Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD2082
2006-06-19 16:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

AUSTRALIAN DEMARCHE: MILITARY PARTICIPATION

Tags:  MOPS PREL PINS UK AS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #2082/01 1701628
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191628Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5161
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0040
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1165
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002082 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016
TAGS: MOPS PREL PINS UK AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN DEMARCHE: MILITARY PARTICIPATION
CONDITIONS AND PRT REFUSAL

REF: BAGHDAD 2046

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DANIEL SPECKHARD FOR REASONS 1.4 (A),
(B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002082

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016
TAGS: MOPS PREL PINS UK AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN DEMARCHE: MILITARY PARTICIPATION
CONDITIONS AND PRT REFUSAL

REF: BAGHDAD 2046

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DANIEL SPECKHARD FOR REASONS 1.4 (A),
(B) AND (D)


1. (C/ REL AS, UK) SUMMARY: On June 17, Australian Ambassador
Howard Brown confirmed to Charge d'Affaires Speckhard that
Australian military forces will participate in overwatch
operations in Dhi Qar and Muthanna Provinces following the
transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqis in Muthanna
Province -- but on the condition that Iraq clearly and
unambiguously consents to each specific operation. Charge
stated that this condition would not be acceptable to either
the USG or to MNF-I. Brown further announced that Australia
had decided not to participate in a PRT. Charge said that
this was a serious disappointment and urged Brown to seek
reconsideration of that decision. Mission believes that we
should not accede to the prior consent condition, and we
should try to bring Canberra back into some form of working
with a PRT. END SUMMARY.


2. (C/REL AS, UK) Australian Ambassador Brown delivered a
demarche to Charge and POLMIL Counselor on June 17 as a
follow-on to the June 15 Quadrilateral and subsequent
bilateral AU-UK meetings in London. Brown said that similar
demarches were being made in capitals and by the Australian
military team at Camp Victory to MNF-I. Australia would
participate in Coalition military overwatch missions, Brown
stated, subject to a satisfactory Implementing Arrangement
between the Coalition and the GOI. Specifically, Brown
explained, Australia would support broader security
operations as required in Dhi Qar and Muthanna provinces; the
Australian forces would relocate to Talil Air Base once their
security mission in support of Japanese troops in Muthanna
was complete. The Australian proposal included a requirement
for "clear and unambiguous Iraqi consent for each specific
operation." (See para 6 for full text of Aide Memoire.)


3. (C/ REL AS, UK) Brown also informed Charge that Australia
will not take part in a PRT in Iraq because of concern for
local Iraqi resentment of Coalition presence and because

involvement in a PRT with limited assets would detract from
Australia's operational overwatch mission.


4. (C/ REL AS, UK) Charge informed Brown that Embassy would
convey these points to Washington. Charge cautioned Brown,
however, that MNF-I and the USG likely would not accept any
requirement to obtain Iraqi consent for Coalition military
operations in advance, which would be inconsistent with
current obligations to protect Iraq's security under UNSCR
1546 and 1637. Such a restriction, Charge explained, also
would contravene our requirements for freedom of movement,
which the GOI has accepted. Finally, Charge noted, the
transfer of security responsibility in Muthanna Province does
not remove MNF-I's continuing responsibility for overall
command and control of all Coalition and Iraqi Security
Forces (Iraqi Army and National Police). Charge added that
he was very disappointed with Canberra's decision on PRT
participation and pressed to see if locating the PRT on
Tallil Air Force Base might change the Australian
government's decision. Brown responded that it would not.

5 (C/ REL AS, UK) COMMENT: The transition of security for
Muthanna Province was announced by the PM on June 19. We
believe that keeping the Australians on board including in
some way in the PRT is important, but we must not accede to
this request for prior Iraqi consent. Persuading the
Australians to do so is best dealt with in capitals. We also
do not know what the GOA meant in the fourth paragraph of the
Aide Memoire (nor did Ambassador Brown),except for a
possible reference to rules of engagement and other national
constraints. This could be fleshed out in capitals as well.
We request that Washington and Canberra keep us apprised of
developments. END COMMENT.

--------------
AIDE MEMOIRE
--------------


6. (C/ REL AS, UK) BEGIN TEXT (sic): The Australian
Delegation the 15 June Quadrilateral Meeting in London held a
number of bilateral Meetings. The following day with the UK
Ministry of Defence and the FCO at which they:

Sought to have the National-Level Implementing Agreement
between the GOI and MNF-I include a specific exchange of

written instruments in the event Coalition Forces are
requested to assist the ISF in crisis re-intervention
operations under operational overwatch.

Stressed the need to ensure there was clear and unambiguous
Iraqi consent for each specific operation.

Recommended that the provincial-level agreement between the
Iraqi Governor of Al Muthanna province and MND-SE include a
reference to respective Coalition Partners' national command
elements and processes.

UK interlocutors undertook to attempt to have appropriate
language to this effect inserted in the respective
agreements. END TEXT.
SPECKHARD