with
fewer civilians who turn meetings into politics and lectures
on morality.


9. (S//REL GBR AUS) The Ambassador asked Al-Mufraji if he was
being held back from doing the right thing by politicians.
Al-Mufraji responded "so far, no." Al-Mufraji added that all
political organizations want him on their side. He commented
that they approach him as if he is depriving them of
something. "I won't be the defense minister for the (Sunni)
National Accord Front, or for the Kurds, but I am the
minister for all of Iraq!"


10. (S//REL GBR AUS) The Ambassador asked if MOD officials
were being removed in the name of de-Ba'athification.
Al-Mufraji replied that only six are being discharged, and
five of those were guilty of corruption and bribery. The
sixth case, that of Brigadier General Sayyid, Legal
Department Chief of Staff, is well-known. His sister was a
high ranking member of a Ba'ath organization, her husband was
a Ba'ath party leader in charge of higher education, and she
now works in Syria for the "Party of Return" (of the Ba'ath
Party to power). MOD could not keep an officer with such
family connections in such a responsible position.
SCOBEY