Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD215
2006-01-26 12:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

WITH COMPETING PROGRAMS, UNITY GOVERNMENT WILL

Tags:  PGOV PNAT KDEM PHUM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2839
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0215/01 0261226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261226Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2293
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000215 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: WITH COMPETING PROGRAMS, UNITY GOVERNMENT WILL
TAKE TIME TO ASSEMBLE SAYS TAWAFFUQ LEADER

REF: BAGHDAD 195

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000215

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: WITH COMPETING PROGRAMS, UNITY GOVERNMENT WILL
TAKE TIME TO ASSEMBLE SAYS TAWAFFUQ LEADER

REF: BAGHDAD 195

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: One of Iraq's top Sunni Arab political
leaders, Tariq al-Hashemi, told us January 25 that while
his constitutents are not happy with the election process,
he will move forward on unity government talks. He
anticipated difficulties finding common ground with the
Kurds and the Shia Islamists on a government program. He
underlined that security is the top issue for the Tawaffuq
leadership. He hoped constitutional issues like federalism
could be put off (since he knows he'll lose any vote in the
parliament). A senior member of the Shia Islamist
Coalition, meanwhile, told us that the Coalition will work
for a unity government even though a deal with the Kurds is
"legally sufficient" to stand up a government. He brushed
off Sunni Arab worries about militia-driven killings and
said the Shia Coalition will bring its own security
concerns -- Sunni Arab religious extremists and ex-
Baathists -- to the negotiating table. Discussions
between the political blocs are still in their early
stages, but already the future of the Interior Ministry is
shaping up as one of the contentious issues. For the Sunni
Arab political bloc, it might be the make-or-break issue.
End Summary.

--------------
SUNNI ARABS STILL GRUMPING ABOUT ELECTION
--------------


2. (C) Tariq al-Hashemi of the Tawaffuq Front told us
January 25 that the Sunni Arab community is still unhappy
with the election results. The fraud, especially in the
South, was well documented and the IECI did not investigate
the complaints properly, he claimed. He sought
compensation - either extra seats awarded from the 45
compensatory seats or extra ministries in the government.
PolCouns told Hashimi that the IMIE report provided
recommendations on how to improve the complaints process
and better ensure IECI staff obeyed the boundries of
propriety. The U.S. would support IECI and UN effort to
implement those recommendations. PolCouns cautioned,

however, that the U.S. had no plan to intervene to boost up
Tawaffuq's seat total, whatever it turns out to be.

--------------
SECURITY, NOT THE CONSTITUTION, IS VITAL
--------------


3. (C) Pol Counselor said the best way to address Sunni
concerns would be for the Tawaffuq to negotiate to obtain
real power in the new government. Hashimi said that he
understood this and Tawaffuq will be seeking key ministries
rather than symbolic political posts like the Presidency.
While conceding that the discussions on government
formation and ministry allocation among the political
groups may take some time, Hashimi continued to point to
security as the number one concern for the Sunnis.
Something must be done about MOI Bayan Jabr, said Hashimi.
People are being killed every day, he fulminated. He
claimed that 16 Sunnis were killed by people wearing police
uniforms and driving police vehicles in Baghdad's al-Salam
district on January 24. The Coalition is doing nothing to
stop the killings, pleaded an angry Hashimi. PolCouns
advised that a good police force and army are needed to
protect the Sunnis. Making sure that the Minister of
Interior and Minister of Defense are non-sectarian
professionals is essential. Hashimi readily agreed and
underlined that security issues top the agenda of the
Tawaffuq Front.


4. (C) Hashemi said the Tawaffuq Front would not push the
constitutional issue of federalism when the new parliament
sits. He readily admitted that the Sunni Arabs would lose
a vote about moving forward on federalism badly in the next
parliament as alignments stand now. He suggested that it
would be easier to form a national unity government with
Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Shia Islamists if the debate on
Constitutional changes (including the setting up of any new
regions) could be put off for several years.

--------------
SUNNI ARABS AND KURDS - NOT NATURAL PARTNERS
--------------


5. (C) Hashimi told PolCouns on January 25 that it will
be difficult to reach agreement on a unity government deal
with the Kurds. The Sunnis and Kurds have incompatible

BAGHDAD 00000215 002 OF 003


views on the key Constitutional issues of federalism and
the status of Kirkuk. Hashimi doubted that the Kurds will
be flexible on these issues. A government coalition must
have a common program on security, the Constitution and the
economy, said Hashimi. Discussions with Ayad Allawi are
proceeding well and the prospects of a Sunni/Allawi block
representing 83 seats appear good, Hashemi observed. He
asserted that convincing the Kurds to join the coalition
would depend largely on the extent of American pressure.
Hashimi readily agreed with ideas agreed upon by Allawi and
the Kurds on issues such as a four-way unity government,
dividing ministries into functional groups each headed by a
deputy prime minister and ensuring each unity government
bloc had representation in each functional group. He liked
the idea of a top-level national security council as well.
(Comment: his discussions with Allawi may be progressing,
but Allawi apparently didn't brief Hashimi in detail on the
discussions in the Irbil. End Comment.)


6. (C) Hashimi underlined that opposition to the Shia
plurality in the COR is not a sufficient bond for coalition
government partners. A coalition that excluded key Shia
Islamist parties would only trigger a sharply negative
reaction from the Shia and the Iranians. Moreover, the
option of breaking the Shia coalition seemed unlikely to
Hashimi. Fadhila's leader Nadeem al-Jabiri is also seeking
Tawaffuq backing for his prime ministerial bid, but Hashimi
dismissed the likelihood of Tawaffuq supporting him.
(Comment: Hashimi did not discount Jabiri on ideological
grounds but rather in a rapid-fire manner in line with
Hashimi's perception of the weight of political forces.
End Comment.)

--------------
SHIA ISLAMIST VIEW: DON'T LECTURE US
--------------


7. (C) (C) Later January 25 Saad Qandil of the Shia
Islamist party SCIRI told PolCouns that the Shia Islamist
Coalition is willing to form a unity government that
includes the Sunni Arabs, but people like Hashimi must stop
claiming the Sunni Arabs have a "right" to participate in
the next government. Qandil sniffed that that the Shia
Coalition and the Kurdish Alliance can practically gain 2/3
of the next parliament alone; they don't need the Sunnis,
he stated flatly. (He added that American insistance on
the unity government theme grates some Shia because it
ignores the legal reality.) PolCouns said the math may
back Qandil's argument, but excluding the Sunni Arabs or
presenting them with a marginal role at the end will narrow
the chances of undercutting the insurgency. He cautioned
that the U.S. wants the political process to dampen the
insurgency, not aggravate it.


8. (C) PolCouns reviewed the types of complaints about
the Interior Ministry raised by Tawaffuq in general, and
the Hayy as-Salam incident January 24 allegations in
particular. Qandil denied that there are militia members
operating in the guise of the Interior Ministry. He
suggested that those responsible for the killings were
Sunni religious extremists (takfiris) in police garb.
PolCouns rejoined that no other part of the political
spectrum outside SCIRI believed that. It would be best to
address the credibility problem at the Interior Ministry
directly, he advised. PolCouns noted that the Sunni Arabs
might be flexible about the next minister as long as it was
a person with subject expertise and no sectarian agenda.
Qandil insisted that the Shia Islamist Coalition would
demand a Shia as Interior Minister. He pointed to the many
terror attacks on Shia and stated that the Shia are the
real victims of violence, not the Sunni Arabs. PolCouns
urged Qandil to consider also how to use deputy minister
positions in the negotiations to enhance the chances of a
deal.

--------------
THE PM CHOICE WILL BE - JAFARI ?
--------------


9. (C) Qandil told PolCouns that negotiations to choose
the next Prime Minister would be more difficult than in the
spring of 2005. Qandil said the Shia Coalition would not
vote to settle the Jafari-Abd al-Mahdi competition because
the tight margin of whatever result came out would be very
divisive. Qandil commented that he thought PM Ja'fari is
the frontrunner, but Abd al-Mahdi would make a better Prime
Minister. Qandil discounted the possibility of a
compromise candidate, such as Fadhila's Nadeem Jabiri or
Deputy TNA Speaker Husayn Shahristani, getting the nod.


BAGHDAD 00000215 003 OF 003


--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Both Hashimi and Qandil agreed on the importance
of a unity government, but we doubt the Shia Islamists and
Tawaffuq will agree on much after that. Notably, feelings
run high among members of both the Shia Islamist Coalition
the Sunni Arab Tawaffuq Front about the Interior Ministry
and security problems. Even once we get past the prime
minister choice and the Presidency Council, we can expect
an sharp fight over the choice of the Interior Minister.
Indeed, it is easy to imagine the Tawaffuq Front quickly
threatening to walk out of the unity government talks
unless they get satisfaction on the choice of the Interior
Minister. We are quietly gathering names of possible
choices should we need them later.
KHALILZAD