Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD2148
2006-06-22 14:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

REACTIONS TO THE BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN

Tags:  PGOV PTER PDEM KCRM MOPS MARR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7489
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2148/01 1731452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221452Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5258
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002148 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PDEM KCRM MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO THE BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN

REF: BAGHDAD 02135

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002148

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PDEM KCRM MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO THE BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN

REF: BAGHDAD 02135

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C//REL MNFI) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. The Baghdad Security
Plan commenced operation June 14. The June 20 MCNS review of
the plan assessed the operation positively, noting room for
improvement (reftel). On June 24, the plan will be formally
reviewed to determine what modifications are needed to
maximize progress. While some of the measures implemented by
the plan, like additional checkpoints set up across the city,
have inconvenienced the citizens of Baghdad, they have proven
effective in controlling crime and decreasing violence.


2. (C//REL MNFI) The below comments reflect reactions from a
variety of political contacts. The majority of our contacts
agreed that improving the security situation in Baghdad would
send a strong message to terrorists all over Iraq. They
supported measures to stem the violence that has continued
across Baghdad for the past several months. However, both
Sunni and Shia contacts reported that they have not seen
Baghdad Security Plan measures implemented in Shia
neighborhoods, which has heightened Sunni concerns that the
plan targets their communities. We interpret the following
comments as partially representing the actual situation, but
also biased by personal views. END COMMENT AND SUMMARY.

--------------
No Change in Shia Neighborhoods
--------------


3. (C//REL MNFI) Sadr City DAC member Ali Suadi told PolFSN
in a June 22 conversation that the Baghdad Security Plan has
had a negligible effect on security in Sadr City. According
to Suadi, the only checkpoints in Sadr City are JAM
checkpoints. There is no sign that JAM is concerned that ISF
will interfere with their activities.


4. (C//REL MNFI) In June 18 meetings with PolOff, Ahmed
Hassan, Hassan Shama, Ahmed Rahim, and Talib Hussein of the
Sadr City District Advisory Council (DAC) said the Baghdad
Security Plan has not affected security in Sadr City. Ahmed

Hassan said the Sadrist-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) still
controls Sadr City. The extra security measures taken under
the Baghdad Security Plan did not prevent the June 16 bombing
of the Buratha Mosque in Baghdad. Hassan recommended that
MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) completely seal off
Sadr City for several days, search every house, and arrest
militia members. He added that the lack of security in Sadr
City has caused some residents - Sunni Arab, Shia, and Kurd
alike - to say they wish for Saddam's return, although he
admitted that most people do not actually want this and say
so only in anger.


5. (C//REL MNFI) On June 18, SCIRI CoR member Ijra Faisal Oda
told PolOff that there is some evidence that the Baghdad
Security plan had been implemented in Sunni areas but that
there was no activity in Sadr City and many Shia
neighborhoods. She pointed out that her parents live in the
very dangerous neighborhood of Hatema (located next to
Ameriyah district) and claimed that the Iraqi Security forces
have not set up any checkpoints.


6. (C//REL MNFI) On June 16, Iraqiyya COR member Hachem
al-Hassani claimed that the plan had not been implemented in
the Shia neighborhoods, which contributed to its
politicization. He acknowledged that many Sunni areas will
be targeted for terrorists, but that the PM needs to show on
television that the plan is being executed in all areas of
Baghdad, otherwise he should expect a violent backlash that
could harm him politically.

-------------- --------------
Sunnis Okay with Plan, Anxious About Implementation
-------------- --------------

7. (C//REL MNFI) Sunni Arab leaders continued to view the
Baghdad Security Plan with skepticism and believed that it
has targeted their communities. Iraqi Islamic Party leader
(IIP) Ala'a Makki told Poloff June 17 that there is great
anxiety about the plan. He said people were afraid that the
plan was meant to attack and disarm the Sunni people. He
said that there was nothing wrong with the plan itself, just
the manner of its implementation and asked for USG support to
ensure that the security measures apply to all the sects, not
just the Sunnis.

8. (C//REL MNFI) The IIP affiliated Dar As-Salam paper
published a front page editorial on June 18 where it said it
could not be optimistic if the new plan was like the previous
ones - "we can expect more random arrests and killings." The
editorial concluded that since the security forces were

BAGHDAD 00002148 002 OF 003


infiltrated by militias that participate in the raids, the
coming days will show if the plan succeeds or fails.

-------------- -
Senior Sunni and Kurdish Leaders Not Consulted
-------------- -

9. (C//REL MNFI) Vice President Tarik al-Hashimi on June 11
said that he had several concerns about the security plan
including that he and other Sunni leaders in government, had
not been consulted when it was drawn up. The plan continued
to refer to "terrorists" in Baghdad, a term previously used
by the MOI to justify attacks on Sunni Arab neighborhoods, he
said. In addition, MOI forces continue to control
checkpoints in Sunni areas under the plan.

10. (C//REL MNFI) Senior Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
Council of Representatives (CoR) member and former Deputy
Prime Minister Rowsch Shaways told PolOff on June 19 that he
personally had not been shown a copy of the Baghdad Security
Plan. However, he agreed that it was crucial to secure
Baghdad ) if the capitol was safe, Shaways reasoned, it
would send a positive message to the rest of the country.
The key thing was to incorporate both Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior forces into the plan, and ensure that
they were supervised by Coalition Forces. The Coalition's
oversight would reassure citizens of Baghdad that they would
not be unfairly scrutinized for sectarian reasons, and would
act as "quality control" over the minimally trained Iraqi
soldiers and police.

--------------
Checkpoints Not the Answer
--------------


11. (C//REL MNFI) Sadr City DAC members Talib Hussein, Ahmed
Rahim, and Hassan Shama characterized the additional
checkpoints that have been set up under the Baghdad Security
Plan as "useless." They said that ISF has neither the
equipment nor the training to effectively search cars for
weapons, including bombs. As a result, the checkpoints serve
only to create more traffic jams, they argued.


12. (C//REL MNFI) Baghdad provincial governor Hussain
al-Tahan (SCIRI) told PolFSN June 19 that there is no
organized security plan, just an increase in checkpoints and
traffic problems. The additional troops were doing nothing
more than duplicating the work of the traffic police. Al-
Tahan called the plan "tribal," claiming that it had not been
developed by experts. He said that he had called Minister of
Interior Jawad al-Bulani to complain about the plan, and its
focus on quantity not quality. To truly secure Baghdad, he
argued, more checkpoints need to be set up at the entrances
to the city, not within the city itself.


13. (C//REL MNFI) In a June 17 meeting, UNAMI Human Rights
Officer Bushra Jamil told PolOff that the Baghdad Security
Plan would not solve the security problems in Baghdad. She
said that more checkpoints would do nothing but snarl
traffic, however she also cautioned that more raids on
private homes could increase public resentment towards the
Iraqi security forces. Jamil insisted that the only way the
security situation would improve would be for coalition and
Iraqi forces to finally act on the information they already
know, and start arresting and punishing the criminals
committing the violence.


14. (C//REL MNFI) One Embassy FSN from Baghdad's
Shia-dominated Qadimiyah district commented on June 18 that
locals were hopeful for the new security plan, but cautious.
She noted that the plan had resulted in more checkpoints and
waiting lines, and that this aspect of the plan made
residents nervous. "We are afraid that a terrorist will
target and try to attack these queues".


15. (C//REL MNFI) In a June 19 conversation with PolFSN,
Baghdad City Council Chairman Basem Al-Yacoubi (Fadhila) said
that it was too early to see results from the Baghdad
Security Plan. He cautioned against rushing to judgment,
noting that "maybe after one month we can evaluate the
results." He also advocated for a greater focus on arms
control, rather than movement control (checkpoints). If
everyone turned in their weapons, perhaps in an amnesty
effort, then violence would end he reasoned.

--------------
Comment
--------------


16. (C//REL MNFI) While many political contacts were critical
of the Baghdad Security Plan, their criticism was generally
aimed at implementation issues rather than at the plan
itself. We report these comments knowing they may reflect

BAGHDAD 00002148 003 OF 003


individual views. Many consider new procedures cumbersome
and inconvenient. For example, while the addition of
checkpoints across the city creates traffic jams at times,
the increased scrutiny both deters and prevents attacks.


17. (C//REL MNFI) Baghdad residents are strongly in favor of
initiatives to increase security. Unfortunately the deep
divide that has developed between Sunni and Shia, as well as
between citizens and the security forces, makes consensus on
security matters difficult to achieve. MNF-I and GOI
officials are well aware of existing sensitivities, and will
continue to assess the effectiveness of the plan and adjust
strategies and procedures as appropriate.
SPECKHARD