IMPLICATIONS OF SUNNI COALITION SPLIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001690

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PNAT PTER IZ
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF SUNNI COALITION SPLIT

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 1664

B. B) BAGHDAD 1623

C. C) BAGHDAD 1613

D. D) BAGHDAD 1566

E. E) BAGHDAD 1484

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Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The simmering conflict within the Sunni
Tawafuq bloc exploded on May 20 when Adb Nasir al-Janabi
lead a walkout by about a dozen of the 59 Sunni Arab CoR
members during Prime Minister Maliki's presentation of the
cabinet (reftel A). The walkout was a manifestation of a
long standing leadership struggle among the three Tawafuq
leaders. Tarik Hashimi's Iraqi Islamic Party, with 26 of
Tawafuq's 44 CoR seats, played a dominant role in
government formation talks to the chagrin of its Tawafuq
Front partners. The walkout over the nomination of the
Defense and Interior Ministers threatened a breakup of the
Tawafuq bloc, with Khalaf Alayan's National Dialogue
Council (INDC) leaving, perhaps to re-form an alliance with
Saleh Mutlak's Hewar. Left unchecked, this split could
lead to the INDC and Hewar leaving the parliament as well
as the government. Should that occur, Speaker Mahmud
Mashadani told us May 21 that he would feel pressured to
resign. In the best case, the INDC can be cajoled back
into government leaving only Saleh Mutlak in the Sunni Arab
political opposition. In the worst case, Mutlak and Alayan
will join forces in that opposition, label IIP leaders
agents of the occupation, and complicate the efforts of the
national unity government to end the insurgency. The
Ambassador has been urging Khalaf Alayan to be reasonable
in his expectations. End summary.

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CoR Walkout Symptom of Deep Division in Tawafuq
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2. (C) The May 20 walkout by the Iraqi National Dialogue
Council as PM Nuri Maliki's government was being voted on
(reftel A) was a manifestation of a leadership struggle
within the Tawafuq. The long-simmering dispute over which
of the three Tawafuq leaders, Tariq al-Hashimi of the Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP),Adnan Dulaymi of the General
Conference of the Iraqi People (GCIP) or Sheykh Khalaf
Alayan of the Iraqi National Dialogue Council (INDC),spoke
for the Sunni Arab "street" has been in the background
since the December 15 CoR election (reftels B-E). The
tensions exploded on May 20 in the presence of Ambassador
Khalilzad (who was attempting to mediate the dispute
immediately before the CoR session). Khalaf Alayan, Abd
al-Nasir al-Janabi and Hewar's Saleh Mutlaq ganged up on
Adnan Dulaymi and shouted him down. Al-Janabi lost his
temper, shoutingat Dulaymi "no one appointed you to
represent the Sunnis!" Mutlak yelled at Dulaymi that "you
stole two of my ministries" and after being asked by
Dulaymi to be civil responded "you have not been civil a
day in your life." (COMMENT: The significance of this
shocking performance cannot be overstated. The public and
rude rebuke of the octogenarian Sunni leader broke many
taboos and was unacceptable in this culture. Outgoing
Prime Minister Ja'fari, also present during the exchange,
was visibly stunned. END COMMENT) Al-Janabi pinpointed
the nature of the conflict when he fumed "we will never
allow the IIP to take over Iraqi Sunni Arabs and bring in
imported leaders". (Note: The latter was a reference to
IIP's Tariq Hashimi, who spent many years abroad during the
Saddam period. It also reminds of the tensions between
Iraqi political figures who took refuge abroad and those
Iraqis who stayed inside Iraq throughout the Saddam era.
End note.)


3. (C) The IIP won 26 of Tawafuq's 44 CoR seats, and with
455 offices around Iraq, has the organization and
infrastructure necessary for a political party. Neither
Dulaymi's General Conference nor Alayan's National Dialog
Council can muster any such organization. Yet the IIP's
primacy in the Tawafuq was never accepted by junior
partners INDC and GCIP who believe that the Tawafuq owes
its popular support to backing from Adnan Dulaymi and
Sheykh Khalaf Alayan. Al-Janabi told Poloffs on May 20
that the IIP is "nothing" - "we represent the street and
the insurgents." Al-Janabi was still visibly shaken hours
after the confrontation with Dulaymi, and had tears in his
eyes when he spoke to Poloffs. GCIP leader Hassan Bazzaz
blustered to Poloff on May 21 that Sunni Arabs did not know
anyone from the IIP list and voted on December 15 for known
names like Adnan Dulaymi.

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Tawafuq Partners Unhappy with IIP Leadership
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4. (C) The specific issue that led to the fallout in
Tawafuq was the charge that IIP dominated the negotiations
for government positions and did not consult with the other
two parties. Abd al-Nasir al-Janabi said on May 20 that
the INDC was not consulted on positions. Bazzaz told
Poloff on May 21 that the IIP's Ali Baban led the
government negotiations for the Tawafuq, and Dulaymi was
also not consulted on the ministries. Bazzaz was still
angry that on the morning of May 20, Dulaymi had told him
that Bazzaz would be Minister of State for Foreign Affairs,
a job that went to IIP's Rafia al-Issawi a few hours later.
Echoing al-Janabi's sentiment, Bazazz said the IIP walked
away with most of the ministerial slots. Bazzaz said that
Dulaymi was also unhappy with the IIP but would not
publicly oppose the IIP since they shared the same Muslim
Brotherhood roots. Poloff countered that Deputy Prime
Minister Salam al-Zawbai was a Dulaymi nominee. Bazzaz
laughed and said al-Zawbai is quote 2/3 IIP and 1/3 Dulaymi
General Conference end quote and repeated the claim that
all the Tawafuq people who got positions were from the IIP.


5. (C) IIP negotiator Ali Baban dismissed their account and
told Poloff on May 21 that he consulted with the Tawafuq
leaders "from time to time." He said he could not take
everyone to the negotiating meetings and he could not make
everyone happy. He seemed little concerned about the split
within Tawafuq ranks.

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INDC May Split from Tawafuq
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6. (C) Janabi announced the withdrawal from the government
on May 20 in the name of Tawafuq though only he and his
friends from the National Dialog Council (INDC) actually
walked out of the chambers, along with Hewar's Saleh Mutlak
and several of his Hewar members. Janabi held out the
possibility of re-joining the government but only if Khalaf
Alayan becomes Minister of Defense. Poloff May 20 reminded
al-Janabi that Mahmud Mashadani, an INDC member, was
Speaker of the CoR, a top leadership position. Hassan
Bazzaz dismised al-Janabi's threats and said the INDC was
only interested in positions for themselves.

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Tough Choice for Mashadani
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7. (C) Ahmed Mashadani, the Speaker's son and aide, told
Poloff after the CoR session on May 20 that his father had
lost a lifetime friend (referring to al-Janabi) when he did
not join in the INDC walkout. Mahmud Mashadani later
called Poloff May 20 and said that the INDC and Mutlak must
be brought back into government. The street is very
unhappy, he added. At a May 21 meeting with PolOffs,
Mashadani seemed desperate for a "win" that would appeal to
the more sectarian elements on the Sunni Arab street. He
said that the May 20 session presented a conflict between
his heart, which was with his INDC brothers, and his brain,
which dictated that the government must be installed. He
said that if the Sunni Arab leaders in office failed to
satisfy their constituency, new leaders would emerge to
replace them. Mashadani pleaded for USG support for Shaykh
Khalaf Alayan as Defense Minister, arguing that it would be
fair exchange for the Shia Islamist Coalition putting "a
killer" like Bayan Jabr into the Finance Ministry. He
remained silent when PolOff said that both the Defense and
Interior Ministries should be led by competent
professionals with cross-sectarian credibiliy. Mashadani
further argued that Alayan would have greater motivation
and ability than any other candidate to mobilize support in
his native Anbar against foreign fighters and terrorists.
He charged that Sunni Arabs were fearful of the presence of
around a dozen "Iranian agents" among parliament and
alleged that Minister of State Hasan Radhi al-Sari also
took his orders from Tehran.


8. (C) Abd al-Nasir al-Janabi claimed Poloff on May 20 that
Mashadani was told to stay in the government for now and
that is why he did not join the boycott. (Comment: Based on
what Mashadani and his son said immediately after the
session, al-Janabi's assertion was likely at attempt to
save face. But should the walkout not be resolved, and if
the INDC remains out of government, Mashadani will face
more pressure from his own immediate political allies to
resign the Speaker's post. End comment.) Mashadani said on
May 21 that he being asked why he is not with his brothers
- even being accused of being an American agent.

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IIP Not Concerned
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9. (C) Poloff asked IIP negotiator Ali Baban on May 21 what
the IIP was doing to resolve the conflict. Baban said that
the IIP hoped to resolve the situation within a few days -
"if we get to nominate Defense and Interior." He said
that Tariq al-Hashimi called Khalaf Alayan late on May 20
and other meetings were held with IIP and INDC leaders.
Khalaf will come back into to government, Baban predicted.
He will eventually see that he will have to work with the
IIP, he concluded.

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Comment
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10. (C) The tensions within Tawafuq reflect the intensity
of competition among Sunni Arab leaders for popular support
within the relatively narrow base of Iraq's Sunni Arab
population. The Tawafuq split could have consequences for
the national unity government's ability to reduce Sunni
Arab support for the insurgency. While Alayan, al-Janabi
and their colleagues in the parliament are only seven in
number, all come from the "hot" Sunni areas of Anbar,
Baghdad and north Babil. A breakup within the bloc could
leave Tarik al-Hashimi and the IIP are vulnerable to attack
of having sold out to the "occupation". Mutlak in
opposition alone (we expect that most of his Hewar CoR
members will join Tawafuq) is inconvenient but manageable -
especially if the government acts to stem sectarian
violence and government human rights abuses. Mutlak re-
joining forces with Khalaf's INDC, and perhaps leaving not
just the government but also the parliament, would be more
problematic. The Ambassador has met several times with
Khalaf Alayan and his allies to urge them to be reasonable
in their expectations and accept compromises. Moreover, we
can mitigate the negatives by helping Sunni Arab leaders
in the government demonstrate the advantage of their
participation to their constituents. Part of this will be
working to ensure the new government takes concrete steps
on de-Ba'athification, investigation of human rights
abuses, a tough stance on militias and other measures to
promote national reconciliation.
KHALILZAD