MCNS - MUTHANNA, BASRAH, AND BAGHDAD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002114

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV CIA IZ MASS MCAP MOPS NATO PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: MCNS - MUTHANNA, BASRAH, AND BAGHDAD

REF: BAGHDAD 2046

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. DANIEL SPECKHARD FOR REASONS 1.4
(A),(B),(D)


1. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) SUMMARY: On June 18, the
Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) met to
discuss security issues in Muthanna, Basrah, and Baghdad. It
was decided to announce the transfer of security
responsibility for Muthanna from the Coalition to the GOI on
June 19. The Basrah security plan was evaluated, with
modifications to be made to the Iraqi command structure. The
MCNS also evaluated the Baghdad security plan, the
implementation of which will be reviewed to improve
effectiveness and counter rising insurgent violence. END
SUMMARY.


2. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
chaired the MCNS on the evening of June 18. Present for the
Iraqis were Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zawbai; Minster of
Interior Jawad al-Bulani; Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir;
Minister of State for National Security Shirwan al-Wa'ili;
Minister of Finance (and former Minister of Interior) Bayan
Jabr; National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie; and
Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Babikir Shawkt. The Coalition was
represented by Charge d'Affaires Speckhard, UK Ambassador
Patey, and MNF-I Deputy Commanding General LTG Fry. Topics
for discussion were security issues in Muthanna, Basrah and
Baghdad.

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF TRANSFER
OF SECURITY IN MUTHANNA
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3. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) Transfer of security responsibility
for Muthanna (reftel) from the Coalition to the GOI is
pending. The MCNS decided to make modifications to the way
that local security is handled in Muthanna because of
problems that had previously arisen with the Basrah
Governor's management of security in his province. The MCNS
implemented restrictions on the Muthanna Governor's authority
to raise his own militia forces, recruit new police personnel
who are more loyal to the Governor than to the GOI, direct
control of police forces, and affect MNF-I movement. Maliki
will decide who would be the lead for handling any crisis in
Muthanna, and -- depending on the circumstances -- the Iraqi
Police (IP) Commander or Iraqi Army (IA) Commander are the
preferred leads.

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MUTHANNA READY FOR SECURITY TRANSFER
--------------


4. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) Maliki decided that the
announcement to transfer provincial security would be made on
June 19. A decision for the date of a formal transfer
ceremony is pending but likely to be July 14. The MCNS
agreed to delay the public announcement of the actual
ceremony date for security reasons. It also was agreed that
the proposed general Implementing Arrangements and the PM's
Security Authorization (which would allow the PM to designate
specific individuals to assume lead roles) would be reviewed
by Maliki, who agreed to decide this week on their specifics.

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PROBLEMS IN BASRAH
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5. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) The MCNS then reviewed the Basrah
security plan. There was consensus that Basrah is a critical
province and that success there could have a ripple effect
across Iraq. As such, solid groundwork needs to be laid to
permit the eventual transfer of security and to allow
provincial elections. There would be leadership changes;
Iraqi forces would become more disciplined and effective; and
a political/national dialogue would be conducted.


6. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) Current weaknesses in the IP and IA
in Basrah are challenges that have to be overcome now, Maliki
stated. In order to instill discipline in the ranks, Maliki
ordered reform of the IP to remove corrupt elements by
prosecuting them. Weak leaders in the IP and IA, he
directed, would be replaced by those with strong, proven
records. Increased security operations would heighten ISF
visibility, deter rogue IP and JAM/militia elements, and
reassure the local populace. The MCNS also assigned specific

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missions: the ISF would lead "deter and reassure" operations
(checkpoints, joint patrols, outreach to local Sunnis, and
increase in surge operations); MNF-I would lead "attrition"
operations (arrest, search, and detention operations).
Command and control arrangements would be revised, minimizing
the Basrah Governor's role and authority in security, with
the GOI selecting a trusted person from the Iraqi army as the
chair of the Provincial Security Committee (formerly the
Governor was the cha
ir).

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BAGHDAD
--------------


7. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) The Baghdad Security plan commenced
on June 14. Maliki requested a review of progress so far and
what changes needed to be made. Although attacks initially
decreased, there was a follow-on spike of violent attacks on
June 17. The MCNS agreed that this spike was an attempt to
discredit the GOI's high-profile security initiative. Also,
due to certain areas being cordoned off, there is concern
that some neighborhoods are short of food and water. Maliki
urged for the momentum to continue and requested that the
security Ministers review what modifications needed to be
made to counter the insurgents and protect the people.
Maliki strongly emphasized that setbacks would not be
accepted and that if more forces are necessary or additional
supplies needed, then they would be brought in from other
areas. It was agreed that a formal review will be conducted
on June 24.

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COMMENT
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8. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) COMMENT: Maliki allowed
free-wheeling discussions by all those present. Rubaie was
extremely vocal in the deliberations, demonstrating his
growing influence as NSA. Maliki, however, ultimately called
the shots, concluding the meeting with a crisp summation of
the decisions taken and the actions pending -- typical of his
decisive, business-like performance thus far. END COMMENT.
SPECKHARD